Syed Khandker

Mr. Syed Khandker

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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11 March 2022 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SKSyed Khandker
Syed Khandker
HTHannu Turtiainen
Hannu Turtiainen
ACAndrei Costin
Andrei Costin
THTimo Hämäläinen
Timo Hämäläinen
To increase situational awareness of maritime vessels and other entities and to enable their exchange of various information, the International Maritime Organization mandated the use of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) in 2004. The AIS is a self-reporting system that uses the VHF radio link. However, any radio-based self-reporting system is prone to forgery, especially in situations where authentication of the message is not designed into the architecture. As AIS was designed in the 1990s when cyberattacks were in their infancy, it does not implement authentication or encryption; thus, it can be seen as fundamentally vulnerable against cyberattacks. This paper demonstrates and evaluates the impact of multiple cyberattacks on AIS via remote radio frequency (RF) links using transmission-enabled software-defined radio (SDR). Overall, we implemented and tested a total of 11 different tests/attacks on 19 AIS setups, using a controlled environment. The tested configurations were derived from heterogeneous platforms such as Windows, Android, generic receivers, and commercial transponders. Our aim is to enhance the early discovery of new vulnerabilities in AIS to effectively address AIS attacks in the nearest future. The results showed that approximately 89% of the setups were affected by Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks at the AIS protocol level. Besides implementing some existing attack ideas (e.g., spoofing, DoS, and flooding), we showed some novel attack concepts in the AIS context such as a coordinated attack, overwhelming alerts, and logical vulnerabilities, all of which have the potential to cause software/system crashes in the worst-case scenarios. Moreover, an implementation/specification flaw related to the AIS preamble was identified during the experiments, which may affect the interoperability of different AIS devices. The error-handling system in AIS was also investigated. Unlike the aviation sector’s Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), the maritime sector’s AIS does not effectively support any error correction method, which may contribute to RF pollution and less effective use of the overall system. The consistency of our results for a comprehensive range of hardware-software configurations indicated the reliability of our approach, test system, and evaluation results.

31 December 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SKSyed Khandker
Syed Khandker
HTHannu Turtiainen
Hannu Turtiainen
ACAndrei Costin
Andrei Costin
THTimo Hämäläinen
Timo Hämäläinen
Automatic-dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is a cornerstone of the next-generation digital sky and is now mandated in several countries. However, there have been many reports of serious security vulnerabilities in the ADS-B architecture. In this article, we demonstrate and evaluate the impact of multiple cyberattacks on ADS-B via remote radio frequency links that affected various network, processing, and display subsystems used within the ADS-B ecosystem. Overall we implemented and tested 12 cyberattacks on ADS-B in a controlled environment, out of which 5 attacks were presented or implemented for the first time. For all these attacks, we developed a unique testbed that consists of 36 tested configurations. Each of the attacks was successful on various subsets of the tested configurations. In some attacks, we discovered wide qualitative variations and discrepancies in how particular configurations react to and treat ADS-B inputs that contain errors or contradicting flight information, with the main culprit almost always being the software implementation. In some other attacks, we managed to cause denial of service by remotely crashing/impacting more than 50% of the test set that corresponded to those attacks. We also implemented, and report some practical countermeasures to these attacks. We demonstrated that the strong relationship between the received signal strength and the distance-to-emitter might help verify the aircraft.s advertised ADS-B position and distance. For example, our best machine learning models achieved 90% accuracy in detecting attackers' spoofed ADS-B signals.

29 May 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
EBEvangelos Bitsikas
Evangelos Bitsikas
SKSyed Khandker
Syed Khandker
ASAhmad Salous
Ahmad Salous
ARAanjhan Ranganathan
Aanjhan Ranganathan
RJRoger Piqueras Jover
Roger Piqueras Jover
CPChristina Pöpper
Christina Pöpper

4 April 2022 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SKSyed Khandker
Syed Khandker
HTHannu Turtiainen
Hannu Turtiainen
ACAndrei Costin
Andrei Costin
THTimo Hämäläinen
Timo Hämäläinen
Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is a key air surveillance technology and a critical component of next-generation air transportation systems. It significantly simplifies aircraft surveillance technology and improves airborne traffic situational awareness. Many types of mobile cockpit information systems (MCISs) are based on ADS-B technology. MCIS gives pilots the flight and traffic-related information they need. MCIS has two parts: an ADS-B transceiver and an electronic flight bag (EFB) application. The ADS-B transceivers transmit and receive the ADS-B radio signals while the EFB applications hosted on mobile phones display the data. Because they are cheap, lightweight, and easy to install, MCISs became very popular. However, due to the lack of basic security measures, ADS-B technology is vulnerable to cyberattacks, which makes the MCIS inherently exposed to attacks. Attacks are even more likely for the MCIS, because they are power, memory, and computationally constrained. This study explores the cybersecurity posture of various MCIS setups for both types of ADS-B technology: 1090ES and UAT978. Total six portable MCIS devices and 21 EFB applications were tested against radio-link-based attacks by transmission-capable software-defined radio (SDR). Packet-level denial of service (DoS) attacks affected approximately 63% and 37% of 1090ES and UAT978 setups, respectively, while many of them experienced a system crash . Our experiments show that DoS attacks on the reception could meaningfully reduce transmission capacity. Our coordinated attack and fuzz tests also reported worrying issues on the MCIS. The consistency of our results on a very broad range of hardware and software configurations indicate the reliability of our proposed methodology as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of our platform.

27 May 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SKSyed Khandker
Syed Khandker
MGMichele Guerra
Michele Guerra
EBEvangelos Bitsikas
Evangelos Bitsikas
RJRoger Piqueras Jover
Roger Piqueras Jover
ARAanjhan Ranganathan
Aanjhan Ranganathan
CPChristina Pöpper
Christina Pöpper

16 January 2019 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SKSyed Khandker
Syed Khandker
Joaquín Torres-SospedraJoaquín Torres-Sospedra
Joaquín Torres-Sospedra
TRTapani Ristaniemi
Tapani Ristaniemi
Radio Frequency (RF) fingerprinting is widely applied for indoor positioning due to the existing Wi-Fi infrastructure present in most indoor spaces (home, work, leisure, among others) and the widespread usage of smartphones everywhere. It corresponds to a simple idea, the signal signature in a location tends to be stable over the time. Therefore, with the signals received from multiple APs, a unique fingerprint can be created. However, the Wi-Fi signal is affected by many factors which degrade the positioning error range to around a few meters. This paper introduces a collaborative method based on device-to-device (D2D) communication to improve the positioning accuracy using only fingerprinting and the direct communication to nearby devices. The results presented in this paper show that the positioning error can be reduced around 44% by considering D2D communication in the operational stage without adding new infrastructure for fingerprinting or complex resource-consuming filters. Moreover, the presence of very large errors is significantly reduced when the collaborative positioning based on D2D is available.