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Qifan Hu
School of Business Administration, Nanchang Institute of Technology, Nanchang 330099, China

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Journal article
Published: 28 October 2020 in International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
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The reduction of fresh agricultural product volume loss throughout the supply chain system is of high importance due to their perishable nature and impact on society, the economy, and environment. In this paper, three models for two-stage pricing, coordination, and volume loss reduction of the supply chain where third-party logistics service providers and retailers act as a Stackelberg leader and a follower for fresh agricultural products are developed, taking into account both volume loss during transport and quality loss in retail in the presence of strategic consumers. The following results are drawn from the contract for sharing revenues and service costs: (1) The supply chain achieve coordination and the products are healthier for consumers; (2) the coordination leads to a reduction in the three types of volume losses simultaneously only if the lowest marginal costs of the supply chain occur under certain conditions; and (3) the increase in the service sensitivity coefficient, the increase in the freshness discount coefficient under certain conditions, the decrease in the consumer benefit discount coefficient under certain conditions, and the decrease in the price sensitivity coefficient lead to an increase in the profit of the supply chain and a reduction in the three types of volume losses.

ACS Style

Fang Qiu; Qifan Hu; Bing Xu. Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chain Coordination and Volume Loss Reduction Based on Strategic Consumer. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2020, 17, 7915 .

AMA Style

Fang Qiu, Qifan Hu, Bing Xu. Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chain Coordination and Volume Loss Reduction Based on Strategic Consumer. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2020; 17 (21):7915.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Fang Qiu; Qifan Hu; Bing Xu. 2020. "Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chain Coordination and Volume Loss Reduction Based on Strategic Consumer." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 21: 7915.

Journal article
Published: 04 June 2019 in International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
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The popularity of e-commerce has impacted traditional retail business. Farmer cooperatives running green agri-food pick-your-own (PYO) farms are facing the choice of whether or not to adopt online channels. PYO operation refers to consumers picking and purchasing the agri-food growing on a farm, and due to it being environmentally-friendly, healthy, and popular, it has been widely adopted by many farm cooperatives. This paper aims to discuss the practicality of introducing online channels to already established PYO farms in the green agri-food supply chain (GASC), who can personally take charge of the online channel or transfer it to one online retailer. Firstly, we constructed the demand functions of green agri-food by putting consumer utility, the freshness of agri-food, and transportation cost into consideration. Secondly, five decision models are built to characterize five operation modes, namely pure PYO mode, self-operated dual-channel mode, decentralized dual-channel mode, centralized dual-channel mode, and contractual cooperation mode. Furthermore, by taking price, demand, and profit with different modes into consideration, we are able to explore the introduction of online channels and green brand construction. Finally, numerical analysis is performed. We found that: (1) introducing an online channel is preferable strategy since the profit of the farmer cooperative in pure PYO mode is always less than the profit of a farmer cooperative in non-self-operated dual-channel modes; (2) the decision of self-operating an online channel is related to the fixed cost of creating a new online channel and the green food brand effect of online channel, and it is the optimal mode in some cases, while the contractual cooperation mode is the optimal mode in the remaining cases; and (3) the green food brand effect of online channels is does not necessarily improve with scale, and the initial freshness has a positive relationship to the profit, demand, and price of farmer cooperatives and online retailers.

ACS Style

Qifan Hu; Qianyun Xu; Bing Xu; And Bing Xu. Introducing of Online Channel and Management Strategy for Green Agri-food Supply Chain based on Pick-Your-Own Operations. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2019, 16, 1990 .

AMA Style

Qifan Hu, Qianyun Xu, Bing Xu, And Bing Xu. Introducing of Online Channel and Management Strategy for Green Agri-food Supply Chain based on Pick-Your-Own Operations. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2019; 16 (11):1990.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Qifan Hu; Qianyun Xu; Bing Xu; And Bing Xu. 2019. "Introducing of Online Channel and Management Strategy for Green Agri-food Supply Chain based on Pick-Your-Own Operations." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 16, no. 11: 1990.

Journal article
Published: 06 February 2019 in Sustainability
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This paper aims to investigate the optimal strategies for both centralized and decentralized modes in a two-echelon omni-channel organic agricultural supply chain (OASC) which consists of one farmer cooperative and one online retailer. Furthermore, the contracts of cooperation between the members in OASC are discussed. Based on both theory differential game and bi-level programming, we utilize the Nerlove–Arrow model and Stackelberg model to examine five cases of decision modes for both agents in the OASC. Then, we achieve the optimal strategies where the specified sets of organic growing effort, organic traceability technology effort, propaganda input, and service input can guarantee the maximization of the related profits. As a result, we could obtain the values of the corresponding optimal profits. For the centralized decision mode, the farmer cooperative and the online retailer make decisions with the goal of maximizing the overall profits of the OASC. Meanwhile, for the decentralized decision mode with four different cases, each member will independently make a decision with the goal of maximizing his own profit respectively. In detail, as for the fully decentralized decision mode, no contracts exist in OASC; regarding the decentralized decision mode with an information traceability cost sharing contract, two members pay the information traceability cost together; and for the decentralized decision mode with a revenue sharing contract, two members share the revenue together; as to the decentralized decision mode with a comprehensive contract, there are two cooperative ways that information traceability cost sharing and revenue sharing can be achieved. In addition, we also considered factors such as the consumer preferences of organic products and the cross influence between channels in models. Finally, through sensitivity analysis and comparison of optimal strategies and profits, we found that: (1) high consumer preferences of organic products and high cross influence between channels are profitable; and (2) the choice of contract is influenced by the relative size of the offline marginal income ratio and the online marginal income ratio.

ACS Style

Qifan Hu; Bing Xu. Differential Game Analysis of Optimal Strategies and Cooperation in Omni-Channel Organic Agricultural Supply Chain. Sustainability 2019, 11, 848 .

AMA Style

Qifan Hu, Bing Xu. Differential Game Analysis of Optimal Strategies and Cooperation in Omni-Channel Organic Agricultural Supply Chain. Sustainability. 2019; 11 (3):848.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Qifan Hu; Bing Xu. 2019. "Differential Game Analysis of Optimal Strategies and Cooperation in Omni-Channel Organic Agricultural Supply Chain." Sustainability 11, no. 3: 848.

Journal article
Published: 07 June 2018 in Sustainability
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In this paper, we explore the pricing and greenness issues of two competitive firms without and with consumer heterogeneity. We derive and compare the optimal solutions and profits employed by firms under different scenarios. Then, we identify the effects of consumer heterogeneity under different competition intensities. The analytical results reveal that if market competition is at a relatively low level, we find that: (i) when the greenness sensitivity of consumers with no preference is sufficiently small, more consumers have high environmental awareness, and companies easily achieve their environmental goals as well as economic goals; (ii) when the greenness sensitivity of consumers with no preference is at a medium level, as the fraction of consumers with high environmental awareness increases, and the firm might achieve economic goals at the cost of reducing environmental goals; and (iii) when the greenness sensitivity of consumers with no preference is at a high level, the fraction of consumers with high environmental awareness increases, but firms might have more difficulty achieving their environmental and economic goals. On the other hand, if the market competition is at a relatively high level, the presence of consumer heterogeneity can help improve environmental goals, but make achievement of economic goals difficult.

ACS Style

Bing Xu; Qingyun Xu; Qiushi Bo; Qifan Hu. Green Product Development with Consumer Heterogeneity under Horizontal Competition. Sustainability 2018, 10, 1902 .

AMA Style

Bing Xu, Qingyun Xu, Qiushi Bo, Qifan Hu. Green Product Development with Consumer Heterogeneity under Horizontal Competition. Sustainability. 2018; 10 (6):1902.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Bing Xu; Qingyun Xu; Qiushi Bo; Qifan Hu. 2018. "Green Product Development with Consumer Heterogeneity under Horizontal Competition." Sustainability 10, no. 6: 1902.