Carlos Gracia-Lázaro

Dr. Carlos Gracia-Lázaro

Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 July 2012 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Carlos Gracia-LázaroCarlos Gracia-Lázaro
Carlos Gracia-Lázaro
AFAlfredo Ferrer
Alfredo Ferrer
GRGonzalo Ruiz
Gonzalo Ruiz
ATAlfonso Tarancón
Alfonso Tarancón
JCJosé A. Cuesta
José A. Cuesta
YMYamir Moreno
Yamir Moreno
It is not fully understood why we cooperate with strangers on a daily basis. In an increasingly global world, where interaction networks and relationships between individuals are becoming more complex, different hypotheses have been put forward to explain the foundations of human cooperation on a large scale and to account for the true motivations that are behind this phenomenon. In this context, population structure has been suggested to foster cooperation in social dilemmas, but theoretical studies of this mechanism have yielded contradictory results so far; additionally, the issue lacks a proper experimental test in large systems. We have performed the largest experiments to date with humans playing a spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma on a lattice and a scale-free network (1,229 subjects). We observed that the level of cooperation reached in both networks is the same, comparable with the level of cooperation of smaller networks or unstructured populations. We have also found that subjects respond to the cooperation that they observe in a reciprocal manner, being more likely to cooperate if, in the previous round, many of their neighbors and themselves did so, which implies that humans do not consider neighbors’ payoffs when making their decisions in this dilemma but only their actions. Our results, which are in agreement with recent theoretical predictions based on this behavioral rule, suggest that population structure has little relevance as a cooperation promoter or inhibitor among humans.

19 January 2015 in Scientific Reports
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Journal Article
Open access
JCJose A Cuesta
Jose A Cuesta
Carlos Gracia-LázaroCarlos Gracia-Lázaro
Carlos Gracia-Lázaro
AFAlfredo Ferrer
Alfredo Ferrer
YMYamir Moreno
Yamir Moreno
ASAngel Sánchez
Angel Sánchez
Cooperativeness is a defining feature of human nature. Theoreticians have suggested several mechanisms to explain this ubiquitous phenomenon, including reciprocity, reputation, and punishment, but the problem is still unsolved. Here we show, through experiments conducted with groups of people playing an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma on a dynamic network, that it is reputation what really fosters cooperation. While this mechanism has already been observed in unstructured populations, we find that it acts equally when interactions are given by a network that players can reconfigure dynamically. Furthermore, our observations reveal that memory also drives the network formation process, and cooperators assort more, with longer link lifetimes, the longer the past actions record. Our analysis demonstrates, for the first time, that reputation can be very well quantified as a weighted mean of the fractions of past cooperative acts and the last action performed. This finding has potential applications in collaborative systems and e-commerce.

11 April 2014 in Scientific Reports
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Journal Article
Open access
JGJelena Grujić
Jelena Grujić
Carlos Gracia-LázaroCarlos Gracia-Lázaro
Carlos Gracia-Lázaro
MMManfred Milinski
Manfred Milinski
DSDirk Semmann
Dirk Semmann
ATArne Traulsen
Arne Traulsen
ASAngel Sánchez
Angel Sánchez
We have carried out a comparative analysis of data collected in three experiments on Prisoner's Dilemmas on lattices available in the literature. We focus on the different ways in which the behavior of human subjects can be interpreted, in order to empirically narrow down the possibilities for behavioral rules. Among the proposed update dynamics, we find that the experiments do not provide significant evidence for non-innovative game dynamics such as imitate-the-best or pairwise comparison rules, whereas moody conditional cooperation is supported by the data from all three experiments. This conclusion questions the applicability of many theoretical models that have been proposed to understand human behavior in spatial Prisoner's Dilemmas. A rule compatible with all our experiments, moody conditional cooperation, suggests that there is no detectable influence of interaction networks on the emergence of cooperation in behavioral experiments.

26 November 2012 in Physical Review E
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Journal Article
Closed access
JGJesús Gomez Gardeñes
Jesús Gomez Gardeñes
Carlos Gracia-LázaroCarlos Gracia-Lázaro
Carlos Gracia-Lázaro
LFLuis Mario Floría
Luis Mario Floría
YMYamir Moreno
Yamir Moreno
Although several mechanisms can promote cooperative behavior, there is no general consensus about why cooperation survives when the most profitable action for an individual is to defect, especially when the population is well mixed. Here we show that when a replicator such as evolutionary game dynamics takes place on interdependent networks, cooperative behavior is fixed on the system. Remarkably, we analytically and numerically show that this is even the case for well-mixed populations. Our results open the path to mechanisms able to sustain cooperation and can provide hints for controlling its rise and fall in a variety of biological and social systems.

10 February 2009 in Physical Review E
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Journal Article
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LFLuis Mario Floría
Luis Mario Floría
Carlos Gracia-LázaroCarlos Gracia-Lázaro
Carlos Gracia-Lázaro
JGJesús Gomez Gardeñes
Jesús Gomez Gardeñes
YMYamir Moreno
Yamir Moreno
In evolutionary dynamics the understanding of cooperative phenomena in natural and social systems has been the subject of intense research during decades. We focus attention here on the so-called “lattice reciprocity” mechanisms that enhance evolutionary survival of the cooperative phenotype in the prisoner’s dilemma game when the population of Darwinian replicators interact through a fixed network of social contacts. Exact results on a “dipole model” are presented, along with a mean-field analysis as well as results from extensive numerical Monte Carlo simulations. The theoretical framework used is that of standard statistical mechanics of macroscopic systems, but with no energy considerations. We illustrate the power of this perspective on social modeling, by consistently interpreting the onset of lattice reciprocity as a thermodynamical phase transition that, moreover, cannot be captured by a purely mean-field approach.

21 March 2012 in Scientific Reports
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Carlos Gracia-LázaroCarlos Gracia-Lázaro
Carlos Gracia-Lázaro
JCJosé A. Cuesta
José A. Cuesta
ASAngel Sánchez
Angel Sánchez
YMYamir Moreno
Yamir Moreno
During the last few years, much research has been devoted to strategic interactions on complex networks. In this context, the Prisoner's Dilemma has become a paradigmatic model, and it has been established that imitative evolutionary dynamics lead to very different outcomes depending on the details of the network. We here report that when one takes into account the real behavior of people observed in the experiments, both at the mean-field level and on utterly different networks, the observed level of cooperation is the same. We thus show that when human subjects interact in a heterogeneous mix including cooperators, defectors and moody conditional cooperators, the structure of the population does not promote or inhibit cooperation with respect to a well mixed population.