There are persistent tensions of both a technical and political nature between Southeast Asia’s two major palm oil producers, Indonesia and Malaysia, and the sustainability governance mechanisms shaping global environmental and trade standards emerging from Europe. The establishment of the national Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) certification standard in 2011 is a sign of discontent with the transnational Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) regime, sparking debate about the legitimacy of private governance models initiated by non-governmental organizations and companies in Europe. This article questions whether the adoption of sustainability norms by Indonesia signals normative convergence or the emergence of rival governance structures that challenge the state. Evidence suggests that elements of norm adoption and rival governance coexist in Indonesia and that ISPO certification is an ambiguous policy with degrees of internal incoherence. The ambiguous nature of ISPO certification gives rise to unresolved disputes over power and authority between various actors. This article shows how these disputes came into being by framing these dynamics as part of a long historical process. Novel insights are gained by employing the state transformation framework and the concept of governance rescaling. Within this framework, we argue that the ambiguous nature of the ISPO results from complex interrelated processes of fragmentation, decentralization and the internationalization of the Indonesian state.
Since 1982, haze pollution has become an almost annual occurrence in Southeast Asia, with the worst episodes being in the period of 1997–1998 and in 2006–2007. Haze originates from peat and forest fires, mostly in Indonesia. The negative effects of haze can be observed at the global level, with increased carbon emissions exacerbating climate change, and more importantly at the regional level, with serious environmental and socioeconomic effects in Indonesia and its neighbouring countries. Most of these fires are manmade, and can be traced back to land-clearing activities of commercial oil palm plantations. This article questions why these companies have been able to burn with such impunity, even though using fire for land clearing is against Indonesian law. It argues that local and foreign plantation companies have cultivated strong patronage linkages with key patrons among the ruling elite. Hence, patrons are encouraged to protect their clients from the repercussions of their actions. This weakens the power of the state in terms of law enforcement, where national laws against the use of fire are thus rendered useless in the face of powerful economic interests. Well-connected companies therefore continue to use fire as a cost-efficient way to clear land while disregarding its serious environmental and socioeconomic implications.
23 May 2013 in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics