Setayesh Radkani

Dr. Setayesh Radkani

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 April 2026 in Nature
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
BABalazs Aczel
Balazs Aczel
BSBarnabas Szaszi
Barnabas Szaszi
HCHarry T. Clelland
Harry T. Clelland
MKMarton Kovacs
Marton Kovacs
FHFelix Holzmeister
Felix Holzmeister
BNBrian A. Nosek
Brian A. Nosek

1 October 2024 in PNAS Nexus
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SRSetayesh Radkani
Setayesh Radkani
MLMarika Landau-Wells
Marika Landau-Wells
RSRebecca Saxe
Rebecca Saxe
In polarized societies, divided subgroups of people have different perspectives on a range of topics. Aiming to reduce polarization, authorities may use debunking to lend support to one perspective over another. Debunking by authorities gives all observers shared information, which could reduce disagreement. In practice, however, debunking may have no effect or could even contribute to further polarization of beliefs. We developed a cognitively inspired model of observers’ rational inferences from an authority’s debunking. After observing each debunking attempt, simulated observers simultaneously update their beliefs about the perspective underlying the debunked claims and about the authority’s motives, using an intuitive causal model of the authority’s decision-making process. We varied the observers’ prior beliefs and uncertainty systematically. Simulations generated a range of outcomes, from belief convergence (less common) to persistent divergence (more common). In many simulations, observers who initially held shared beliefs about the authority later acquired polarized beliefs about the authority’s biases and commitment to truth. These polarized beliefs constrained the authority’s influence on new topics, making it possible for belief polarization to spread. We discuss the implications of the model with respect to beliefs about elections.

4 August 2025 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Journal Article
Open access
SRSetayesh Radkani
Setayesh Radkani
JTJoshua B. Tenenbaum
Joshua B. Tenenbaum
RSRebecca Saxe
Rebecca Saxe
Authorities, from parents of toddlers to leaders of formal institutions, use punishment to communicate disapproval and enforce social norms. Ideally, from whether and how severely a transgression is punished, targets and observers infer shared social norms. Yet in light of every punitive choice, observers also evaluate the motives and legitimacy of the authority. Here, we show that the effects of punishment can only be understood by considering these inferences simultaneously. We measured human observers’ joint inferences empirically in three preregistered experiments ( N = 1 , 254 ) and developed a rational Bayesian model using an inverse planning framework that captures and explains these inferences and their interactions quantitatively and parsimoniously. When people have different priors about norms or authorities, the model predicted and we experimentally confirmed that observing punishment by the authority can sustain polarization. This work reveals the rational logic behind how people learn from punishment and a key constraint on the function of punishment in establishing shared social norms.

7 January 2026 in Nature
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Journal Article
Open access
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RCRuidong Chen
Ruidong Chen
SRSetayesh Radkani
Setayesh Radkani
NVNeelima Valluru
Neelima Valluru
SYSeng Bum Michael Yoo
Seng Bum Michael Yoo
MJMehrdad Jazayeri
Mehrdad Jazayeri
We use our experiences to form and update beliefs about the hidden states of the world1,2,3. When possible, we also gather evidence by observing others. However, how the brain integrates experiential and observational evidence is not understood. We studied the dynamics of evidence integration in a two-player game with volatile hidden states. Both humans and monkeys successfully updated their beliefs while playing the game and observing their partner, although less effectively when observing. Electrophysiological recordings in animals revealed that the anterior cingulate cortex integrates independent sources of experiential and observational evidence into a coherent neural representation of dynamic belief about the environment’s state. The geometry of population activity revealed the computational architecture of this integration and provided a neural account of the behavioural asymmetry between experiential and observational evidence accumulation. This work lays the groundwork for understanding the neural mechanisms underlying evidence accumulation in social contexts in the primate brain.

2 June 2023 in PsyArXiv
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Preprint
Open access
SRSetayesh Radkani
Setayesh Radkani
RSRebecca Saxe
Rebecca Saxe
Punishment is a cost imposed on a target, in response to an undesirable action. Yet choosing to punish also reveals information about the authority’s own motives and values. We propose that observers jointly infer the wrongness of the action and the authority’s motivations. Using hypothetical scenarios in unfamiliar societies, we experimentally manipulated observers’ prior beliefs and measured human observers’ inferences after observing punishment. These inferences were recapitulated in a formal model that inverts an intuitive causal model of authorities who make rational choices about punishment by weighing its costs and benefits (i.e. utilities). An essential component of this model, driving these inferences, is that legitimate authorities consider the utility of a proportional response to harmful actions, which depends on the balance between the wrongness of the act and the severity of the punishment.

25 October 2022 in PsyArXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
SRSetayesh Radkani
Setayesh Radkani
EHEleanor Holton
Eleanor Holton
BCBenoît de Courson
Benoît de Courson
RSRebecca Saxe
Rebecca Saxe
DNDaniel Nettle
Daniel Nettle
People facing material deprivation are more likely to turn to acquisitive crime, but it is not clear why. Recent theory suggests that people should be more willing to steal if they are on the wrong side of a ‘desperation threshold’; that is, a level of resources critical to wellbeing. Below such a threshold, people should pursue any risky behaviour that offers the possibility of a short route back above, and should be insensitive to the severity of possible punishments, since they have little left to lose. We developed a multi-player economic game with a desperation threshold and the possibility of theft as well as cooperation. Across four experiments with 1000 UK and US adults, we showed that falling short of a desperation threshold increased stealing from other players. Within the microsocieties created in the game, the presence of more players with below-threshold resources produced low trust, driven by the experience of being stolen from. Contrary to predictions, our participants appeared to be somewhat sensitive to the severity of punishment for being caught trying to steal. Our results show, in an experimental microcosm, that some members of society falling short of a threshold of material desperation can have powerful social consequences.