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Hao Sun
Department of Management Science and Engineering, School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China

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Short Biography

He has contributed more than 10 journal articles to professional journals such as Journal of Cleaner Production, Resources, Conservation and Recycling, Sustainability, Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services and Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization. His current research interests include Supply Chain Management and Behavioral Operations management.

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Journal article
Published: 05 July 2021 in Sustainability
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The potential broad market of green consumption has encouraged an increasing number of enterprises to carry out green technology innovation activities. This paper examines a two-stage supply chain of e-commerce sales channels under different cooperative models. We find that consumers’ green preferences are the main factor that affects green product market demand. The manufacturer and the retailer can raise the levels of green technology innovation and extend green promotional services to expand product market demand in online and offline channels. However, consumers’ e-commerce preferences and online free-riding behaviors affect the manufacturer’s sales channel choice. The retailer can improve the level of green promotional services to hold offline channel market demand, while promotional behaviors have a positive/negative spillover effect on online market demand if the level of free riding falls above/below consumers’ e-commerce preferences. The higher the cooperative level is, the later the manufacturer will open the online channel and close the offline channel to ensure a high level of green promotional service from the cooperative retailer. The results show that the stronger the level of cooperation among all members is, the better the economic, ecological, and social benefits will be. Therefore, we design a revenue-cost sharing contract that can effectively motivate green technology innovation and green promotional services and afford all members win-win profits.

ACS Style

Zongyu Mu; Yuangang Zheng; Hao Sun. Cooperative Green Technology Innovation of an E-Commerce Sales Channel in a Two-Stage Supply Chain. Sustainability 2021, 13, 7499 .

AMA Style

Zongyu Mu, Yuangang Zheng, Hao Sun. Cooperative Green Technology Innovation of an E-Commerce Sales Channel in a Two-Stage Supply Chain. Sustainability. 2021; 13 (13):7499.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Zongyu Mu; Yuangang Zheng; Hao Sun. 2021. "Cooperative Green Technology Innovation of an E-Commerce Sales Channel in a Two-Stage Supply Chain." Sustainability 13, no. 13: 7499.

Journal article
Published: 07 June 2021 in Sustainability
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This paper investigates the impacts of cap-and-trade (CAT) regulation on a three-echelon closed-loop supply chain network (CLSCN) that consists of suppliers, high-emission and low-emission manufacturers, demand markets and carbon trading centers. The presented CLSCN model includes both product trading and carbon trading subnets. Combining variational inequality theory (VI) with complementary theory, we first characterize the optimal conditions for members in each tier first, and then derive that of the entire CLSCN. In addition, we focus on the effects of carbon caps and EOL collection rate target on CLSCN performances with numerical examples. The results reveal that, in some cases, there is a consistency between carbon emission reduction target of the government and the profit target of enterprises. The government should choose reasonable and moderate carbon caps for all the enterprises to balance the CLSCN members’ economic interests, carbon emissions, as well as resources utilization rate. Moreover, the government should not blindly pursue a high collection rate target. The above conclusions can provide practical guidance for governments and enterprises in a CLSCN under CAT regulation.

ACS Style

Guitao Zhang; Xiao Zhang; Hao Sun; Xinyu Zhao. Three-Echelon Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium under Cap-and-Trade Regulation. Sustainability 2021, 13, 6472 .

AMA Style

Guitao Zhang, Xiao Zhang, Hao Sun, Xinyu Zhao. Three-Echelon Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium under Cap-and-Trade Regulation. Sustainability. 2021; 13 (11):6472.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Guitao Zhang; Xiao Zhang; Hao Sun; Xinyu Zhao. 2021. "Three-Echelon Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium under Cap-and-Trade Regulation." Sustainability 13, no. 11: 6472.