Since the Cambodian economy is largely dependent on agricultural production, it is important to understand the effects of climate change on rice production, the primary staple crop of Cambodia. This study assessed the economic impacts of climate change in Cambodia to provide an appropriate set of policy suggestions that could lead to sustainable agricultural productivity and economic growth. The results from the GLAM-Rice crop model and various climate models indicate that Cambodia will be severely affected by climate change, which will lead to lower rice production and economic growth. The changes in rice yield under the RCP 8.5 and RCP 4.5 baseline scenarios reduced the GDP by 8.16% and 10.57%, respectively. By employing an investment model based on a real options framework, the economic effects and feasibility of adaptation strategies such as irrigation and adjustment of planting dates are identified. The analysis indicates that irrigation is a feasible option and the most efficacious strategy to reduce the negative impacts of climate change for the agricultural sector. The index of economic feasibility for irrigation, defined by the ratio of the current realized agriculture value-added to the identified threshold, is 0.6343 and 0.8803 under the RCP 8.5 and RCP 4.5 baseline scenarios, respectively. The results suggest that the priority choice for adaptation measure be in order of irrigation, 20-day later adjustment, and 20-day earlier adjustment.

Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. (1947) is canonized in the law and economics literature as the first use of cost-benefit analysis for determining negligence and assigning liability. This paper revisits the original case in which the famous Hand formula was born, and examines whether Judge Hand's ruling in that case would truly provide correct incentives for efficient precaution. We show that the original rule specified by Judge Hand is different from the usual application of the Hand formula by modern law-and-economics theorists in the standard continuous care model. Through a game theoretic analysis of the case, we show that Judge Hand's negligence rule from United States v. Carroll Towing Co. may in fact produce games with inefficient equilibria. Such a possibility of inefficiency does not depend on the specific liability rule that governed the original case. It is even more ironic that there exist cases where the equilibrium is efficient, but the equilibrium requires that the victim not have a "bargee" on board, which flies in the face of Judge Hand's opinion.

This paper modifies the standard tort model by introducing role-type uncertainty, that is, it is assumed that neither party knows in advance whether she will be