The global effort to curb carbon emissions is accelerating demand for clean energy technologies and the materials they rely on. Demand for these materials will only continue to grow, especially as some nations aim to achieve net zero emissions by 2050. While some major materials like steel, copper, and aluminum are already powering the fossil fuel economy, others are more minor materials with potential supply risks. These risks could jeopardize the ability to reduce greenhouse gas emissions within the desirable timeframe to avoid significant climate change. In some cases, it may be necessary to take action to improve the resilience of material supply chains and mitigate supply risks. Understanding the importance of individual materials to clean energy and the supply risks associated with them is necessary to identify which materials may serve as potential roadblocks to a clean energy future. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued a series of 13 supply chain deep dive assessment reports on various energy technologies in 2022 in response to President Biden’s Executive Order on America’s Supply Chains (E.O. 14017). These reports emphasized that supply chain bottlenecks can occur at any stage of the value chain from mining and refining to component and even sub-system manufacturing. The bottlenecks are a combination of factors such as material availability, equipment availability, work force availability and quality, logistics, regulatory framework, and market conditions. These bottlenecks were worsened during the global Covid-19 pandemic. Its lingering impacts have hindered capacity expansion for material supply chains and prevented product lead-time recovery. One approach to reduce supply chain risks for the United States is to have a strong domestic manufacturing sector with a diverse set of producers. Boosting responsible domestic production would require leveraging the latest science not only in material extraction but also in developing substitutes, recycling, reuse, and remanufacturing. This report is an updated analysis of previous Critical Materials Strategy (CMS) reports published by the DOE in 2010, 2011, and 2019 based on national and global priorities, technology advancement, and technology adoption trends. Like the CMS reports, this analysis presents the results of a formal material criticality assessment to identify which materials are critical to the continued deployment of clean energy technologies globally. The analysis in this report leveraged the DOE supply chain deep dive assessments to develop the initial list of materials to evaluate. This DOE Critical Materials Assessment (CMA) is conducted independently of criticality assessments performed by other U.S. government agencies, such as that conducted by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). This analysis complements the USGS critical minerals determination in three aspects. First, the DOE assessment is performed from a global perspective, while the USGS analysis focusses on the importance of minerals to the U.S. economy. Second, this report focuses on the importance of materials to clean energy technologies, rather than to the economy in general. Lastly, this study is forward looking to 2035 based on clean energy deployment scenarios, whereas the USGS assessment is retrospective. Materials evaluated in this report that do not appear in the USGS Critical Minerals List include copper, uranium, electrical steel, and SiC. A draft version of this report received ~80 public comments related to supporting data and methodological improvement. Those comments have been incorporated as much as possible where appropriate. Highlights of findings from this 2023 CMA include: · Rare earth materials (neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium) used in magnets in electric vehicle (EV) motors and wind turbine generators continue to be critical. While dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb) are both heavy rare earth elements that serve the same function in magnets, the criticality of Tb is slightly lower than that for Dy in the short term due to the widespread use of Dy in high-grade magnets and Tb’s present role as a substitute. Similarly, praseodymium (Pr) is critical in the medium term but only near critical in the short term because it is more substitutable in magnets than neodymium (Nd). · Materials used in batteries for EVs and stationary storage are now considered to be critical. While cobalt (Co) was found to be critical in this and previous reports, lithium (Li) becomes critical in the medium term due to its broader use in various battery chemistries and the rampant growth of the EV industry. Natural graphite is a new addition in this assessment and is also found to be critical. · Platinum group metals used in hydrogen electrolyzers, such as platinum (Pr) and iridium (Ir), are critical due to an increased focus on hydrogen technologies to achieve net zero carbon emissions, while those used in catalytic converters, such as rhodium (Rh

Climate change has spurred increased electrification through means of transportation, hydropower, and wind turbines which has caused an increased demand for permanent magnet materials. Current commercial magnet technologies rely heavily on several critical materials such as neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, samarium, and cobalt which are primarily sourced and refined outside of the United States (U.S.). To combat these problems, the Critical Materials Institute (CMI) has begun research into alternative magnet compositions to reduce critical material content. Additionally, these alternative magnets can fulfill a gap in the market between high performance neodymium-iron-boron (Nd-Fe-B) and samarium cobalt (Sm–Co) magnets and low performance ferrite or bonded Nd-Fe-B magnets, earning the term gap magnets. This research seeks to compile a simple strategy for identifying an application for these alternative magnets and assessing preliminary market impacts through substitution for two example magnets. The first magnet was identified to be applicable for ancillary motors and sensors in conventional gasoline vehicles with a maximum substitution of 4,825 metric tonnes (mt) per year by the year 2050. The second magnet was identified to be applicable for magnetic couplings in energy and industrial sectors with a maximum substitution of 978 mt per year by the year 2050.