Rixin Xu

Rixin Xu

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Rixin Xu

School of Computer Science and Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2019 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RXRixin Xu
Rixin Xu
QZQiang Zeng
Qiang Zeng
Liehuang ZhuLiehuang Zhu
Liehuang Zhu
HCHaotian Chi
Haotian Chi
XDXiaojiang Du
Xiaojiang Du
MGMohsen Guizani
Mohsen Guizani
The combination of smart home platforms and automation apps introduce much convenience to smart home users. However, this also brings the potential of privacy leakage. If a smart home platform is permitted to collect all the events of a user day and night, then the platform will learn the behavior patterns of this user before long. In this paper, we investigate how IFTTT, one of the most popular smart home platforms, has the capability of monitoring the daily life of a user in a variety of ways that are hardly noticeable. Moreover, we propose multiple ideas for mitigating privacy leakages, which altogether form a “Filter-and-Fuzz” (F&F) process: first, it filters out events unneeded by the IFTTT platform. Then, it fuzzifies the values and frequencies of the remaining events. We evaluate the F&F process, and the results show that the proposed solution makes IFTTT unable to recognize any of the user’s behavior patterns.

21 March 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZZZijian Zhang
Zijian Zhang
MDMianxiong Dong
Mianxiong Dong
Liehuang ZhuLiehuang Zhu
Liehuang Zhu
ZGZhitao Guan
Zhitao Guan
RCRuoyu Chen
Ruoyu Chen
KOKaoru Ota
Kaoru Ota
Smart meters have already been widely used for electric utilities to provide reliable power service. Since those meters keep reporting customer's energy consumption data in minute-level or even second-level, Terabyte-level big data has to be stored and analyzed for the companies. To relieve the storage and computation pressure, some companies attempt to outsource their data on the cloud. However, this exposes customer's privacy at risk, because customer's activities can be inferred from analyzing the meter readings. In this paper, we propose a privacy-friendly cloud storage (PCS) scheme and three secure cloud statistic (SCS) schemes for smart meter data on outsourced clouds. Putting these schemes together achieves three queries from the electric companies. Next, we provably analyze the privacy and the security for these schemes. Finally, we design MapReduce algorithms to show the performance for the cloud statistic.

17 September 2018 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RXRixin Xu
Rixin Xu
Liehuang ZhuLiehuang Zhu
Liehuang Zhu
AWAn Wang
An Wang
XDXiaojiang Du
Xiaojiang Du
KCKim-Kwang Raymond Choo
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
Keke GaiKeke Gai
Keke Gai
Side-channel attack is a known security risk to smart cards, and there have been efforts by smart card manufacturers to incorporate side-channel attack countermeasures. In this paper, we study a widely used smart card that uses the 3DES algorithm. First, a platform is setup to extract the power consumption information from the electromagnetic wave. Based on the findings from the initial analysis, we determine that the card is equipped with a “head and tail protection” mechanism. Second, a chosen-plaintext power analysis with a complexity of 2 16 is proposed, which is designed to recover the second round key from the power leakage in the third round. Then, a slicing-collision-algebraic attack is presented, which decreases the complexity to 2 6 rapidly. The experiments show that after collecting 20000 power traces (in approximately 200 s), only $2^{6} \times 8$ key guesses and another 177 searches (about 300 seconds) are sufficient in recovering the 56-bit source keys of DES successfully. In other words, we demonstrate how the security of the 3DES card can be easily compromised, using side-channel attacks. Finally, we recommend that the head and tail protection should extend to the first and last four rounds, at the minimal, in order to be side-channel attack resilience.

1 January 2018 in Security and Communication Networks
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
QZQi Zhang
Qi Zhang
AWAn Wang
An Wang
YNYongchuan Niu
Yongchuan Niu
NSNing Shang
Ning Shang
RXRixin Xu
Rixin Xu
Liehuang ZhuLiehuang Zhu
Liehuang Zhu
Identity-based cryptographic algorithm SM9, which has become the main part of the ISO/IEC 14888-3/AMD1 standard in November 2017, employs the identities of users to generate public-private key pairs. Without the support of digital certificate, it has been applied for cloud computing, cyber-physical system, Internet of Things, and so on. In this paper, the implementation of SM9 algorithm and its Simple Power Attack (SPA) are discussed. Then, we present template attack and fault attack on SPA-resistant SM9. Our experiments have proved that if attackers try the template attack on an 8-bit microcontrol unit, the secret key can be revealed by enabling the device to execute one time. Fault attack even allows the attackers to obtain the 256-bit key of SM9 by performing the algorithm twice and analyzing the two different results. Accordingly, some countermeasures to resist the three kinds of attacks above are given.