An Wang

Dr. An Wang


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
31 January 2019 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
YNYongchuan Niu
Yongchuan Niu
JZJiawei Zhang
Jiawei Zhang
AWAn Wang
An Wang
CCCaisen Chen
Caisen Chen
Edge computing has become a promising paradigm for the context-aware and delay-sensitive IoT data analytics. For the sake of security, some cryptographic algorithms such as AES, RSA, and so on, are employed for the encryption communication and authentication. The collision power attack is a typical physical attack to recover the secret key of the AES algorithm. However, almost all collision attacks aim at the detection of internal collisions caused by the output of S-boxes, and the linear layers are not concerned with those protected implementations. The relation between the mask and the masked data has been given little attention and stays as is, where the leakages still exist. In this paper, we focus on three typical AES implementations in edge computing, and propose a new type of collision attack by making use of leakages from linear layers, which is capable of breaking masking schemes with uniformly distributed random masks. In addition, a novel scalable collision attack of general applicability and high-efficiency is proposed and applied to masked linear layers and masked S-boxes. It can reach an equal level of performance compared to the second-order power analysis with acceptable off-line search, which improves the known collision attacks significantly.

17 September 2018 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RXRixin Xu
Rixin Xu
Liehuang ZhuLiehuang Zhu
Liehuang Zhu
AWAn Wang
An Wang
XDXiaojiang Du
Xiaojiang Du
KCKim-Kwang Raymond Choo
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
Keke GaiKeke Gai
Keke Gai
Side-channel attack is a known security risk to smart cards, and there have been efforts by smart card manufacturers to incorporate side-channel attack countermeasures. In this paper, we study a widely used smart card that uses the 3DES algorithm. First, a platform is setup to extract the power consumption information from the electromagnetic wave. Based on the findings from the initial analysis, we determine that the card is equipped with a “head and tail protection” mechanism. Second, a chosen-plaintext power analysis with a complexity of 2 16 is proposed, which is designed to recover the second round key from the power leakage in the third round. Then, a slicing-collision-algebraic attack is presented, which decreases the complexity to 2 6 rapidly. The experiments show that after collecting 20000 power traces (in approximately 200 s), only $2^{6} \times 8$ key guesses and another 177 searches (about 300 seconds) are sufficient in recovering the 56-bit source keys of DES successfully. In other words, we demonstrate how the security of the 3DES card can be easily compromised, using side-channel attacks. Finally, we recommend that the head and tail protection should extend to the first and last four rounds, at the minimal, in order to be side-channel attack resilience.

3 September 2021 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Keke GaiKeke Gai
Keke Gai
YDYaoling Ding
Yaoling Ding
AWAn Wang
An Wang
Liehuang ZhuLiehuang Zhu
Liehuang Zhu
KCKim-Kwang Raymond Choo
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
ZWZhuping Wang
Zhuping Wang
The concepts between Internet of Things (IoT) and edge computing are increasingly intertwined, as an edge-computing architecture generally comprises a (large) number of diverse IoT devices. This, however, increases the potential attack vectors since any one of these connected IoT devices can be targeted to facilitate other malicious cyber activities. Physical attacks are generally harder to mitigate and less studied, in comparison to their cyber counterparts. Thus, in this article we present an attack framework targeting true random number generators (TRNGs), which are a key component in cryptosystems for edge devices. We then demonstrate how such a framework can guide our investigation of a commercial ASIC chip that runs ring-oscillator-based TRNG. Specifically, we show that our template power attack, low voltage fault attack, and voltage glitch fault attack do not require prior knowledge of the TRNG implementation.

5 September 2024 in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ZWZiyu Wang
Ziyu Wang
YDYaoling Ding
Yaoling Ding
AWAn Wang
An Wang
YZYuwei Zhang
Yuwei Zhang
CWCongming Wei
Congming Wei
Liehuang ZhuLiehuang Zhu
Liehuang Zhu
In side-channel analysis of public-key algorithms, we usually classify operations based on the differences in power traces produced by different basic operations (such as modular square or modular multiplication) to recover secret information like private keys. The more accurate the segmentation of power traces, the higher the efficiency of their classification. There exist two commonly used methods: one is equidistant segmentation, which requires a fixed number of basic operations and similar trace lengths for each type of operation, leading to limited application scenarios; the other is peak-based segmentation, which relies on personal experience to configure parameters, resulting in insufficient flexibility and poor universality. In this paper, we propose an automated trace segmentation method based on reinforcement learning applicable to a wide range of common implementation of public-key algorithms. The introduction of reinforcement learning, which doesn’t need labels, into trace processing for side-channel analysis marks its debut in this field. Our method has good universality on the traces with varying segment lengths and differing peak heights. By using prioritized experience replay optimized Deep Q-Network algorithm, we reduce the required number of parameters to one, which is the key length. We also employ various techniques to improve the segmentation effectiveness, such as clustering algorithm and enveloped-based feature enhancement. We validate the effectiveness of the new method in nine scenarios involving hardware and software implementations of different public-key algorithms executed on diverse platforms such as microcontrollers, SAKURA-G, and smart cards. Specifically, one of these implementations is protected by time randomization countermeasures. Experimental results show that a basic version of our method can correctly segment most traces. The enhanced version is capable of reconstructing the sequence of operations during trace segmentation, achieving an accuracy rate of 100% for the majority of the traces. For traces that cannot be entirely restored, we utilize reward values of reinforcement learning to correct errors and achieve fully recovery. We also conducted comparative experiments with supervised seq2seq methods, revealing our approach’s 42% higher accuracy in operation recovery and 96% faster time efficiency. In addition, we applied our method to the post-quantum cryptography Kyber, and successfully recovered an intermediate value crucial for deriving the secret key. Besides, power traces collected from these devices have been uploaded as open databases, which are available for researchers engaged in public-key algorithms to conduct related experiments or verify our method.

1 October 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AWAn Wang
An Wang
YLYuan Li
Yuan Li
YDYaoling Ding
Yaoling Ding
Liehuang ZhuLiehuang Zhu
Liehuang Zhu
YWYongjuan Wang
Yongjuan Wang
Various Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques are combined with classic side-channel methods to improve the efficiency of attacks. Among them, Genetic-Algorithms-based Correlation Power Analysis (GA-CPA) is proposed to launch attacks on hardware cryptosystems to extract the secret key efficiently. However, the convergence efficiency of GA-CPA is unsatisfactory due to two problems: the randomly generated initial population generally have low fitness, and the mutation operation in each iteration hardly produces high-quality individuals because of the confusion and diffusion characteristics of S-boxes. In this paper, we propose an analysis framework of GA-CPA which focuses on solving these two problems. First, we explore the list of candidate key bytes which is the result of Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) on a limited number of power traces, so that the population can be initialized with high quality candidates. Second, we improve the mutation operation by guiding the candidate key to mutate in a higher-fitness direction instead of randomly. Third, we make full use of the fitness calculation method and combine it with key enumeration algorithms to further improve the efficiency of key recovery. Simulation experimental results show that our method reduces the number of traces by 33.3% and 43.9% compared to CPA with key enumeration and GA-CPA respectively when the success rate is fixed to 90%. Real experiments performed on SAKURA-G confirm that the number of traces required in our method is much less than the numbers of traces required in CPA and GA-CPA. Besides, we adjust our method to deal with DPA contest v1 dataset, and achieve a better result of 40.76 traces than the winning proposal of 42.42 traces. The computation cost of our proposal is nearly 16.7% of the winner.

14 May 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ALAnnyu Liu
Annyu Liu
AWAn Wang
An Wang
SSShaofei Sun
Shaofei Sun
CWCongming Wei
Congming Wei
YDYaoling Ding
Yaoling Ding
Liehuang ZhuLiehuang Zhu
Liehuang Zhu
Side-channel analysis (SCA) based on machine learning, particularly neural networks, has gained considerable attention in recent years. However, previous works predominantly focus on establishing connections between labels and related profiled traces. These approaches primarily capture label-related features and often overlook the connections between traces of the same label, resulting in the loss of some valuable information. Besides, the attack traces also contain valuable information that can be used in the training process to assist model learning. In this paper, we propose a profiled SCA approach based on contrastive learning named CL-SCA to address these issues. This approach extracts features by emphasizing the similarities among traces, thereby improving the effectiveness of key recovery while maintaining the advantages of the original SCA approach. Through experiments of different datasets from different platforms, we demonstrate that CL-SCA significantly outperforms other approaches. Moreover, by incorporating attack traces into the training process using our approach, we can further enhance its performance. This extension can improve the effectiveness of key recovery, which is fully verified through experiments on different datasets.