Gabriele Gratton

Dr. Gabriele Gratton

School of Economics, UNSW Business School, USNW Sydney
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2015 in Theoretical Economics
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LBLaurent Bouton
Laurent Bouton
GGGabriele Gratton
Gabriele Gratton
The majority runoff system is widely used around the world. Yet, our understanding of its properties and of voters\u2019 behavior is limited. In this paper, we fully characterize the set of strictly perfect voting equilibria in large three-candidate majority runoff elections. Considering all possible distributions of preference orderings and intensities, we prove that only two types of equilibria can exist. First, there are always equilibria in which only two candidates receive votes. Second, there may exist an equilibrium in which three candidates receive votes. Its characteristics challenge common beliefs: (i) neither sincere voting by all voters, nor push over tactics (i.e. supporters of the front-runner voting for a less-preferred candidate in order to influence who will face the front-runner in the second round) are supported in equilibrium, and (ii) the winner does not necessarily have democratic legitimacy since the Condorcet winner may not even participate in the second round

20 September 2021 in International Economic Review
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GGGabriele Gratton
Gabriele Gratton
MMMassimo Morelli
Massimo Morelli
Political checks and balances are debated desiderata in the evaluation of democratic systems. We suggest a framework where the pros and cons of checks and balances are, respectively, the reduction of type‐I errors and the increase of type‐II errors in policy decision making. Political checks and balances are less desirable for intermediate levels of competence of the political class when accountability is high. In policy areas where the effects of reforms are harder to evaluate and accountability is low, political checks and balances are always desirable. Positive constitutional design reveals the possibility of constitutional traps, with politicians choosing less desirable regimes.

3 October 2020 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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GGGabriele Gratton
Gabriele Gratton
BLBarton E. Lee
Barton E. Lee
We study a model of the rise and fall of illiberal democracies. Voters value both liberty and security. In times of crisis, voters may prefer to elect an illiberal government that, by violating constitutional constraints, offers greater security but less liberty. However, violating these constraints allows the government to manipulate information, in turn reducing electoral accountability. We show how elements of liberal constitutions induce voters to elect illiberal governments that remain in power for inefficiently long—including forever. We derive insights into what makes constitutions stable against the rise of illiberal governments. We extend the model to allow for illiberal governments to overcome checks and balances and become autocracies. We briefly discuss the empirical relevance of our theoretical framework.

5 January 2015 in Economic Inquiry
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GGGabriele Gratton
Gabriele Gratton
AKAnton Kolotilin
Anton Kolotilin

14 June 2016 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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MFMaleke Fourati
Maleke Fourati
GGGabriele Gratton
Gabriele Gratton
PGPauline A. Grosjean
Pauline A. Grosjean
Data from the first post-Arab Spring elections reveal that support for Islamic parties came from richer districts and individuals. We show that standard public finance arguments help explain the voting pattern in these elections and others in the Muslim world. Our model predicts that a voter’s probability to vote for a religious party (i) increases in income for the poorest voters, but possibly decreases in income for the richest; (ii) is greater for voters in richer districts; and (iii) increases with the voter’s religiosity. We test these predictions on original micro-level data in a nationally representative sample of 600 individuals in 30 districts in Tunisia. Our empirical results align with our predictions and suggest that belonging to the middle class and living in a richer district together affect voting decisions more than being a religious voter. We also test for other possible factors affecting voting decisions, such as education, or attitudes towards corruption or towards the West. Finally, we document similar patterns in other key elections in the Muslim world.

23 April 2021 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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GGGabriele Gratton
Gabriele Gratton
MMMassimo Morelli
Massimo Morelli
Political checks and balances are certainly among the most debated desiderata in the construction of democratic systems and their evaluation. This paper suggests a conceptual framework that could be useful to inform this debate. We propose a model where the pros and cons of a strengthening of checks and balances are respectively the reduction of type-I errors and the increase of potential type-II errors in policy decision-making. Political checks and balances are less desirable for intermediate levels of competence of the political class when in conjunction with high accountability. In policy areas where the welfare effects of a reform are harder to evaluate and effective accountability is low, political checks and balances are always desirable. Positive constitutional design unfortunately reveals the possibility of constitutional traps, with politicians choosing or defending the less desirable regime.