With the rapid development of the Internet of Things, more and more small devices are connected into the Internet for monitoring and control purposes. One such type of devices, smart plugs, have been extensively deployed worldwide in millions of homes for home automation. These smart plugs, however, would pose serious security problems if their vulnerabilities were not carefully investigated. Indeed, we discovered that some popular smart home plugs have severe security vulnerabilities which could be fixed but unfortunately are left open. In this paper, we case study a smart plug system of a known brand by exploiting its communication protocols and successfully launching four attacks: 1) device scanning attack; 2) brute force attack; 3) spoofing attack; and 4) firmware attack. Our real-world experimental results show that we can obtain the authentication credentials from the users by performing these attacks. We also present guidelines for securing smart plugs.

Given the distributed nature of the massively connected "Things" in IoT, IoT networks have been a primary target for cyberattacks. Although machine learning based network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) can effectively detect abnormal network traffic behaviors, most existing approaches are based on a large amount of labeled traffic flow data, which hinders their implementation in the highly dynamic IoT networks with limited labeling. In this paper, we develop a novel Flow Topology based Graph Convolutional Network (FT-GCN) approach for label-limited IoT network intrusion detection. Our main idea is to leverage the underlying traffic flow patterns, i.e., the flow topological structure, to unlock the full potential of the traffic flow data with limited labeling, where the FT-GCN will be deployed at the edge servers in IoT networks to detect intrusions via software defined network technologies. Specifically, FT-GCN first takes the time correlation of traffic flows into account to construct an interval-constrained traffic graph (ICTG). Besides, a Node-Level Spatial (NLS) attention mechanism is designed to further enhance the key statistical features of traffic flows in ICTG. Finally, the combined representation of statistical flow features and flow topological structure are learned by the cost-effective Topology Adaptive Graph Convolutional Networks (TAGCN) for intrusion identification in IoT networks. Extensive experiments are conducted on three real-world datasets, which demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed FT-GCN compared to state-of-the-art approaches.

The Internet of Things (IoT) has gained popularity in recent years. Today’s IoT applications are now increasingly deployed in cloud platforms to perform Big Data analytics. In cloud data center networks (DCN), TCP incast usually happens when multiple senders simultaneously communicate with a single receiver. However, when TCP incast happens, DCN may suffer from both throughput collapse for TCP burst flows and temporary starvation for TCP background flows. In this paper, we propose a software defined network (SDN)-based TCP congestion control mechanism, referred to as SDTCP, to leverage the features, e.g., centralized control methods and the global view of the network, in order to solve the TCP incast problems. When we detect network congestion on an OpenFlow switch, our controller can select the background flows and reduce their bandwidth by adjusting the advertised window of TCP ACK packets of the corresponding background flows so as to reserve more bandwidth for burst flows. SDTCP is transparent to the end systems and can accurately decelerate the rate of background flows by leveraging the global view of the network gained via SDN. The experiments demonstrate that our SDTCP can provide high tolerance for burst flows and achieve better flow completion time for short flows. Therefore, SDTCP is an effective and scalable solution for the TCP incast problem.

Various low-latency anonymous communication systems such as Tor and Anonymizer have been designed to provide anonymity service for users. In order to hide the communication of users, most of the anonymity systems pack the application data into equal-sized cells (e.g., 512 B for Tor, a known real-world, circuit-based, low-latency anonymous communication network). Via extensive experiments on Tor, we found that the size of IP packets in the Tor network can be very dynamic because a cell is an application concept and the IP layer may repack cells. Based on this finding, we investigate a new cell-counting-based attack against Tor, which allows the attacker to confirm anonymous communication relationship among users very quickly. In this attack, by marginally varying the number of cells in the target traffic at the malicious exit onion router, the attacker can embed a secret signal into the variation of cell counter of the target traffic. The embedded signal will be carried along with the target traffic and arrive at the malicious entry onion router. Then, an accomplice of the attacker at the malicious entry onion router will detect the embedded signal based on the received cells and confirm the communication relationship among users. We have implemented this attack against Tor, and our experimental data validate its feasibility and effectiveness. There are several unique features of this attack. First, this attack is highly efficient and can confirm very short communication sessions with only tens of cells. Second, this attack is effective, and its detection rate approaches 100% with a very low false positive rate. Third, it is possible to implement the attack in a way that appears to be very difficult for honest participants to detect (e.g., using our hopping-based signal embedding).

IoT security and privacy has raised grave concerns. Efforts have been made to design tools to identify and understand vulnerabilities of IoT systems. Most of the existing protocol security analysis techniques rely on a well understanding of the underlying communication protocols. In this paper, we systematically present the first manual reverse engineering framework for discovering communication protocols of embedded Linux based IoT systems. We have successfully applied our framework to reverse engineer a number of IoT systems. As an example, we present a detailed use of the framework reverse-engineering the WeMo smart plug communication protocol by extracting the firmware from the flash, performing static and dynamic analysis of the firmware and analyzing network traffic. The discovered protocol exposes severe design flaws that allow attackers to control or deny the service of victim plugs. Our manual reverse engineering framework is generic and can be applied to both read-only and writable Embedded Linux filesystems.