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The reduction of fresh agricultural product volume loss throughout the supply chain system is of high importance due to their perishable nature and impact on society, the economy, and environment. In this paper, three models for two-stage pricing, coordination, and volume loss reduction of the supply chain where third-party logistics service providers and retailers act as a Stackelberg leader and a follower for fresh agricultural products are developed, taking into account both volume loss during transport and quality loss in retail in the presence of strategic consumers. The following results are drawn from the contract for sharing revenues and service costs: (1) The supply chain achieve coordination and the products are healthier for consumers; (2) the coordination leads to a reduction in the three types of volume losses simultaneously only if the lowest marginal costs of the supply chain occur under certain conditions; and (3) the increase in the service sensitivity coefficient, the increase in the freshness discount coefficient under certain conditions, the decrease in the consumer benefit discount coefficient under certain conditions, and the decrease in the price sensitivity coefficient lead to an increase in the profit of the supply chain and a reduction in the three types of volume losses.
Fang Qiu; Qifan Hu; Bing Xu. Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chain Coordination and Volume Loss Reduction Based on Strategic Consumer. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2020, 17, 7915 .
AMA StyleFang Qiu, Qifan Hu, Bing Xu. Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chain Coordination and Volume Loss Reduction Based on Strategic Consumer. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2020; 17 (21):7915.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFang Qiu; Qifan Hu; Bing Xu. 2020. "Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chain Coordination and Volume Loss Reduction Based on Strategic Consumer." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 21: 7915.
Although supply quality management has been studied extensively, one important marketing phenomenon, that is, reference effect has been rarely considered in dual-channel supply chain quality management literatures. In fact, the quality reference effect is also an important factor which influences consumer purchasing behavior. We aim to explore the influence of the reference effect on the optimal decisions and performance of a dual-channel supply. Thus, we formulate dynamic models that include the product quality reference effect and the service quality reference effect in a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under the different decision-making scenarios. Utilizing differential game theory, optimal decisions are obtained for the product quality and service quality decision under the different decision-making scenarios. In addition, the optimal decisions and profits are compared, then a service cost-sharing coordinating mechanism is proposed and proven to be effective in the supply chain system. The main results show when the initial reference service quality is low, the consumer service quality reference effect is beneficial to the manufacturer. The spillover effect of service quality is not conducive to the retailer and the manufacturer. When the initial reference product quality is low, both online and offline product quality reference effects are beneficial to the retailer and the manufacturer. The stable (or final) reference quality will not be affected by the initial reference quality. The sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision making. We design a cost-sharing coordinating mechanism to eliminate the double marginal effect.
Zhou Xideng; Xu Bing; Xie Fei; Li Yu. Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain. Sustainability 2020, 12, 2296 .
AMA StyleZhou Xideng, Xu Bing, Xie Fei, Li Yu. Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain. Sustainability. 2020; 12 (6):2296.
Chicago/Turabian StyleZhou Xideng; Xu Bing; Xie Fei; Li Yu. 2020. "Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain." Sustainability 12, no. 6: 2296.
New trade-in services such as online trade-in, trade-in on e-commerce platforms and omni-channel trade-in, are emerging due to the development of e-commerce. To offer these new trade-in services, firms need to determine the optimal product price and rebate and decide whether to pay the rebate with a gift card (G) or cash (C). To address these challenges for firms, our paper considers a firm selling a new product to new consumers and offering a trade-in service to replacement consumers. In addition, we develop theoretical models to examine the optimal decisions in the cases of G and C and explore the optimal payment for the rebate. We reveal that G payment is a better choice for the firm only if the used product residual value is relatively low and the market size ratio between replacement and new consumers is relatively low; otherwise, the firm should choose C payment. Interestingly, replacement consumers’ preferred trade-in rebate payment (i.e., C payment) leads a lower trade-in demand than G payment and C payment may be harmful. In the extension, we consider a firm with online and offline sales channels and different types of replacement consumers who own different used products, and find that our main results regarding the optimal rebate payment still hold. Moreover, we find that in the context of a used product with a relatively medium residual value, firms with online and offline sales channels are more likely to choose G than firms with one sales channel; otherwise, firms are more likely to choose C.
Kaiying Cao; Guoxin Han; Bing Xu; Jia Wang. Gift card payment or cash payment: Which payment is suitable for trade-in rebate? Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 2020, 134, 101857 .
AMA StyleKaiying Cao, Guoxin Han, Bing Xu, Jia Wang. Gift card payment or cash payment: Which payment is suitable for trade-in rebate? Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review. 2020; 134 ():101857.
Chicago/Turabian StyleKaiying Cao; Guoxin Han; Bing Xu; Jia Wang. 2020. "Gift card payment or cash payment: Which payment is suitable for trade-in rebate?" Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 134, no. : 101857.
Considering consumers are increasingly shopping online nowadays and the online sales market is dominated by e‐commerce giants, traditional retailers need to choose whether to enter e‐commerce platforms. Moreover, traditional retailers need to determine whether to offer offline return services considering online return services are very popular. To address these challenges, we explore a retailer's optimal offline return strategy and channel choice of whether or not to enter a platform in the contexts of symmetric information and asymmetric information, respectively. We present conditions for the retailer to share information. Interestingly, we find that the retailer in some conditions has no motivation to improve customer satisfaction rate of offline store. Most important, we find that the retailer's channel choice depends on the magnitude of the annual service fee that is affected by offline return strategy and asymmetric information, and the offline return strategy depends on the magnitude of the average residual value of returned products.
Kaiying Cao; Yuqiu Xu; Jiajia Cao; Bing Xu; Jia Wang. Whether a retailer should enter an e‐commerce platform taking into account consumer returns. International Transactions in Operational Research 2020, 27, 2878 -2898.
AMA StyleKaiying Cao, Yuqiu Xu, Jiajia Cao, Bing Xu, Jia Wang. Whether a retailer should enter an e‐commerce platform taking into account consumer returns. International Transactions in Operational Research. 2020; 27 (6):2878-2898.
Chicago/Turabian StyleKaiying Cao; Yuqiu Xu; Jiajia Cao; Bing Xu; Jia Wang. 2020. "Whether a retailer should enter an e‐commerce platform taking into account consumer returns." International Transactions in Operational Research 27, no. 6: 2878-2898.
: This paper is motivated by the dilemma faced by firms who sell new and remanufactured products offline that need to consider whether to enter e-commerce platforms considering that more and more consumers are shopping online on e-commerce platforms rather than shopping offline. Our paper aims to help firms with new and remanufactured products make a channel choice and determine product pricing strategies in the contexts of e-commerce and carbon tax policy. Our paper uses optimization theory, game theory, utility functions and profit-maximization models to investigate the optimal channel choice of whether a firm should enter an e-commerce platform; it also investigates the optimal prices of new and remanufactured products and referral fees in two cases—the firm does not enter the platform (N) and the firm enters the platform (Y). Some insights are presented as follows: We found that the firm should enter the platform if the annual service fee is relatively low, otherwise, the firm should not enter the platform. Interestingly, in the case of a firm with an offline store with relatively large operational costs or hassle costs, the firm is more reluctant to enter the platform. In the extension, we considered some consumers who only purchase offline products, and found that the firm considering these consumers is more likely to choose not to enter the platform. Moreover, we argue that the carbon tax policy has a positive effect on product prices but a negative effect on referral fees charged by the platform, and the choice of Y hurts the environment due to a relatively high total carbon emission.
Jiajia Cao; Bing Xu; Jia Wang. Optimal Channel Choice of Firms with New and Remanufactured Products in the Contexts of E-Commerce and Carbon Tax Policy. Sustainability 2019, 11, 5407 .
AMA StyleJiajia Cao, Bing Xu, Jia Wang. Optimal Channel Choice of Firms with New and Remanufactured Products in the Contexts of E-Commerce and Carbon Tax Policy. Sustainability. 2019; 11 (19):5407.
Chicago/Turabian StyleJiajia Cao; Bing Xu; Jia Wang. 2019. "Optimal Channel Choice of Firms with New and Remanufactured Products in the Contexts of E-Commerce and Carbon Tax Policy." Sustainability 11, no. 19: 5407.
The green supply chain (GSC) can effectively reduce the waste of resources and avoid environmental pollution. For a closed-loop supply chain network consisting of multiple manufacturers, multiple retailers, and multiple consumer and recycling markets, we assume that retailers are responsible for the recycling of used products, manufacturers use raw materials to produce new products and recycled products for remanufacturing, and government departments subsidize all manufacturers and retailers for GSC technology investment. Then, the equilibrium conditions of manufacturers, retailers, demand markets, and recycling markets are obtained by using the variational inequality method, complementarity theorem, and Nash equilibrium theory, and the variational inequality model of the closed-loop supply chain network multiphase equilibrium is established. Based on numerical simulation, the optimal technology investment decision of green supply chain under different government subsidy rates, and the influence of market structure and enterprise cost asymmetry on the equilibrium solution of supply chain network are analyzed. The results show that government subsidies can effectively promote enterprises to upgrade their level of GSC technology investment. The intensification of enterprise competition and the asymmetry of enterprise costs will affect the composition of enterprise profits and the allocation of profits between enterprises, and the former will weaken the effect of government subsidies.
Haixiang Wu; Bing Xu; Ding Zhang. Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model with Subsidy on Green Supply Chain Technology Investment. Sustainability 2019, 11, 4403 .
AMA StyleHaixiang Wu, Bing Xu, Ding Zhang. Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model with Subsidy on Green Supply Chain Technology Investment. Sustainability. 2019; 11 (16):4403.
Chicago/Turabian StyleHaixiang Wu; Bing Xu; Ding Zhang. 2019. "Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model with Subsidy on Green Supply Chain Technology Investment." Sustainability 11, no. 16: 4403.
The popularity of e-commerce has impacted traditional retail business. Farmer cooperatives running green agri-food pick-your-own (PYO) farms are facing the choice of whether or not to adopt online channels. PYO operation refers to consumers picking and purchasing the agri-food growing on a farm, and due to it being environmentally-friendly, healthy, and popular, it has been widely adopted by many farm cooperatives. This paper aims to discuss the practicality of introducing online channels to already established PYO farms in the green agri-food supply chain (GASC), who can personally take charge of the online channel or transfer it to one online retailer. Firstly, we constructed the demand functions of green agri-food by putting consumer utility, the freshness of agri-food, and transportation cost into consideration. Secondly, five decision models are built to characterize five operation modes, namely pure PYO mode, self-operated dual-channel mode, decentralized dual-channel mode, centralized dual-channel mode, and contractual cooperation mode. Furthermore, by taking price, demand, and profit with different modes into consideration, we are able to explore the introduction of online channels and green brand construction. Finally, numerical analysis is performed. We found that: (1) introducing an online channel is preferable strategy since the profit of the farmer cooperative in pure PYO mode is always less than the profit of a farmer cooperative in non-self-operated dual-channel modes; (2) the decision of self-operating an online channel is related to the fixed cost of creating a new online channel and the green food brand effect of online channel, and it is the optimal mode in some cases, while the contractual cooperation mode is the optimal mode in the remaining cases; and (3) the green food brand effect of online channels is does not necessarily improve with scale, and the initial freshness has a positive relationship to the profit, demand, and price of farmer cooperatives and online retailers.
Qifan Hu; Qianyun Xu; Bing Xu; And Bing Xu. Introducing of Online Channel and Management Strategy for Green Agri-food Supply Chain based on Pick-Your-Own Operations. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 2019, 16, 1990 .
AMA StyleQifan Hu, Qianyun Xu, Bing Xu, And Bing Xu. Introducing of Online Channel and Management Strategy for Green Agri-food Supply Chain based on Pick-Your-Own Operations. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2019; 16 (11):1990.
Chicago/Turabian StyleQifan Hu; Qianyun Xu; Bing Xu; And Bing Xu. 2019. "Introducing of Online Channel and Management Strategy for Green Agri-food Supply Chain based on Pick-Your-Own Operations." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 16, no. 11: 1990.
This paper aims to investigate the optimal strategies for both centralized and decentralized modes in a two-echelon omni-channel organic agricultural supply chain (OASC) which consists of one farmer cooperative and one online retailer. Furthermore, the contracts of cooperation between the members in OASC are discussed. Based on both theory differential game and bi-level programming, we utilize the Nerlove–Arrow model and Stackelberg model to examine five cases of decision modes for both agents in the OASC. Then, we achieve the optimal strategies where the specified sets of organic growing effort, organic traceability technology effort, propaganda input, and service input can guarantee the maximization of the related profits. As a result, we could obtain the values of the corresponding optimal profits. For the centralized decision mode, the farmer cooperative and the online retailer make decisions with the goal of maximizing the overall profits of the OASC. Meanwhile, for the decentralized decision mode with four different cases, each member will independently make a decision with the goal of maximizing his own profit respectively. In detail, as for the fully decentralized decision mode, no contracts exist in OASC; regarding the decentralized decision mode with an information traceability cost sharing contract, two members pay the information traceability cost together; and for the decentralized decision mode with a revenue sharing contract, two members share the revenue together; as to the decentralized decision mode with a comprehensive contract, there are two cooperative ways that information traceability cost sharing and revenue sharing can be achieved. In addition, we also considered factors such as the consumer preferences of organic products and the cross influence between channels in models. Finally, through sensitivity analysis and comparison of optimal strategies and profits, we found that: (1) high consumer preferences of organic products and high cross influence between channels are profitable; and (2) the choice of contract is influenced by the relative size of the offline marginal income ratio and the online marginal income ratio.
Qifan Hu; Bing Xu. Differential Game Analysis of Optimal Strategies and Cooperation in Omni-Channel Organic Agricultural Supply Chain. Sustainability 2019, 11, 848 .
AMA StyleQifan Hu, Bing Xu. Differential Game Analysis of Optimal Strategies and Cooperation in Omni-Channel Organic Agricultural Supply Chain. Sustainability. 2019; 11 (3):848.
Chicago/Turabian StyleQifan Hu; Bing Xu. 2019. "Differential Game Analysis of Optimal Strategies and Cooperation in Omni-Channel Organic Agricultural Supply Chain." Sustainability 11, no. 3: 848.
Carbon tax policy is widely adopted by many countries to curb carbon emissions. In the context of carbon tax policy, firms have more incentive to improve carbon reduction levels by reducing their carbon tax costs. However, firms need to bear carbon reduction costs that may cause shortage of capital. Thus, firms may face problems of financial constraints, which may demotivate firms to produce greener products. To address the decision‐making challenges of firms in the contexts of carbon tax policy and financial constraints, we consider a supply chain with a manufacturer who produces green products and a retailer who sells these products. Our study develops five models to investigate the two firms’ optimal wholesale price, carbon reduction level and ordering quantity, according to the manufacturer and retailer with or without financial constraints. Our goal in this study is to explore how carbon tax policy and banks’ interest rates affect the profits of the two firms, supply chain and consumer surplus. Certain managerial insights are obtained as follows. We demonstrate that carbon tax policy and banks’ interest rates demotivate the manufacturer to produce greener products and demotivate the retailer to order more products. If the interest rate to the manufacturer (retailer) is relatively low, then the manufacturer with financial constraint benefits (harms) the consumers compared with the retailer with financial constraint. Importantly, our analysis suggests that carbon tax policy harms the firms but benefits consumers, and the government in some conditions should reduce unit carbon tax.
Kaiying Cao; Bing Xu; Yi He; Qingyun Xu. Optimal carbon reduction level and ordering quantity under financial constraints. International Transactions in Operational Research 2018, 27, 2270 -2293.
AMA StyleKaiying Cao, Bing Xu, Yi He, Qingyun Xu. Optimal carbon reduction level and ordering quantity under financial constraints. International Transactions in Operational Research. 2018; 27 (5):2270-2293.
Chicago/Turabian StyleKaiying Cao; Bing Xu; Yi He; Qingyun Xu. 2018. "Optimal carbon reduction level and ordering quantity under financial constraints." International Transactions in Operational Research 27, no. 5: 2270-2293.
In this paper, we explore the pricing and greenness issues of two competitive firms without and with consumer heterogeneity. We derive and compare the optimal solutions and profits employed by firms under different scenarios. Then, we identify the effects of consumer heterogeneity under different competition intensities. The analytical results reveal that if market competition is at a relatively low level, we find that: (i) when the greenness sensitivity of consumers with no preference is sufficiently small, more consumers have high environmental awareness, and companies easily achieve their environmental goals as well as economic goals; (ii) when the greenness sensitivity of consumers with no preference is at a medium level, as the fraction of consumers with high environmental awareness increases, and the firm might achieve economic goals at the cost of reducing environmental goals; and (iii) when the greenness sensitivity of consumers with no preference is at a high level, the fraction of consumers with high environmental awareness increases, but firms might have more difficulty achieving their environmental and economic goals. On the other hand, if the market competition is at a relatively high level, the presence of consumer heterogeneity can help improve environmental goals, but make achievement of economic goals difficult.
Bing Xu; Qingyun Xu; Qiushi Bo; Qifan Hu. Green Product Development with Consumer Heterogeneity under Horizontal Competition. Sustainability 2018, 10, 1902 .
AMA StyleBing Xu, Qingyun Xu, Qiushi Bo, Qifan Hu. Green Product Development with Consumer Heterogeneity under Horizontal Competition. Sustainability. 2018; 10 (6):1902.
Chicago/Turabian StyleBing Xu; Qingyun Xu; Qiushi Bo; Qifan Hu. 2018. "Green Product Development with Consumer Heterogeneity under Horizontal Competition." Sustainability 10, no. 6: 1902.
Purpose This paper aims to address the following problems: What are the firms’ optimal pricing and quality policies under three scenarios (no bundling, pure bundling and mixed bundling)? In what condition will one bundling strategy dominate the others? How does the degree of complementarity affect the firms’ decision? Design/methodology/approach Using the game theory, this study first establishes three models of bundling strategies: no bundling, pure bundling and mixed bundling and then obtains the optimal prices and quality decisions. This study uses numerical analysis to explore the relationships between the prices (demands and profits) and some key parameters and to obtain some valuable management complications. Findings Some interesting and valuable management implications are established: regardless of the degree of complementarity, adopting a pure bundling or mixed bundling strategy is better than separately selling an individual product; a high degree of complementarity leads to reduced profit in the no bundling and mixed bundling scenarios, whereas the condition in the pure bundling strategy is the opposite; and when the degree of complementarity is adequately large, choosing pure bundling strategy is more profitable. Research limitations/implications On the one hand, this study does not calculate the profit sharing ratio, and hence, the equilibrium profit sharing ratio can be explored in future work. On the other hand, marketing efforts (e.g. advertising and promotion) can be included in the study. Practical implications This study derives the necessary conditions for the most effective bundling strategy that maximizes firm’s profits, and these conclusions can provide a decision reference to the bundling decisions of firms. Originality/value First, the optimal bundling strategies in a horizontal supply chain consisting of two firms is considered. Under the pure and mixed bundling strategies, the two firms sell the bundled product by building a cooperative program. Second, both the pricing policies and quality decisions of supply chain members under the different bundling strategies are studied.
Qingyun Xu; Bing Xu; Ping Wang; Yi He. Bundling strategies for complementary products in a horizontal supply chain. Kybernetes 2018, 47, 1158 -1177.
AMA StyleQingyun Xu, Bing Xu, Ping Wang, Yi He. Bundling strategies for complementary products in a horizontal supply chain. Kybernetes. 2018; 47 (6):1158-1177.
Chicago/Turabian StyleQingyun Xu; Bing Xu; Ping Wang; Yi He. 2018. "Bundling strategies for complementary products in a horizontal supply chain." Kybernetes 47, no. 6: 1158-1177.