As the fastest growing segment of aviation, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) continue to increase in number, technical complexity and capabilities. Numerous civilian and commercial uses are drastically transforming civil protection, asset delivery, commercial and entertaining activities. However, UAS pose significant challenges in terms of safety, security and privacy within society. An increasing phenomenon, nowadays, is drone-related incidents near airport facilities, which are expected to proliferate in frequency, complexity and severity, as drones become larger and more powerful. Critical infrastructures need to be protected from such aerial attacks, through effective counteracting technologies, risk management and resilience plans. In this paper, we present a survey of drone incidents near airports and a literature review of sensor technologies, able to prevent, detect, identify and mitigate rogue drones. We exhibit the benefits and limitations of available counter-drone technologies (C-UAS); however, defending airports against misused drone activity is a hard problem. Therefore, we analyze three realistic attack scenarios from malicious drones and propose an effective C-UAS protection plan for each case. We discuss applicability limitations of C-UAS in the aviation context and propose a resilience action plan for airport stakeholders for defending against airborne threats from misused drones.

Airports are at the forefront of technological innovation, mainly due to the fact that the number of air travel passengers is exponentially increasing every year. As a result, airports enhance their infrastructure intelligence and evolve as smart facilities to support growth, by offering an enjoyable travel experience. New challenges are coming up, which aviation has to deal with and adapt to, such as the integration of Industrial IoT (Internet of Things) in airport facilities and the increased use of smart devices from travelers and employees. Cybersecurity is becoming a key enabler for safety, which is paramount in the aviation context. Smart airports strive to provide optimal services in a reliable and sustainable manner, by working around the domains of growth, efficiency, safety and security. This article researches: (a) the implementation rate of cybersecurity measures in commercial airports; (b) malicious threats that evolve due to IoT and smart devices installed; (c) risk scenario analysis for IoT malicious attacks with threat mitigation actions. With the aim to enhance operational practices and develop robust cybersecurity governance in smart airports, we present a systematic and comprehensive analysis of malicious attacks in smart airports, to facilitate airport community comprehend risks and proactively act, by implementing cybersecurity best practices and resilience measures.

During the past two decades, oil and gas operational and information technology systems have experienced constant digital growth, closely followed by an increasing number of cyber-attacks on the newly interconnected systems. Adversaries exploit vulnerable accessible device or malware attacks networked services, in an attempt to gain access to critical systems and machinery that are interconnected over networks. Given the importance of the oil and gas sector on the global economy and the diversity of critical systems often being controlled over remote locations, it is highly important to understand and mitigate such attacks. In this paper, we survey cyber-attacks on all three domains of the oil and gas sector (upstream, midstream, downstream) starting from the early 90s up until 2020. For each domain, we document and analyze verified attacks based on real-world reports and published demo attacks on systems. We map and catalogue the attack types used in each case, in order to understand common and subliminal attack paths against oil and gas critical operations. Our aim is threefold, i.e., first, to assess documented attacks using standardized impact assessment techniques and highlight potential consequences of cyber-attacks on this sector, second, to build a vulnerability taxonomy based on technical knowledge gathered by all such incidents and connect each vulnerability with oil and gas systems and respective attack paths, and third, to map the documented knowledge and taxonomies with MITRE’s international knowledge base of Adversary Tactics and Techniques, so as to provide a general guide for analyzing and protecting against cyber-attacks at oil and gas infrastructures.

Organizations are exposed to threats that increase the risk factor of their ICT systems. The assurance of their protection is crucial, as their reliance on information technology is a continuing challenge for both security experts and chief executives. As risk assessment could be a necessary process in an organization, one of its deliverables could be utilized in addressing threats and thus facilitate the development of a security strategy. Given the large number of heterogeneous methods and risk assessment tools that exist, comparison criteria can provide better understanding of their options and characteristics and facilitate the selection of a method that best fits an organization's needs. This article aims to address the problem of selecting an appropriate risk assessment method to assess and manage information security risks, by proposing a set of comparison criteria, grouped into four categories. Based upon them, it provides a comparison of the 10 popular risk assessment methods that could be utilized by organizations to determine the method that is more suitable for their needs. Finally, a case study is presented to demonstrate the selection of a method based on the proposed criteria.

The need for effective training of cyber security personnel working in critical infrastructures and in the corporate has brought attention to the evolution of Cyber Ranges (CRs) as learning and training tools. Although CRs have been organized for many years, there is a lack of standards and common methodologies that facilitate their development and optimize their effectiveness. Aiming at strengthening cyber security education and research that utilize well designed CRs, we first analyze the CRs domain to identify key characteristics, strengths and fundamental weaknesses, and based on these outcomes we propose the Cyber Range Design Framework (CRDF), which includes the CR Architecture and the CR Life-Cycle. The CR Architecture presents the main components of CRDF compliant CRs, whereas the CR Life-Cycle presents the development phases of such approaches and the activities these phases embrace. CRDF builds on the Conceptual Framework for eLearning and Training (COFELET) and on the Exercise Life-Cycle. COFELET is particularly elaborated for the development of cyber security educational approaches, by adopting its design considerations that were based on widely adopted educational theories and approaches (e.g., scenario-based, reuse of elements). CRDF envisages the elaboration of CRs which optimize their impact, mitigate their weaknesses, and minimize their preparation and running costs. Under this prism, a preliminary appreciation of the CRDF approaches effectiveness is presented along with the expected outcomes of such approaches.