Henrik Palmer Olsen

Henrik Palmer Olsen

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Henrik Palmer Olsen

Københavns Universitet, Faculty of Law, Area of Research, Centre of Excellence for International Courts and Governance, DK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

29Years (1998-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
6 March 2017 in Leiden Journal of International Law
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
UŠUrška Šadl
Urška Šadl
HOHenrik Palmer Olsen
Henrik Palmer Olsen
A recent editorial in this journal stressed the need to rearticulate the methodology – and thereby the distinctiveness – of international law in the context of blurring disciplinary lines between international law and international relations. The aim of this article is to contribute to the methodological aspect of the debate. First, the article outlines a legal empirical approach, which complements legal methodology of international law with empirical tools and techniques such as citation network analysis and corpus linguistics. Second, the article applies the approach on the case law of two European courts: the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It demonstrates how the study of case citations and the language of courts enhance the validity, reliability, and transparency of the established legal method. In particular, scholars of international law gain a stable and complete quantitative basis for a further in-depth study of case law, precedent and interpretation. Additional benefit stems from a set of transparent criteria by which to criticize the jurisprudence of international courts. Firmer ground emerges from which to evaluate the courts’ role in the political process, their societal impact and their legitimacy. At the same time the approach preserves the main features of the distinct legal methodology of international law – especially its attention to legal detail.

12 March 2024 in Digital Government: Research and Practice
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
HOHenrik Palmer Olsen
Henrik Palmer Olsen
THThomas Troels Hildebrandt
Thomas Troels Hildebrandt
CWCornelius Wiesener
Cornelius Wiesener
MLMatthias Smed Larsen
Matthias Smed Larsen
AFAsbjørn William Ammitzbøll Flügge
Asbjørn William Ammitzbøll Flügge
What information should and can be transparent for artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms? This article examines the socio-technical and legal perspectives of transparency in relation to algorithmic decision-making in public administration. We show how transparency in AI can be understood in light of the various technologies and the challenges one may encounter. Despite some first steps in that direction, there exists so far no mature standard for documenting AI models. From a legal perspective, this article examined the applicable freedom of information (FOI) regimes across different jurisdictions, with a particular focus on Denmark and other Scandinavian countries. Despite notable differences, our findings show that the FOI regimes generally only grant access to existing documents, and that access can be denied on the basis of the wide proprietary interests and internal documents exemptions. This is why we ultimately conclude that the European data-protection framework and the proposed EU AI Act — with their far-reaching duties to document the functioning of AI systems — provide promising new avenues for research and insights into transparency in AI.


12 June 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
HWHilde Weerts
Hilde Weerts
RXRaphaële Xenidis
Raphaële Xenidis
FTFabien Tarissan
Fabien Tarissan
HOHenrik Palmer Olsen
Henrik Palmer Olsen
MPMykola Pechenizkiy
Mykola Pechenizkiy
Concerns regarding unfairness and discrimination in the context of artificial intelligence (AI) systems have recently received increased attention from both legal and computer science scholars. Yet, the degree of overlap between notions of algorithmic bias and fairness on the one hand, and legal notions of discrimination and equality on the other, is often unclear, leading to misunderstandings between computer science and law. What types of bias and unfairness does the law address when it prohibits discrimination? What role can fairness metrics play in establishing legal compliance? In this paper, we aim to illustrate to what extent European Union (EU) non-discrimination law coincides with notions of algorithmic fairness proposed in computer science literature and where they differ. The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, we analyse seminal examples of algorithmic unfairness through the lens of EU non-discrimination law, drawing parallels with EU case law. Second, we set out the normative underpinnings of fairness metrics and technical interventions and compare these to the legal reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU. Specifically, we show how normative assumptions often remain implicit in both disciplinary approaches and explain the ensuing limitations of current AI practice and non-discrimination law. We conclude with implications for AI practitioners and regulators.

28 February 2017 in International Journal of Discrimination and the Law
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HOHenrik Palmer Olsen
Henrik Palmer Olsen
AKAysel Küçüksu
Aysel Küçüksu
This article is concerned with identifying how contemporary data technology can be used to find and analyse the big amount of case law generated by international courts in a more comprehensive way than that achieved through the traditional manual reading of case law at the core of textbook or doctrinal analysis of judgements. The focus of the article is the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHRs) and its Article 14 + 2 case law, which is studied through the tools of citation network analysis. The resulting findings are then compared to a standard textbook approach in order to show how citation network analysis offers a reliable method in selecting cases for qualitative analysis and drawing information relevant to specific legal issues. The article proposes and eventually advances a new approach to legal research, which integrates quantitative network analysis with qualitative legal (doctrinal) analysis, and shows how this form of analysis enables a study of case law through the recognition of patterns within it that would have otherwise been difficult to identify. Using this approach to advance new insights into the prohibition of discrimination under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the article ultimately offers a new instrument for scholars and practitioners to put into use when considering the future narrative of discrimination law.

3 June 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
HWHilde Weerts
Hilde Weerts
RXRaphaële Xenidis
Raphaële Xenidis
FTFabien Tarissan
Fabien Tarissan
HOHenrik Palmer Olsen
Henrik Palmer Olsen
MPMykola Pechenizkiy
Mykola Pechenizkiy
Various metrics and interventions have been developed to identify and mitigate unfair outputs of machine learning systems. While individuals and organizations have an obligation to avoid discrimination, the use of fairness-aware machine learning interventions has also been described as amounting to ‘algorithmic positive action’ under European Union (EU) non-discrimination law. As the Court of Justice of the European Union has been strict when it comes to assessing the lawfulness of positive action, this would impose a significant legal burden on those wishing to implement fair-ml interventions. In this paper, we propose that algorithmic fairness interventions often should be interpreted as a means to prevent discrimination, rather than a measure of positive action. Specifically, we suggest that this category mistake can often be attributed to neutrality fallacies: faulty assumptions regarding the neutrality of (fairness-aware) algorithmic decision-making. Our findings raise the question of whether a negative obligation to refrain from discrimination is sufficient in the context of algorithmic decision-making. Consequently, we suggest moving away from a duty to ‘not do harm’ towards a positive obligation to actively ‘do no harm’ as a more adequate framework for algorithmic decision-making and fair ml-interventions.