This study contributes new insights into dividend policy by investigating how debt levels and firm size moderate the relationship between cash holdings and dividend payouts. Grounded in the MM theory of capital structure, the research challenges the traditional assumption of dividend irrelevance by incorporating real-world financial constraints and governance dynamics. The sample consists of 475 non-financial firms listed in Thailand, covering data from 2019 to 2023. Using Hayes’s PROCESS Macro for moderated moderation analysis, the findings reveal that cash holdings positively influence dividend payouts, and this effect is contingent upon both the firm’s leverage and size. Specifically, small firms with low debt levels tend to offer higher dividend payout, whereas large firms with below-average industry debt show diminished dividend payouts. This interaction presents a novel theoretical contribution by linking liquidity management, capital structure, and firm scale in explaining dividend behavior dimensions that have rarely been integrated in prior research. The study extends the existing literature on investment returns and corporate financial policy and provides practical implications for investors and corporate decision-makers operating in emerging markets.

The study investigates how minority shareholding affects dividend payout policy in Thai listed companies, with firm growth and debt burden positioned as joint financial moderators. Using a moderated moderation design through Hayes’ PROCESS Macro Model 3, the analysis draws on 2430 firm-year observations from 532 companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand during 2019–2023. Grounded in Agency Theory, Signaling Theory, and Pecking Order Theory, the results reveal a positive association between minority shareholding and dividend payouts, lending empirical support to the agency-based view of dividends as a governance mechanism. Nevertheless, corporate debt plays a negative moderating role, consistent with Pecking Order Theory’s prediction that leverage constraints reduce payout flexibility. The three-way interaction analysis further demonstrates that minority shareholder influence is contingent upon the firm’s financial context, particularly the joint configuration of growth prospects and leverage. In firms with simultaneously high growth and high debt, the governance role of minority shareholders is substantially diminished. On the other hand, in firms with high growth and low leverage, minority shareholders exert a stronger influence, consistent with Signaling Theory. The results reveal minority shareholder governance as financially contingent and highlight the need to assess financial constraints alongside ownership-based governance mechanisms in emerging capital markets.

The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) reflects both the cost and weight of each financing source, so separating them matters for explaining the ESG–firm value relationship. This study examines how ESG disclosure (ESGD) and ESG performance (ESGP) are related to firm value through WACC, with firm size as a moderator. Using 649 firm-year observations from 140 Thai listed firms (2016–2024), we estimate a moderated mediation model with firm-level cluster bootstrapping. ESGD is positively associated with WACC, whereas ESGP is not. Exploratory analysis shows ESGD is positively associated with the equity weight, but not with the cost of equity or cost of debt. Controlling for the equity weight, the ESGD–WACC association becomes insignificant. WACC is positively associated with Tobin’s Q, yet the indirect association of ESGD through WACC is only weakly supported. We find no evidence that this indirect association differs by firm size. With firm fixed effects, ESGD is not significantly associated with WACC, indicating no evidence of a within-firm association. The results suggest, exploratorily, that the ESGD–WACC association may reflect financing composition rather than the cost of each source, underscoring the need to separate these components before interpreting ESG’s role in the cost of capital and firm value.