It is very challenging to detect traffic signs using a high-precision real-time approach in realistic scenes with respect to driver-assistance systems for driving vehicles and autonomous driving. To address this challenge, in this paper, a new detection scheme (named MSA_YOLOv3) is proposed to accurately achieve real-time localization and classification of small traffic signs. First, data augmentation is achieved using image mixup technology. Second, a multi-scale spatial pyramid pooling block is introduced into the Darknet53 network to enable the network to learn object features more comprehensively. Finally, a bottom-up augmented path is designed to enhance the feature pyramid in YOLOv3, and the result is to achieve accurate localization of objects by utilizing fine-grained features effectively in the lower layers. According to the tests on the TT100K dataset (which is a dataset for traffic sign detection), the performance of the proposed MSA_YOLOv3 is better than that of YOLOv3 in detecting small traffic signs. The detection speed of MSA_YOLOv3 is 23.81 FPS, and the mAP (mean Average Precision) reaches up to 86%.
With wide development of various information technologies, our daily activities are becoming deeply dependent on cyberspace. People often use handheld devices (e.g., mobile phones or laptops) to publish social messages, facilitate remote e-health diagnosis, or monitor a variety of surveillance. However, security insurance for these activities remains as a significant challenge. Representation of security purposes and their enforcement are two main issues in security of cyberspace. To address these challenging issues, we propose a Cyberspace-oriented Access Control model (CoAC) for cyberspace whose typical usage scenario is as follows. Users leverage devices via network of networks to access sensitive objects with temporal and spatial limitations. We generalize subjects and objects in cyberspace and propose scene-based access control. To enforce security purposes, we argue that all operations on information in cyberspace are combinations of atomic operations. If every single atomic operation is secure, then the cyberspace is secure. Taking applications in the browser-server architecture as an example, we present seven atomic operations for these applications. A number of cases demonstrate that operations in these applications are combinations of introduced atomic operations. We also design a series of security policies for each atomic operation. Finally, we demonstrate both feasibility and flexibility of our CoAC model by examples.
With limited computing resources and a lack of physical lines of defense, the Internet of Things (IoT) has become a focus of cyberattacks. In recent years, outbreak propagation attacks against the IoT have occurred frequently, and these attacks are often strategical. In order to detect the outbreak propagation as soon as possible, t embedded Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are widely deployed in the IoT. This paper tackles the problem of outbreak detection in adversarial environment in the IoT. A dynamic scheduling strategy based on specific IDSs monitoring of IoT devices is proposed to avoid strategic attacks. Firstly, we formulate the interaction between the defender and attacker as a Stackelberg game in which the defender first chooses a set of device nodes to activate, and then the attacker selects one seed (one device node) to spread the worms. This yields an extremely complex bilevel optimization problem. Our approach is to build a modified Column Generation framework for computing the optimal strategy effectively. The optimal response of the defender’s problem is expressed as mixed-integer linear programming (MILPs). It is proved that the solution of the defender’s optimal response is a NP-hard problem. Moreover, the optimal response of defenders is improved by an approximate algorithm--a greedy algorithm. Finally, the proposed scheme is tested on some randomly generated instances. The experimental results show that the scheme is effective for monitoring optimal scheduling.
Personal data custodian services enable data owners to share their data with data consumers in a convenient manner, anytime and anywhere. However, with data hosted in these services being beyond the control of the data owners, it raises significant concerns about privacy in personal data sharing. Many schemes have been proposed to realize fine-grained access control and privacy protection in data sharing. However, they fail to protect the rights of data owners to their data under the law, since their designs focus on the management of system administrators rather than enhancing the data owners’ privacy. In this paper, we introduce a novel task-driven personal data sharing system based on the data capsule paradigm realizing personal data sharing autonomy. It enables data owners in our system to fully control their data, and share it autonomously. Specifically, we present a tamper-resistant data capsule encapsulation method, where the data capsule is the minimal unit for independent and secure personal data storage and sharing. Additionally, to realize selective sharing and informed-consent based authorization, we propose a task-driven data sharing mechanism that is resistant to collusion and EDoS attacks. Furthermore, by updating parts of the data capsules, the permissions granted to data consumers can be immediately revoked. Finally, we conduct a security and performance analysis, proving that our scheme is correct, sound, and secure, as well as revealing more advantageous features in practicality, compared with the state-of-the-art schemes.
20 May 2018 in Security and Communication Networks
Security measurement matters to every stakeholder in network security. It provides security practitioners the exact security awareness. However, most of the works are not applicable to the unknown threat. What is more, existing efforts on security metric mainly focus on the ease of certain attack from a theoretical point of view, ignoring the “likelihood of exploitation.” To help administrator have a better understanding, we analyze the behavior of attackers who exploit the zero-day vulnerabilities and predict their attack timing. Based on the prediction, we propose a method of security measurement. In detail, we compute the optimal attack timing from the perspective of attacker, using a long-term game to estimate the risk of being found and then choose the optimal timing based on the risk and profit. We design a learning strategy to model the information sharing mechanism among multiattackers and use spatial structure to model the long-term process. After calculating the Nash equilibrium for each subgame, we consider the likelihood of being attacked for each node as the security metric result. The experiment results show the efficiency of our approach.