Against the background of China’s “dual carbon” goals and the continued advancement of the green and low-carbon transformation of resource-based industries, resource-based enterprises urgently need to rely on green innovation to overcome development constraints characterized by high resource dependence, strong environmental pressures, and mounting transformation challenges. Patient capital, with its long-term orientation, stable support, and risk-sharing characteristics, can provide sustained financial backing and governance support for green innovation in resource-based enterprises; however, its underlying mechanism remains to be further explored. Drawing on patient capital theory, this study constructs a “capital–ESG–innovation” analytical framework to examine the impact of patient capital on green innovation in resource-based enterprises and its mechanism of action. Using Chinese A-share listed resource-based enterprises from 2014 to 2023 as the research sample, this study measures patient capital from two dimensions, namely stable equity and relational debt, and conducts empirical analysis through panel regression and multiple robustness tests. The results show that patient capital significantly promotes green innovation in resource-based enterprises, with both relational debt and stable equity playing positive roles. Mechanism tests reveal that ESG performance serves as an important mediating channel through which patient capital promotes green innovation. Further analysis indicates that the level of regional marketization strengthens the green innovation effect of patient capital, and this effect is more pronounced in large enterprises, enterprises subject to stronger media supervision, and enterprises whose executives have higher green cognition. This study enriches the literature on the relationship between patient capital and green innovation and provides empirical evidence for cultivating long-term capital and promoting the green and low-carbon transformation of resource-based enterprises.

Amid mounting environmental pressures and tightening resource constraints in China’s cities, advancing zero-waste city initiatives has become a critical avenue for sustainable urban governance. Zero-waste cities not only improve environmental quality but also enhance resource recycling and foster innovative urban governance models. This study develops an evolutionary game model that incorporates prospect theory to examine the strategic interactions between provincial and local governments. The results show that: (1) each side’s subjective perception of gains and losses significantly shapes its willingness to cooperate; (2) incentives and penalties exert asymmetric effects over the course of policy evolution: subsidies matter most during initiation, penalties are pivotal for overcoming resistance in the transition phase, and non-material incentives become increasingly important as the governance system matures; (3) zero-waste city development follows a three-stage evolutionary trajectory, moving from pilot programs to self-sustaining local governance. Using numerical simulations, this research further assesses how key parameters affect the strategic choices of both levels of government, generating policy-relevant insights for municipal solid waste management and intergovernmental cooperation in zero-waste city governance.

Toxic metal pollution in farmland soils has become a critical environmental issue threatening land security and agricultural sustainability. This study develops an evolutionary game model involving the government, enterprises, the public, and environmental public-interest organizations to analyze the dynamic interactions underlying multi-actor governance. By combining equilibrium analysis with numerical simulations, the study examines the conditions for collaborative governance and the effects of key parameters on the system’s evolution. The results reveal a stage-based trajectory: weak regulation and limited participation in the early stage lead to persistent illegal discharge; strengthened government intervention and rising social participation in the transitional stage promote more coordinated supervision, although enterprises may still behave non-compliantly; in the mature stage, favorable cost–benefit conditions induce enterprises to adopt compliant treatment, reducing reliance on continuous external oversight. Further analysis shows that effective incentive and deterrence mechanisms are essential for activating multi-actor responses, while enterprises’ strategies are mainly driven by pollution-control costs, expected returns, and potential losses, and social participation depends on monitoring costs, expected benefits, and government support. Initial strategy distributions have limited influence on long-term outcomes. These findings provide policy-relevant insights for improving institutional design and strengthening collaborative governance in the management of toxic metal pollution in China’s farmland soils.