Caleb Cox

Dr. Caleb Cox

School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 September 2015 in Games
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Journal Article
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Caleb CoxCaleb Cox
Caleb Cox
BSBrock Stoddard
Brock Stoddard
We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while in the Take-framed game, players take from an existing public good. The results show Take framing and Individual-level feedback lead to more extreme behavior (free-riding and full cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability of cooperation.

18 April 2018 in Journal of Public Economics
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Journal Article
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Caleb CoxCaleb Cox
Caleb Cox
BSBrock Stoddard
Brock Stoddard

7 August 2018 in Economics Letters
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Journal Article
Closed access
Caleb CoxCaleb Cox
Caleb Cox
OKOleg Korenok
Oleg Korenok
EMEdward Millner
Edward Millner
LRLaura Razzolini
Laura Razzolini

14 March 2023 in Experimental Economics
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ABAndrzej Baranski
Andrzej Baranski
Caleb CoxCaleb Cox
Caleb Cox
We experimentally investigate the effect of pre-bargaining communication on productive incentives in a multilateral bargaining game with joint production under two conditions: observable and unobservable investments. In both conditions, communication fosters fair sharing and is rarely used to pit individuals against each other. Proportional sharing arises with observable investments with or without communication, leading to high efficiency gains. Without investment observability, communication is widely used to truthfully report investments and call for equitable sharing, allowing substantial efficiency gains. Since communication occurs after production, our results highlight a novel indirect channel through which communication can enhance efficiency in social dilemmas. Our results contrast with previous findings on bargaining over an exogenous fund, where communication leads to highly unequal outcomes, competitive messages, and virtually no appeals to fairness.

1 June 2022 in Experimental Economics
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DBDavid Bruner
David Bruner
Caleb CoxCaleb Cox
Caleb Cox
DMDavid M. McEvoy
David M. McEvoy
BSBrock Stoddard
Brock Stoddard
We examine motives for ‘overbidding’ in contests between individuals using a “two-headed” approach to decision-making. In “two-headed” contests, subject pairs send suggested bids and messages to a partner. Content analysis of the messages provides insight into an individual’s bidding motives. In addition, we elicit measures of preferences, beliefs, and impulsiveness. We find that beliefs about others’ bids and messages that emphasize winning (i.e., utility of winning) are the most robust predictors of ‘overbidding’. Our results suggest that analyzing communication provides a rich window into an individual’s thought process when making decisions, and can complement insights from elicited values from common decision tasks (Replication materials, including data, do files, and software, are available at https://sites.google.com/view/david-bruner/research).

4 September 2021 in Review of Industrial Organization
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Journal Article
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Caleb CoxCaleb Cox
Caleb Cox
AKArzé Karam
Arzé Karam
MPMatthias Pelster
Matthias Pelster