Significant effort has been exerted on the study of economic variables such as absolute energy prices to understand energy consumption and economic growth. However, this approach ignores general inflation effects, whereby the prices of baskets of goods may rise or fall at different rates from those of energy prices. Thus, it may be the relative energy price, not the absolute energy price, that has most important effects on energy consumption. To test this hypothesis, we introduce a new explanatory variable, the domestic relative energy price, which we define as “the ratio of domestic energy prices to the general price level of an economy,” and we test the explanatory power of this new variable. Thus, this paper explores the relationship between relative energy prices and energy consumption in China from the perspective of inflation costs over the period from 1988 to 2012. The direct, regulatory and time-varying effects are captured using methods such as ridge regression and the state-space model. The direct impacts of relative energy prices on total energy consumption and intensity are −0.337 and −0.250, respectively; the effects of comprehensive regulation on energy consumption through the economic structure and the energy structure are −0.144 and −0.148, respectively; and the depressing and upward effects of rising and falling energy prices on energy consumption are 0.3520 and 0.3564, respectively. When economic growth and the energy price level were stable, inflation persisted; thus, rising energy prices benefitted both the economy and the environment. Our analysis is important for policy makers to establish effective energy-pricing policies that ensure both energy conservation and the stability of the pricing system.

We investigate a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) where the retailer and the third-party recycler compete against each other to collect waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) given that collection effort is their private information. Using the principle-agent theory, we develop a CLSC model with dual collection channel without the government’s reward–penalty mechanism (RPM). An information screening contract is designed for the manufacturer to attain real information on collection effort levels; meanwhile, the optimal decision-making results of other decision variables are derived. Next, we take RPM into account to further examine the efficacy of the government’s guidance mechanism in improving collection rate and profits of CLSC members. Our results indicate that (i) the collection competition reduces the total collection quantity and the expected profits of all the CLSC members without RPM; (ii) all CLSC members’ expected profits are improved if both two collection agents select a high collection effort level without and with RPM; (iii) RPM increases buyback price, collection price, collection quantity, and franchise fee but decreases wholesale price and retail price; with the reward–penalty intensity increasing, the manufacturer’s expected profit first decreases and then increases, while the expected profits of H-type retailer and H-type third-party recycler continue to increase. We find that RPM may ultimately stimulate the collection agents to collect more WEEEs, while the intense collection competition reduces the profits of CLSC members.