In the process of promoting demand-side management, the core stakeholder groups are government departments, power grid companies, and electricity users. Due to the different positions and conflicting interests of the three parties in the game, intense and complex battles will occur. This paper investigates a tripartite evolutionary game involving government, power grid companies, and electricity users in the context of demand-side management (DSM) and analyzes the dynamic interactions between government departments, power grid companies, and electricity users within the framework of DSM using evolutionary game theory. Using evolutionary game theory, we explore how incentives and strategic interactions among these three stakeholders evolve over time, affecting the stability of DSM policies. The model addresses the asymmetry in the decision-making process and examines the dynamic equilibrium outcomes under various scenarios. The results provide insights into the optimal design of incentive mechanisms to enhance DSM adoption. The findings offer practical recommendations to improve DSM policies, fostering balanced interests between government, grid companies, and users. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of strategic interactions in DSM, revealing how adaptive behaviors can enhance energy efficiency. It also underscores the importance of carefully designed incentive mechanisms in achieving long-term stability and cooperation among key stakeholders.
Electricity markets are intricate systems that facilitate efficient energy exchange within interconnected grids. With the rise of low-carbon transportation driven by environmental policies and tech advancements, energy trading has become crucial. This trend towards Electric Vehicles (EVs) is bolstered by the pivotal role played by EV charging operators in providing essential charging infrastructure and services for widespread EV adoption. This paper introduces a blockchain-assisted secure electricity trading framework between EV charging operators and the electricity market with renewable energy sources. We propose a single-leader, multi-follower Stackelberg game between the electricity market and EV charging operators. In the two-stage Stackelberg game, the electricity market acts as the leader, deciding the price of electric energy. The EV charging aggregator leverages blockchain technology to record and verify energy trading transactions securely. The EV charging operators, acting as followers, then decide their demand for electric energy based on the set price. To find the Stackelberg equilibrium, we employ a Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) algorithm that tackles non-stationary challenges through policy, action space, and reward function formulation. To optimize efficiency, we propose the integration of pruning techniques into DRL, referred to as Tiny DRL. Numerical results demonstrate that our proposed schemes outperform traditional approaches.
To achieve low carbon emissions in the power system and contribute to economic growth, a low-carbon optimization scheduling strategy for a power system, considering carbon responsibility sharing and electric vehicle demand response, is proposed based on the establishment of a flexible-load model guided by carbon potential. Firstly, utilizing the principle of proportional sharing to track carbon emission flow and establish a carbon emission flow model. Secondly, based on the Shapley value carbon responsibility allocation method, the reasonable range of carbon responsibility on each load side is calculated, and a hierarchical carbon price is established. A load aggregator demand response carbon emission model is established using the node carbon potential, and a dual-layer optimization scheduling model for the power system based on the node carbon potential demand response is constructed. The upper layer of the model is the optimal economic dispatch of the power grid operator, and the lower layer is the demand response economic dispatch of the load aggregator. Through numerical verification, the carbon trading model takes into account the system’s carbon emissions and overall operating costs while balancing the system’s low-carbon and economic aspects.
2 September 2025 in International Journal of Computational Intelligence Systems
This study develops a centralized reinforcement learning framework, employing Q-learning, for efficient vehicle-to-grid (V2G) scheduling of large electric vehicle (EV) fleets. To address scalability challenges and inherent uncertainties in user behavior, the framework utilizes an aggregated state representation. This state captures the time-of-day, the distribution of the fleet’s state of charge (SOC) across discrete bins, and an estimated user adherence factor. The central agent learns a control policy based on this aggregated state to dynamically issue charging, discharging, or idle commands to EVs grouped within specific SOC bins. The primary objectives are to enhance power grid stability by minimizing the peak-to-average ratio (PAR) and to improve the economic viability of V2G participation for EV owners. Simulations conducted under a 40% EV penetration level (relative to a 300,000 vehicle base fleet) demonstrate the proposed method’s effectiveness: it reduced the grid PAR to 1.0683, compared to 1.0729 for a baseline uncontrolled charging scenario. Critically, the proposed method transformed the economic outcome, achieving positive average daily earnings of $1.17 per EV, in stark contrast to an average daily loss of $6.75 per EV under the baseline. These results validate the potential of the proposed intelligent, centralized control strategy using aggregated information to effectively manage large-scale V2G systems, enhance grid stability, and provide economic benefits under practical behavioral assumptions.
This paper proposes a robust strategy to select the load identification features, which is based on particle resampling to promote the performance for the successive load identification. Firstly, the sliding window incorporated with the bilateral cumulative sum control chart (CUSUM) method is utilized to obtain the load event. Then, the minimum inner-class variance, using the time-serial data, is introduced to judge the happened time as precise as possible, thus marking the changing point of the state of load for the following feature extraction. Due to the fluctuating data of current and voltage sampled by the monitoring device, the particle resampling method, containing the importance principle, is applied to find the steady and effectiveness point, ensuring that the obtained features have the desired fit with its actual features. The fitness measurement is then carried out by using the 2-D fuzzy theory. Finally, the proposed method was tested on the real household measurements in the labs. The result demonstrates an improvement in obtaining the desired load features when applied to the real household for the following load identification.
China’s power generation system has undergone reforms, leading to a competitive electricity market where independent producers participate through competitive bidding. With the rise of low-carbon policies, producers must optimize bidding strategies while reducing carbon emissions, creating complex interactions with local governments. Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is well-suited to analyze these dynamics. This study begins by summarizing the fundamental concepts of electricity trading markets, including transaction models, bidding mechanisms, and carbon reduction strategies. Existing research on the application of evolutionary game theory in power markets is reviewed, with a focus on theoretical constructs such as evolutionary stable strategies and replicator dynamics. Based on this foundation, the study conducts a detailed mathematical analysis of symmetric and asymmetric two-group evolutionary game models in general market scenarios. Building upon these models, a three-group evolutionary game framework is developed to analyze interactions within power producer groups and between producers and regulators under low-carbon mechanisms. A core innovation of this study is the incorporation of a case study based on China’s electricity market, which examines the evolutionary dynamics between local governments and power producers regarding carbon reduction strategies. This includes analyzing how regulatory incentives, market-clearing prices, and demand-side factors influence producers’ bidding and emission reduction behaviors. The study also provides a detailed analysis of the bidding strategies for small, medium, and large power producers, revealing the significant impact of carbon pricing and market-clearing prices on strategic decision-making. Specifically, the study finds that small producers tend to adopt more conservative bidding strategies, aligning closely with market-clearing prices, while large producers take advantage of economies of scale, adjusting their strategies at higher capacities. The study explores the conditions under which carbon emission reduction strategies achieve stable equilibrium, as well as the implications of these equilibria for both market efficiency and environmental sustainability. The study reveals that integrating carbon reduction strategies into power market dynamics significantly impacts bidding behaviors and long-term market stability, especially under the influence of governmental penalties and incentives. The findings provide actionable insights for both power producers and policymakers, contributing to the advancement of low-carbon market theories and supporting the global transition to sustainable energy systems.