David Ingram

Dr. David Ingram


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

15Years (2012-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 February 2015 in The Philosophical Quarterly
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JTJonathan Tallant
Jonathan Tallant
DIDavid Ingram
David Ingram
Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions ‘upstanding’ and ‘nefarious’ presentists. Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, positing presently existing truth-makers for truths about the past; nefarious presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language of truth-maker theory but without paying any ontological price. We argue that presentists should be nefarious presentists.

11 March 2016 in Philosophical Studies
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DIDavid Ingram
David Ingram
Presentists believe that only present things exist. But opponents insist this view has unacceptable implications: if only present things exist, we can’t express singular propositions about the past, since the obvious propositional constituents don’t exist, nor can we account for temporal passage, or the openness of the future. According to such opponents, and in spite of the apparent ‘common sense’ status of the view, presentism should be rejected on the basis of these unacceptable implications. In this paper, I present and defend a version of presentism (‘Thisness Presentism’) that avoids the unacceptable implications. The basic strategy I employ is familiar—I postulate presently existing entities to serve as surrogates (or ‘proxies’) for non-present entities—but some of the details of my proposal are more novel, and their application to these problems is certainly novel. One overarching thesis of this paper is that Thisness Presentism is preferable to other versions of presentism since it solves important problems facing standard iterations of the view. And I assume that this is a good positive reason in favour of the underlying thisness ontology.

22 February 2012 in Analysis
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JTJonathan Tallant
Jonathan Tallant
DIDavid Ingram
David Ingram
Presentists face a familiar problem. If only present objects exist, then what ‘makes true’ our true claims about the past? According to Ross Cameron, the ‘truth-makers’ for past and future tensed propositions are presently instantiated Temporal Distributional Properties. We present an argument against Cameron’s view. There are two ways that we might understand the term ‘distribute’ as it appears. On one reading, the resulting properties are not up to the task of playing the truth-maker role; on the other, the properties are incompatible with presentism.

25 October 2012
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Book Chapter
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JTJonathan Tallant
Jonathan Tallant
DIDavid Ingram
David Ingram
Ross Cameron proposes to reconcile presentism and truth-maker theory by invoking temporal distributional properties, instantiated by present entities, as the truth-makers for truths about the past. This chapter argues that Cameron's proposal fails because objects can change which temporal distributional properties they instantiate and this entails that the truth-values of truths about the past can change in an objectionable way.

16 December 2020 in Synthese
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JTJonathan Tallant
Jonathan Tallant
DIDavid Ingram
David Ingram
Recently, some have attempted to reformulate debates in first-order metaphysics, particularly in the metaphysics of time and modality, for reasons due to Williamson (Modal logic as metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2013). In this paper, we focus on the ways in which the likes of Cameron, Correia and Rosenkranz, Deasy, Ingram, Tallant, Viebahn,inter alia, have initiated and responded to attempts to capture the core of presentism using a formal, logical machinery. We argue that such attempts are doomed to fail because there is no theoretical core to presentism. There is no single view or family of views that is presentism.

6 December 2016 in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
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Journal Article
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DIDavid Ingram
David Ingram