Mads Greaker

Mads Greaker

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Mads Greaker

Oslo and Akershus University College - Oslo Business School

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
21 February 2023 in Environmental and Resource Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
RGRolf Golombek
Rolf Golombek
MGMads Greaker
Mads Greaker
SKSnorre Kverndokk
Snorre Kverndokk
LMLin Ma
Lin Ma
Asbstract: We model the value chain of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) by focusing on the decisions taken by actors involved in either capture, transport or storage of CO2. Plants emitting CO2 are located apart. If these invest in carbon capture facilities, the captured CO2 is transported to terminals, which again transport the received amount of CO2 to a storage site. Because of network effects, we may have three equilibria: one with no CCS, one with low investments in CCS, and one with high investments in CCS. In a numerical specification of the model, we find that the market for CCS may be in a state of excess inertia, i.e., even if the social cost of carbon is sufficiently high to justify investment from a social point of view, the market actors may not succeed in coordinating their efforts to reach the equilibrium with high investment. The government should then consider offering economic incentives to investments. In addition to the network effect, several other market imperfections exist, such as market power, economics of scale and the environmental externality from CO2 emissions. We identify policy instruments—in addition to a correctly set carbon tax—that will correct for the remaining market imperfections and bring private investments in line with the first-best levels. Without correction, too many terminals are set up and too few plants invest in capture facilities in our reference market structure.

12 March 2010 in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
RGRolf Golombek
Rolf Golombek
MGMads Greaker
Mads Greaker
MHMichael Hoel
Michael Hoel
Climate mitigation policy should be imposed over a long period, and spur innovation of new technologies in order to make stabilization of green house gas concentration economically feasible. The government may announce current and future policy packages that stimulate current R&D in climate-friendly technologies. However, once climate-friendly technologies have been developed, the government may have no incentive to implement the pre-announced future policies, that is, there may be a time inconsistency problem. We show that if the government can optimally subsidize R&D today, there is no time inconsistency problem. Thus, lack of commitment is not an argument for higher current R&D subsidies than the first-best subsidy. If the offered R&D subsidy is lower than the optimal subsidy, the current (sub-game perfect) carbon tax rate exceeds the first-best carbon tax rate.

12 June 2012 in Climate Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JHJon Hovi
Jon Hovi
MGMads Greaker
Mads Greaker
CHCathrine Hagem
Cathrine Hagem
BHBjart Holtsmark
Bjart Holtsmark
The compliance enforcement system of the Kyoto Protocol provides only weak incentives for Parties to comply with their commitments. For example, the penalties for non-compliant countries are not legally binding, and moreover, there is no second-order punishment for those countries that fail to implement them. Thus, a Party can simply refuse to comply without consequence. The alternative compliance enforcement systems that have been proposed in the literature also face substantial problems. A simple, flexible, potent, and credible compliance enforcement system for a post-Kyoto climate agreement, based on deposits, is proposed here: at ratification, each country deposits a significant amount of money, and continues to do so in the preparation stage each year until the start of the commitment period. At the end of this period, those countries that meet their emissions limitation targets receive a full refund of their deposit, while those that fail to do so forfeit part or all of it. A simplified two-country model of the deposit system and a numerical example of an agreement involving the US, Japan, Russia, and Europe is also provided. If each country's deposit is no less than its abatement costs, there is a strong incentive for participating countries to avoid non-compliance.

1 January 2014 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
CFCarolyn Fischer
Carolyn Fischer
MGMads Greaker
Mads Greaker
KRKnut Einar Rosendahl
Knut Einar Rosendahl
Asymmetric regulation of a global pollutant between countries can alter the competitiveness of industries and lead to emissions leakage, which hampers countries’ welfare. In order to limit leakage, governments consider supporting domestic trade exposed firms by subsidizing their investments in abatement technology. The suppliers of such technologies tend to be less than perfectly competitive, particularly when both emissions regulations and advanced technologies are new. In this context of twin market failures, we consider the relative effects and desirability of subsidies for abatement technology. We find a more robust recommendation for upstream subsidies than for downstream subsidies. Downstream subsidies tend to increase global abatement technology prices, reduce pollution abatement abroad and increase emission leakage. On the contrary, upstream subsidies reduce abatement technology prices, and hence also emissions leakage. Moreover, as opposed to downstream subsidies, they provide domestic abatement technology firms with a strategic advantage.

4 March 2026 in Energy Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MGMads Greaker
Mads Greaker
THTom-Reiel Heggedal
Tom-Reiel Heggedal
KRKnut Einar Rosendahl
Knut Einar Rosendahl

1 May 2011 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
MGMads Greaker
Mads Greaker
MHMichael Hoel
Michael Hoel
Since governments can influence the demand for a new abatement technology through their environmental policy, they may be able to expropriate innovations in new abatement technology ex post. This suggests that incentives for environmental R&D may be lower than the incentives for market goods R&D. This in turn may be used as an argument for environmental R&D getting more public support than other R&D. In this paper we systematically compare the incentives for environmental R&D with the incentives for market goods R&D. We find that the relationship might be the opposite: When the innovator is able to commit to a licence fee before environmental policy is resolved, incentives are always higher for environmental R&D than for market goods R&D. When the government sets its policy before or simultaneously with the innovator’s choice of licence fee, incentives for environmental R&D may be higher or lower than for market goods R&D.