Igor Erovenko

Dr. Igor Erovenko

Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of North Carolina, Greensboro, NC 27402, USA
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 January 2018 in Royal Society Open Science
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ABAndrew Brettin
Andrew Brettin
RRRosa Rossi–Goldthorpe
Rosa Rossi–Goldthorpe
KWKyle Weishaar
Kyle Weishaar
IEIgor Erovenko
Igor Erovenko
Ebola virus disease (EVD) is a severe infection with an extremely high fatality rate spread through direct contact with body fluids. A promising Ebola vaccine (rVSV-ZEBOV) may soon become universally available. We constructed a game-theoretic model of Ebola incorporating individual decisions to vaccinate. We found that if a population adopts selfishly optimal vaccination strategies, then the population vaccination coverage falls negligibly short of the herd immunity level. We concluded that eradication of Ebola is feasible if voluntary vaccination programmes are coupled with focused public education efforts. We conducted uncertainty and sensitivity analysis to demonstrate that our findings do not depend on the choice of the epidemiological model parameters.

10 September 2018 in Bulletin of Mathematical Biology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
JKJulia Kobe
Julia Kobe
NPNeil Pritchard
Neil Pritchard
ZSZiaqueria Short
Ziaqueria Short
IEIgor Erovenko
Igor Erovenko
Jan RychtarJan Rychtar
Jan Rychtar
JRJonathan T. Rowell
Jonathan T. Rowell

31 July 2006 in Journal of Number Theory
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
IEIgor Erovenko
Igor Erovenko
ARAndrei S. Rapinchuk
Andrei S. Rapinchuk

2 September 2020 in Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CACarmen B. Acosta-Alonzo
Carmen B. Acosta-Alonzo
IEIgor Erovenko
Igor Erovenko
ALAaleah Lancaster
Aaleah Lancaster
HOHyunju Oh
Hyunju Oh
Jan RychtarJan Rychtar
Jan Rychtar
DTDewey Taylor
Dewey Taylor
Typhoid fever has long established itself endemically in rural Ghana despite the availability of cheap and effective vaccines. We used a game-theoretic model to investigate whether the low vaccination coverage in Ghana could be attributed to rational human behaviour. We adopted a version of an epidemiological model of typhoid fever dynamics, which accounted not only for chronic life-long carriers but also for a short-cycle transmission in the immediate environment and a long-cycle transmission via contamination of the water supply. We calibrated the model parameters based on the known incidence data. We found that unless the (perceived) cost of vaccination is negligible, the individually optimal population vaccination rate falls significantly short of the societally optimal population vaccination rate needed to reach herd immunity. We expressed both the herd immunity and the optimal equilibrium vaccination rates in terms of only a few observable parameters such as the incidence rate, demographics, vaccine waning rate and the perceived cost of vaccination relative to the cost of infection. This allowed us not to rely on other uncertain epidemiological model parameters and, in particular, to bypass uncertainties about the role of the carriers in the transmission.

9 October 2019 in Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
IEIgor Erovenko
Igor Erovenko
JBJohann Bauer
Johann Bauer
MBMark Broom
Mark Broom
KPKaran Pattni
Karan Pattni
Jan RychtarJan Rychtar
Jan Rychtar
We model a mobile population interacting over an underlying spatial structure using a Markov movement model. Interactions take the form of public goods games, and can feature an arbitrary group size. Individuals choose strategically to remain at their current location or to move to a neighbouring location, depending upon their exploration strategy and the current composition of their group. This builds upon previous work where the underlying structure was a complete graph (i.e. there was effectively no structure). Here, we consider alternative network structures and a wider variety of, mainly larger, populations. Previously, we had found when cooperation could evolve, depending upon the values of a range of population parameters. In our current work, we see that the complete graph considered before promotes stability, with populations of cooperators or defectors being relatively hard to replace. By contrast, the star graph promotes instability, and often neither type of population can resist replacement. We discuss potential reasons for this in terms of network topology.

27 June 2020 in Dynamic Games and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MBMark Broom
Mark Broom
IEIgor Erovenko
Igor Erovenko
Jan RychtarJan Rychtar
Jan Rychtar
We consider models of evolution in structured populations involving multiplayer games. Whilst also discussing other models, we focus on the modelling framework developed by Broom and Rychtář (J Theor Biol 302:70–80, 2012) onwards. This includes key progress so far, the main gaps and limitations, the relationship and synergies with other models and a discussion of the direction of future work. In this regard as well as discussing existing work, there is some new research on the applicability and robustness of current models with respect to using them to model real populations. This is an important potential advance, as previously all of the work has been entirely theoretical. In particular, the most complex models will have many parameters, and we concentrate on considering simpler versions with a small number of parameters which still possess the key features which would make them applicable. We find that these models are generally robust, in particular issues that can arise related to small payoff changes at critical values and removal of pivotal vertices would have similar effects on other modelling system including evolutionary graph theory. These often occur where it can be argued that there is a lack of robustness in the real system that the model faithfully picks up, and so is not a problematic feature.