Employees’ voice is an important source of organizational learning and adaptive change. As algorithmic management is increasingly applied across organizational management processes, an urgent practical question arises: Does it affect employees’ participation in organizational improvement through voice? To address this challenge, drawing on signaling theory, this study examines the differential effects of distinct dimensions of algorithmic management on voice, while also considering work locus of control as a key moderating variable. We collected one-to-one matched data from 351 employees and their supervisors in a large Chinese platform-based enterprise. We tested the hypothesized theoretical model using structural equation modeling and bootstrapping procedures. The results show that algorithmic feedback enhances employees’ felt responsibility for constructive change, which in turn promotes employees’ voice. In contrast, algorithmic directing, algorithmic scheduling, and algorithmic monitoring undermine employees’ felt responsibility for constructive change and thereby inhibit voice. In addition, work locus of control moderates these relationships: employees with an external work locus of control strengthen the negative effects of algorithmic directing, algorithmic scheduling, and algorithmic monitoring, whereas employees with an internal work locus of control strengthen the positive effect of algorithmic feedback. These findings deepen our understanding of how different dimensions of algorithmic management shape voice and offer practical insights for fostering voice in contexts characterized by algorithmic management.

Introduction: Employee stock ownership is widely used to align employee and organizational interests, yet its ethical implications across different ownership levels remain insufficiently understood. Drawing on goal-framing theory, we develop a conditional dual-path model linking employee stock ownership level to unethical pro-organizational behavior through felt responsibility and bottom-line mentality, with perceived corporate green human resource management (CGHRM) practices moderating these pathways. Methods: We tested the proposed model using three-wave, multisource data collected from 303 employee–coworker dyads in three Chinese firms. Results: Perceived CGHRM practices strengthened the positive association between employee stock ownership level and felt responsibility but weakened the positive association between employee stock ownership level and bottom-line mentality. Accordingly, the negative indirect association between employee stock ownership level and unethical pro-organizational behavior through felt responsibility was stronger when perceived CGHRM practices were higher, whereas the positive indirect association through bottom-line mentality was stronger when perceived CGHRM practices were lower. Discussion: This study extends the employee stock ownership literature to the domain of employee ethical behavior by identifying two contrasting psychological pathways linking ownership level to unethical pro-organizational behavior. It also advances a more contextualized understanding of the ethical implications of employee ownership arrangements by highlighting the moderating role of perceived CGHRM practices.