Brock Stoddard

Dr. Brock Stoddard

Appalachian State University, Boone, NC, United States

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2014 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
BSBrock Stoddard
Brock Stoddard
JWJames M. Walker
James M. Walker
AWArlington Williams
Arlington Williams

18 April 2018 in Journal of Public Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Caleb CoxCaleb Cox
Caleb Cox
BSBrock Stoddard
Brock Stoddard

9 February 2021 in Southern Economic Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
BSBrock Stoddard
Brock Stoddard
CCCaleb A. Cox
Caleb A. Cox
JWJames M. Walker
James M. Walker

17 December 2022 in Journal of the Economic Science Association
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
NBNicholas T. Bailey
Nicholas T. Bailey
ARAbhijit Ramalingam
Abhijit Ramalingam
BSBrock Stoddard
Brock Stoddard
Experiments in economics usually provide subjects with starting capital to be used in the experiment. This practice could affect decisions as there is no risk of loss. This phenomenon is known as the house-money effect. In a repeated public goods game, we test for house-money effects by paying subjects in advance an amount they could lose in the experiment. We do not find evidence of a house-money effect over time.

1 March 2019 in Games and Economic Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ARAbhijit Ramalingam
Abhijit Ramalingam
BSBrock Stoddard
Brock Stoddard
JWJames M. Walker
James M. Walker

1 November 2024 in Experimental Economics
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
ARAbhijit Ramalingam
Abhijit Ramalingam
BSBrock Stoddard
Brock Stoddard
JWJames M. Walker
James M. Walker
Using public goods games in a laboratory setting, we study team-level production, where two teams compete for the resources of a common-member who can benefit from and provide effort in both teams. Intrinsically, the common-member faces divided loyalties. We examine such competition in a setting in which the common-member has productive abilities equal to that of the other team members (dedicated-members), and in two settings where he/she has greater relative potential. When effort (contributions) by the common-member have greater productivity (coupled with higher opportunity costs to contribute) in providing the public good relative to that of dedicated-members, we find team performance is not significantly increased. On the other hand, when the common-member has a greater endowment, sufficient to match the absolute contributions of team members in both teams, there is a significant increase in team performance. The evidence suggests that a norm of reciprocity by dedicated-members based on absolute contributions of the common-member better explains behavior than a norm based on the value added of the common-member's contributions. This behavior, along with fairness norms elicited in a survey, suggests that on average dedicated members do not sufficiently incorporate the common-members' higher opportunity costs in the treatment where his/her productivity is increased. This setting provides an important illustration of where the behavioral response to the type of inequality matters, leading to differences in team efficiency.