The paper investigates and theorises different forms and patterns of resistance to international courts (ICs) and develops an analytical framework for explaining their variability. In order to make intelligible the resistance that many ICs are currently facing, the paper first unpacks the concept of resistance. It then introduces a key distinction between mere pushback from individual Member States or other actors, seeking to influence the future direction of a court's case-law, and actual backlash – a critique triggering significant institutional reform or even the dismantling of tribunals. On the basis on the proposed theoretical framework, the paper provides a roadmap for empirical studies of resistance to ICs, considering the key contextual factors necessary to take into account in such studies.
30 October 2017 in Journal of International Dispute Settlement
Has the Brighton Declaration produced a New Deal on European human rights by assigning a new and more central role to national legal and political institutions and by demanding greater subsidiarity? Against the backdrop of a systematic exploration of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), this article concludes that, after the Brighton Declaration, the ECtHR is indeed providing more subsidiarity. The Court now makes greater use of the terms ‘margin of appreciation’ and ‘wide(r) margin’, particularly regarding two areas of law: Article 8 on the right to privacy and Article 35 on access to the Court. However, as the article further demonstrates, this increase in subsidiarity is not conferred on all Member States equally. The old, Western Member States are generally the greatest beneficiaries of the ECtHR’s new jurisprudential directions. But the analysis also demonstrates that, contrary to popular belief, the most vocal critics of the system are not given preferential treatment. A final, more general conclusion that follows from these findings is that the ECtHR is receptive to political signals and does not, as is often claimed, operate in a political vacuum. Although currently merely soft law documents, the Brighton Declaration and its associated Protocols, by precipitating change at the Court, have achieved exactly what they set out to do. This has theoretical implications for the understanding of the evolution of international courts.
This article examines the changing authority of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) since its establishment in 1959. The first part focuses on the partic
5 November 2021 in American Political Science Review
Is the public backlash against human rights rulings from European courts driven by substantive concerns over case outcomes, procedural concerns over sovereignty, or combinations thereof? We conducted preregistered survey experiments in Denmark, France, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom using three vignettes: a foreigner who faces extradition, a person fighting a fine for burning Qurans, and a home owner contesting eviction. Each vignette varies with respect to whether a European court disagrees with a national court (deference treatment) and whether an applicant wins a case (outcome treatment). We find little evidence that deference moves willingness to implement judgments or acceptance of court authority but ample evidence that case outcomes matter. Even nationalists and authoritarians are unmoved by European court decisions as long as they agree with the case outcome. These findings imply that nationalist opposition to European courts is more about content than the location of authority and that backlash to domestic and international courts may be driven by similar forces.