This article analyzes China’s pension arrangement and notes that China has recently established a universal non-contributory pension plan covering urban non-employed workers and all rural residents, combined with the pension plan covering urban employees already in place. Further, in the latest reform, China has discontinued the special pension plan for civil servants and integrated this privileged welfare class into the urban old-age pension insurance program. With these steps, China has achieved a degree of universalism and integration of its pension arrangement unprecedented in the non-Western world. Despite this radical pension transformation strategy, we argue that the current Chinese pension arrangement represents a case of “incomplete” universalism. First, its benefit level is low. Moreover, the benefit level varies from region to region. Finally, universalism in rural China has been undermined due to the existence of the “policy bundle.” Additionally, we argue that the 2015 pension reform has created a situation in which the stratification of Chinese pension arrangements has been “flattened,” even though it remains stratified to some extent.

The 2020 coronavirus pandemic has catapulted China into a serious social and political crisis. This article focuses upon how Chinese social policy has responded to the Covid-19 crisis. It reveals that the Chinese welfare state has woven a comprehensive social safety net to mitigate the social suffering of Chinese society in the mid- and post-crisis periods. Different types of social policy programs have been combined and synthesized, including social insurance, social assistance, and social welfare arrangements. Facing the challenges of the new risks caused by the pandemic, the collaboration of the Chinese state and intermediary social welfare organizations has played a crucial role in providing both cash benefits and social services (benefits in kind). For the first time, social policy in China has acted as a major player for coping with the negative outcomes of a pandemic. This article concludes that the pandemic-related crisis has justified an interventionist approach and logic, driven by the state’s welfare system, which favors a model of “big government”. However, this model also requires justification and legitimation.

Globally, the use of e-health has accelerated dramatically during the coronavirus pandemic. Based on both quantitative and qualitative data collected in China’s Hubei province (i.e. the first epicentre of COVID-19), this research explores how the pandemic influences the practices of e-health from the perspective of users. Through analysis of 1,033 surveys and 14 in-depth interviews, we find that e-health has played a crucial role in residents’ healthcare during the COVID-19 pandemic. Certain external factors influence the choice of digital health, including the high risk of infection outdoors, the shutting down of transport systems, and dysfunctional healthcare facilities that neglect non-COVID-19 patients’ clinical demands. Against this backdrop, we argue digital health acts as a functional equivalent to traditional medical treatment and has largely satisfied patients and users in the crisis period. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has unintentionally sped up the diffusion of digital medicine over the long term as respondents expressed their willingness to continue use of e-health in the post-COVID-19 phase. However, we assert that despite the increasing use of e-health, it cannot fully substitute traditional offline treatment. Thus, we suggest a combination of online and offline healthcare will be more commonly practiced in the future.

Local Chinese governments have been experimenting with a form of top-down “co-production” under different names and for various purposes. This paper examines practices in four Chinese cities to understand the process by which this co-production is introduced, its implementation and its outcomes. We found that in these cities, co-production is imposed on urban communities by the higher authorities, with the state playing very active roles in initiating, financing and facilitating the process. Despite the much-improved community environment, communities are not participating to the extent that the state would like. Nonetheless, we argue that this top-down approach has its merits. It may be an efficient way to ignite the co-production process and to some extent sustain it. When these practices are embedded in an authoritarian hierarchy, however, local officials involved are unavoidably evaluated by two separate performance assessment systems, the hierarchical and the horizontal, which so far have not been compatible.