27 August 2018 in Nature Human Behaviour
1 September 2020 in Management Science
Risk is an integral part of many economic decisions and is vitally important in finance. Despite extensive research on decision making under risk, little is known about how risks are actually perceived by financial professionals, the key players in global financial markets. In a large-scale survey experiment with 2,213 finance professionals and 4,559 laypeople in nine countries representing ~50% of the world’s population and more than 60% of the world’s gross domestic product, we expose participants to return distributions with equal expected return, and we systematically vary the distributions’ next three higher moments. Of these, skewness is the only moment that systematically affects financial professionals’ perception of financial risk. Strikingly, variance does not influence risk perception, even though return volatility is the most common risk measure in finance in both academia and the industry. When testing other, compound risk measures, the probability to experience losses is the strongest predictor of what is perceived as being risky. Analyzing professionals’ propensity to invest, skewness and loss probability also have strong predictive power, while volatility and kurtosis have some additional effect. Our results are very similar for laypeople, and they are robust across and within countries with different cultural backgrounds, as well as for different job fields of professionals. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, decision analysis.
30 July 2024 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
A typical empirical study involves choosing a sample, a research design, and an analysis path. Variation in such choices across studies leads to heterogeneity in results that introduce an additional layer of uncertainty, limiting the generalizability of published scientific findings. We provide a framework for studying heterogeneity in the social sciences and divide heterogeneity into population, design, and analytical heterogeneity. Our framework suggests that after accounting for heterogeneity, the probability that the tested hypothesis is true for the average population, design, and analysis path can be much lower than implied by nominal error rates of statistically significant individual studies. We estimate each type's heterogeneity from 70 multilab replication studies, 11 prospective meta-analyses of studies employing different experimental designs, and 5 multianalyst studies. In our data, population heterogeneity tends to be relatively small, whereas design and analytical heterogeneity are large. Our results should, however, be interpreted cautiously due to the limited number of studies and the large uncertainty in the heterogeneity estimates. We discuss several ways to parse and account for heterogeneity in the context of different methodologies.
4 September 2018 in Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science
The self-concept maintenance theory holds that many people will cheat in order to maximize self-profit, but only to the extent that they can do so while maintaining a positive self-concept. Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008, Experiment 1) gave participants an opportunity and incentive to cheat on a problem-solving task. Prior to that task, participants either recalled the Ten Commandments (a moral reminder) or recalled 10 books they had read in high school (a neutral task). Results were consistent with the self-concept maintenance theory. When given the opportunity to cheat, participants given the moral-reminder priming task reported solving 1.45 fewer matrices than did those given a neutral prime (Cohen’s d = 0.48); moral reminders reduced cheating. Mazar et al.’s article is among the most cited in deception research, but their Experiment 1 has not been replicated directly. This Registered Replication Report describes the aggregated result of 25 direct replications (total N = 5,786), all of which followed the same preregistered protocol. In the primary meta-analysis (19 replications, total n = 4,674), participants who were given an opportunity to cheat reported solving 0.11 more matrices if they were given a moral reminder than if they were given a neutral reminder (95% confidence interval = [−0.09, 0.31]). This small effect was numerically in the opposite direction of the effect observed in the original study (Cohen’s d = −0.04).