Land‐based climate mitigation measures have gained significant attention and importance in public and private sector climate policies. Building on previous studies, we refine and update the mitigation potentials for 20 land‐based measures in >200 countries and five regions, comparing “bottom‐up” sectoral estimates with integrated assessment models (IAMs). We also assess implementation feasibility at the country level. Cost‐effective (available up to $100/tCO₂eq) land‐based mitigation is 8–13.8 GtCO₂eq yr⁻¹between 2020 and 2050, with the bottom end of this range representing the IAM median and the upper end representing the sectoral estimate. The cost‐effective sectoral estimate is about 40% of available technical potential and is in line with achieving a 1.5°C pathway in 2050. Compared to technical potentials, cost‐effective estimates represent a more realistic and actionable target for policy. The cost‐effective potential is approximately 50% from forests and other ecosystems, 35% from agriculture, and 15% from demand‐side measures. The potential varies sixfold across the five regions assessed (0.75–4.8 GtCO2eq yr⁻¹) and the top 15 countries account for about 60% of the global potential. Protection of forests and other ecosystems and demand‐side measures present particularly high mitigation efficiency, high provision of co‐benefits, and relatively lower costs. The feasibility assessment suggests that governance, economic investment, and socio‐cultural conditions influence the likelihood that land‐based mitigation potentials are realized. A substantial portion of potential (80%) is in developing countries and LDCs, where feasibility barriers are of greatest concern. Assisting countries to overcome barriers may result in significant quantities of near‐term, low‐cost mitigation while locally achieving important climate adaptation and development benefits. Opportunities among countries vary widely depending on types of land‐based measures available, their potential co‐benefits and risks, and their feasibility. Enhanced investments and country‐specific plans that accommodate this complexity are urgently needed to realize the large global potential from improved land stewardship.

The lives lost and economic costs of viral zoonotic pandemics have steadily increased over the past century. Prominent policymakers have promoted plans that argue the best ways to address future pandemic catastrophes should entail, “detecting and containing emerging zoonotic threats.” In other words, we should take actions only after humans get sick. We sharply disagree. Humans have extensive contact with wildlife known to harbor vast numbers of viruses, many of which have not yet spilled into humans. We compute the annualized damages from emerging viral zoonoses. We explore three practical actions to minimize the impact of future pandemics: better surveillance of pathogen spillover and development of global databases of virus genomics and serology, better management of wildlife trade, and substantial reduction of deforestation. We find that these primary pandemic prevention actions cost less than 1/20th the value of lives lost each year to emerging viral zoonoses and have substantial cobenefits.

To reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation, Indonesia instituted a nationwide moratorium on new license areas (“concessions”) for oil palm plantations, timber plantations, and logging activity on primary forests and peat lands after May 2011. Here we indirectly evaluate the effectiveness of this policy using annual nationwide data on deforestation, concession licenses, and potential agricultural revenue from the decade preceding the moratorium. We estimate that on average granting a concession for oil palm, timber, or logging in Indonesia increased site-level deforestation rates by 17–127%, 44–129%, or 3.1–11.1%, respectively, above what would have occurred otherwise. We further estimate that if Indonesia’s moratorium had been in place from 2000 to 2010, then nationwide emissions from deforestation over that decade would have been 241–615 MtCO₂e (2.8–7.2%) lower without leakage, or 213–545 MtCO₂e (2.5–6.4%) lower with leakage. As a benchmark, an equivalent reduction in emissions could have been achieved using a carbon price-based instrument at a carbon price of $3.30–7.50/tCO₂e (mandatory) or $12.95–19.45/tCO₂e (voluntary). For Indonesia to have achieved its target of reducing emissions by 26%, the geographic scope of the moratorium would have had to expand beyond new concessions (15.0% of emissions from deforestation and peat degradation) to also include existing concessions (21.1% of emissions) and address deforestation outside of concessions and protected areas (58.7% of emissions). Place-based policies, such as moratoria, may be best thought of as bridge strategies that can be implemented rapidly while the institutions necessary to enable carbon price-based instruments are developed. Significance Our paper is significant in a number of respects. First, we expand the literature on quasi-experimental evaluation of the causal impact of conservation measures to include agricultural concessions. Second, our report is rare in that we use panel data and techniques in a literature on spatially explicit land-use change econometrics that has necessarily relied upon cross-sectional analyses because of data-availability constraints. Third, our report is rare among land-use change scenario analyses in that we calibrate the effect of land-use designations empirically, rather than assuming idealized perfect effectiveness of conservation measures or complete conversion without such measures. Finally, we compare the effectiveness of place-based policies with alternative price-based instruments for climate-change mitigation within a globally significant landscape.

Mitigating climate change cost-effectively requires identifying least-cost-per-ton GHG abatement methods. Here, we estimate and map GHG abatement cost (US$ per tCO₂) for two common reforestation methods: natural regeneration and plantations. We do so by producing and integrating new maps of implementation costs and opportunity costs of reforestation, likely plantation genus and carbon accumulation by means of natural regeneration and plantations, accounting for storage in harvested wood products. We find natural regeneration (46%) and plantations (54%) would each have lower abatement cost across about half the area considered suitable for reforestation of 138 low- and middle-income countries. Using the more cost-effective method at each location, the 30 year, time-discounted abatement potential of reforestation below US$50 per tCO₂ is 31.4 GtCO₂ (24.2–34.3 GtCO₂ below US$20–100 per tCO₂)—44% more than natural regeneration alone or 39% more than plantations alone. We find that reforestation offers 10.3 (2.8) times more abatement below US$20 per tCO₂ (US$50 per tCO₂) than the most recent IPCC estimate.

We estimate and map the impacts that alternative national and subnational economic incentive structures for reducing emissions from deforestation (REDD+) in Indonesia would have had on greenhouse gas emissions and national and local revenue if they had been in place from 2000 to 2005. The impact of carbon payments on deforestation is calibrated econometrically from the pattern of observed deforestation and spatial variation in the benefits and costs of converting land to agriculture over that time period. We estimate that at an international carbon price of $10/tCO ₂ e, a “mandatory incentive structure,” such as a cap-and-trade or symmetric tax-and-subsidy program, would have reduced emissions by 163–247 MtCO ₂ e/y (20–31% below the without-REDD+ reference scenario), while generating a programmatic budget surplus. In contrast, a “basic voluntary incentive structure” modeled after a standard payment-for-environmental-services program would have reduced emissions nationally by only 45–76 MtCO ₂ e/y (6–9%), while generating a programmatic budget shortfall. By making four policy improvements—paying for net emission reductions at the scale of an entire district rather than site-by-site; paying for reductions relative to reference levels that match business-as-usual levels; sharing a portion of district-level revenues with the national government; and sharing a portion of the national government's responsibility for costs with districts—an “improved voluntary incentive structure” would have been nearly as effective as a mandatory incentive structure, reducing emissions by 136–207 MtCO ₂ e/y (17–26%) and generating a programmatic budget surplus.