Although the Paris Agreement arguably made some progress, interest in supplementary approaches to climate change co-operation persist. This article examines the conditions under which a climate club might emerge and grow. Using agent-based simulations, it shows that even with less than a handful of major actors as initial members, a club can eventually reduce global emissions effectively. To succeed, a club must be initiated by the ‘right’ constellation of enthusiastic actors, offer sufficiently large incentives for reluctant countries and be reasonably unconstrained by conflicts between members over issues beyond climate change. A climate club is particularly likely to persist and grow if initiated by the United States and the European Union. The combination of club-good benefits and conditional commitments can produce broad participation under many conditions.
Parties to the Paris Agreement face mounting social pressure to raise their ambition, thereby reducing the gap between individual pledges and collective temperature goals. Although crucial for inciting positive change, especially given that the Paris Agreement lacks an enforcement mechanism, it is also important to consider social pressure’s potential negative unintended consequences. First, it might undermine the Paris Agreement’s celebrated flexibility, which allows countries to design their Nationally Determined Contributions according to domestic conditions and capabilities. Second, it might result in widespread noncompliance by inciting pledges that the countries concerned prove unwilling or even unable to fulfill. Should that happen, confidence in the Paris Agreement and its institutions might falter. Further research is therefore needed to identify the scope conditions for social pressure to work effectively in the domain of international climate policy.
30 June 2006 in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics
The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, there is no second-order punishment for those countries that fail to implement them. Thus, a Party can simply refuse to comply without consequence. The alternative compliance enforcement systems that have been proposed in the literature also face substantial problems. A simple, flexible, potent, and credible compliance enforcement system for a post-Kyoto climate agreement, based on deposits, is proposed here: at ratification, each country deposits a significant amount of money, and continues to do so in the preparation stage each year until the start of the commitment period. At the end of this period, those countries that meet their emissions limitation targets receive a full refund of their deposit, while those that fail to do so forfeit part or all of it. A simplified two-country model of the deposit system and a numerical example of an agreement involving the US, Japan, Russia, and Europe is also provided. If each country's deposit is no less than its abatement costs, there is a strong incentive for participating countries to avoid non-compliance.