Luis Mario Floría

Prof. Luis Mario Floría


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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10 February 2009 in Physical Review E
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Journal Article
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LFLuis Mario Floría
Luis Mario Floría
Carlos Gracia-LázaroCarlos Gracia-Lázaro
Carlos Gracia-Lázaro
JGJesús Gomez Gardeñes
Jesús Gomez Gardeñes
YMYamir Moreno
Yamir Moreno
In evolutionary dynamics the understanding of cooperative phenomena in natural and social systems has been the subject of intense research during decades. We focus attention here on the so-called “lattice reciprocity” mechanisms that enhance evolutionary survival of the cooperative phenotype in the prisoner’s dilemma game when the population of Darwinian replicators interact through a fixed network of social contacts. Exact results on a “dipole model” are presented, along with a mean-field analysis as well as results from extensive numerical Monte Carlo simulations. The theoretical framework used is that of standard statistical mechanics of macroscopic systems, but with no energy considerations. We illustrate the power of this perspective on social modeling, by consistently interpreting the onset of lattice reciprocity as a thermodynamical phase transition that, moreover, cannot be captured by a purely mean-field approach.

26 October 2009 in Physical Review E
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Carlos Gracia-LázaroCarlos Gracia-Lázaro
Carlos Gracia-Lázaro
LLL. F. Lafuerza
L. F. Lafuerza
LFLuis Mario Floría
Luis Mario Floría
YMYamir Moreno
Yamir Moreno
In the Axelrod's model of cultural dissemination, we consider the mobility of cultural agents through the introduction of a density of empty sites and the possibility that agents in a dissimilar neighborhood can move to them if their mean cultural similarity with the neighborhood is below some threshold. While for low values of the density of empty sites, the mobility enhances the convergence to a global culture, for high enough values of it, the dynamics can lead to the coexistence of disconnected domains of different cultures. In this regime, the increase in initial cultural diversity paradoxically increases the convergence to a dominant culture. Further increase in diversity leads to the fragmentation of the dominant culture into domains, forever changing in shape and number, as an effect of the never ending eroding activity of cultural minorities.

4 May 2011 in Physical Review E
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Carlos Gracia-LázaroCarlos Gracia-Lázaro
Carlos Gracia-Lázaro
LFLuis Mario Floría
Luis Mario Floría
YMYamir Moreno
Yamir Moreno
The Axelrod-Schelling model incorporates into the original Axelrod's model of cultural dissemination the possibility that cultural agents placed in culturally dissimilar environments move to other places, the strength of this mobility being controlled by an intolerance parameter. By allowing heterogeneity in the intolerance of cultural agents, and considering it as a cultural feature, i.e., susceptible of cultural transmission (thus breaking the original symmetry of Axelrod-Schelling dynamics), we address here the question of whether tolerant or intolerant traits are more likely to become dominant in the long-term cultural dynamics. Our results show that tolerant traits possess a clear selective advantage in the framework of the Axelrod-Schelling model. We show that the reason for this selective advantage is the development, as time evolves, of a positive correlation between the number of neighbors that an agent has in its environment and its tolerant character.

14 October 2014 in Physical Review E
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Journal Article
Open access
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Carlos Gracia-LázaroCarlos Gracia-Lázaro
Carlos Gracia-Lázaro
JGJesús Gomez Gardeñes
Jesús Gomez Gardeñes
LFLuis Mario Floría
Luis Mario Floría
YMY. Moreno
Y. Moreno
In this paper we explore the onset of cooperative traits in the public goods game. This well-known game involves N-agent interactions and thus reproduces a large number of social scenarios in which cooperation appears to be essential. Many studies have recently addressed how the structure of the interaction patterns influences the emergence of cooperation. Here we study how information about the payoffs collected by each individual in the different groups it participates in influences the decisions made by its group partners. Our results point out that cross-information plays a fundamental and positive role in the evolution of cooperation for different versions of the public goods game and different interaction structures.

26 March 2009
Verified
Book
Closed access
MZMuhammad H. Zaman
Muhammad H. Zaman
JCJason K. Cheung
Jason K. Cheung
VSVincent K. Shen
Vincent K. Shen
JEJeffrey R. Errington
Jeffrey R. Errington
TTThomas M. Truskett
Thomas M. Truskett
MDMichael W. Deem
Michael W. Deem
Cells are complex objects, representing a multitude of structures and processes. In order to understand the organization, interaction and hierarchy of these structures and processes, a quantitative understanding is absolutely critical. Traditionally, statistical mechanics-based treatment of biological systems has focused on the molecular level, with larger systems being ignored. This book integrates understanding from the molecular to the cellular and multi-cellular level in a quantitative framework that will benefit a wide audience engaged in biological, biochemical, biophysical and clinical research. It will build new bridges of quantitative understanding that link fundamental physical principles governing cellular structure and function with implications in clinical and biomedical contexts.

3 January 2017 in Games
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Journal Article
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Carlos Gracia-LázaroCarlos Gracia-Lázaro
Carlos Gracia-Lázaro
LFLuis Mario Floría
Luis Mario Floría
YMYamir Moreno
Yamir Moreno
The outcome of many social and economic interactions, such as stock-market transactions, is strongly determined by the predictions that agents make about the behavior of other individuals. Cognitive hierarchy theory provides a framework to model the consequences of forecasting accuracy that has proven to fit data from certain types of game theory experiments, such as Keynesian beauty contests and entry games. Here, we focus on symmetric two-player-two-action games and establish an algorithm to find the players’ strategies according to the cognitive hierarchy approach. We show that the snowdrift game exhibits a pattern of behavior whose complexity grows as the cognitive levels of players increases. In addition to finding the solutions up to the third cognitive level, we demonstrate, in this theoretical frame, two new properties of snowdrift games: (i) any snowdrift game can be characterized by only a parameter, its class; (ii) they are anti-symmetric with respect to the diagonal of the pay-off’s space. Finally, we propose a model based on an evolutionary dynamics that captures the main features of the cognitive hierarchy theory.