A popular view in metaphysics is that which propositions are true depends upon how the world is (see, for instance, Bigelow 1988; Lewis 1992; Sider 2001). In more evocative (as well as ontologically committing) language, truth requires ground. This thought then gets used to do some serious work. As Sider (2001: 40) has it, ‘[t]he point of … the principle that truth supervenes on being is to rule out dubious ontologies’. Here, I argue that (at least some) ‘dubious’ ontologies are theoretically virtuous.
In this article I offer a new version of presentism and argue that this new version of presentism is not a species of the A-theory. Along the way, I argue that Rasmussen’s recent attempt to articulate a version of presentism that is not also a version of the A-theory does not succeed.
Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, face a problem concerning truths about the past. Presentists should (but cannot) locate truth-makers for truths about the past. What can presentists say in response? We identify two rival factions ‘upstanding’ and ‘nefarious’ presentists. Upstanding presentists aim to meet the challenge, positing presently existing truth-makers for truths about the past; nefarious presentists aim to shirk their responsibilities, using the language of truth-maker theory but without paying any ontological price. We argue that presentists should be nefarious presentists.