This article examines lake drying and livelihood dynamics in the context of multiple stressors through a case study of the “Small Lake Chad” in the Republic of Chad. Livelihoods research in regions experiencing persistent lake water fluctuations has largely focused on the well-being and security of lakeshore dwellers. Little is known about the mechanisms through which lake drying shapes livelihood drawbacks and opportunities, and whether locally evolved responses are enhancing livelihoods. Here we address these gaps using empirical, mixed-methods field research couched within the framework of livelihoods and human well-being contexts. The analysis demonstrates that limited opportunities outside agriculture, the influx of mixed ethnic migrants and the increasing spate of violence all enhance livelihood challenges. Livelihood opportunities centre on the renewal effects of seasonal flood pulses on lake waters and the learning opportunities triggered by past droughts. Although drying has spurred new adaptive behaviours predicated on seasonality, traditional predictive factors and the availability of assets, responses have remained largely reactive. The article points to where lake drying fits amongst changes in the wider socio-economic landscape in which people live, and suggests that awareness of the particularities of the mechanisms that connect lake drying to livelihoods can offer insights into the ways local people might be assisted by governments and development actors.
Climate variability is amongst an array of threats facing agricultural livelihoods, with its effects unevenly distributed. With resource conflict being increasingly recognised as one significant outcome of climate variability and change, understanding the underlying drivers that shape differential vulnerabilities in areas that are double-exposed to climate and conflict has great significance. Climate change vulnerability frameworks are rarely applied in water conflict research. This article presents a composite climate–water conflict vulnerability index based on a double exposure framework developed from advances in vulnerability and livelihood assessments. We apply the index to assess how the determinants of vulnerability can be useful in understanding climate variability and water conflict interactions and to establish how knowledge of the climate–conflict linked context can shape interventions to reduce vulnerability. We surveyed 240 resource users (farmers, fishermen and pastoralists) in seven villages on the south-eastern shores of Lake Chad in the Republic of Chad to collect data on a range of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity variables. Results suggest that pastoralists are more vulnerable in terms of climate-structured aggressive behaviour within a lake-based livelihoods context where all resource user groups show similar levels of exposure to climate variability. Our approach can be used to understand the human and environmental security components of vulnerability to climate change and to explore ways in which conflict-structured climate adaptation and climate-sensitive conflict management strategies can be integrated to reduce the vulnerability of populations in high-risk, conflict-prone environments.
In recent years, research on normatively positive social tipping dynamics in response to the climate crisis has produced invaluable insights. In contrast, relatively little attention has been given to the potentially negative social tipping processes that might unfold due to an increasingly destabilized Earth system and to how they might in turn reinforce social and ecological destabilization dynamics and/or impede positive social change. In this paper, we discuss selected potential negative social tipping processes (anomie, radicalization and polarization, displacement, conflict, and financial destabilization) linked to Earth system destabilization. We draw on related research to understand the drivers and likelihood of these negative tipping dynamics, their potential effects on human societies and the Earth system, and the potential for cascading interactions (e.g. food insecurity and displacement) contributing to systemic risks. This first attempt to provide an explorative conceptualization and empirical account of potential negative social tipping dynamics linked to Earth system destabilization is intended to motivate further research into an under-studied area that is nonetheless crucial for our ability to respond to the climate crisis and for ensuring that positive social tipping dynamics are not averted by negative ones.
As conflict, climate shocks, and land/water degradation—the “triple challenge”—continue to exert increasing pressure upon fishing and farming livelihoods in many developing countries, a need exists to better understand how differential vulnerabilities undermine or amplify food security outcomes. In this study, we investigate how vulnerability to the “triple challenge” affect food security using an in-depth case study approach that merges social statistics and quantitative data analysis. We frame vulnerability using a combination of sensitivity, exposure, and adaptive capacity, and operationalize food security using the FAO Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES), which is an experience-based measure capturing the food access dimension of food security. We draw on survey data from 252 fishing and 251 farming households in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and quantify the different components of vulnerability, deriving specific livelihood-related vulnerability scores. By merging and analyzing differential food security variables and vulnerability scores using ordered logistic models, we find that vulnerability to the “triple challenge” increases the probability of being in a severe food insecure state, particularly for households with a high dependency ratio. Parallel to this finding, we note that access to social capital and opportunities for livelihood diversification could drive gains in income, enhancing the capacity of households to attain a food-secure status in the face of recurrent instabilities. This study advances vulnerability literacy in food-insecure contexts and reveals ways to support populations on the frontline of interacting conflict, climate, and environmental crises.
The science of climate security and conflict is replete with controversies. Yet the increasing vulnerability of politically fragile countries to the security consequences of climate change is widely acknowledged. Although climate conflict reflects a continuum of conditional forces that coalesce around the notion of vulnerability, how different portrayals of vulnerability influence the discursive formation of climate conflict relations remains an exceptional but under-researched issue. This paper combines a systematic discourse analysis with a vulnerability interpretation diagnostic tool to explore (i) how discourses of climate conflict are constructed and represented, (ii) how vulnerability is communicated across discourse lines, and (iii) the strength of contextual vulnerability against a deterministic narrative of scarcity-induced conflict, such as that pertaining to land. Systematically characterising climate conflict discourses based on the central issues constructed, assumptions about mechanistic relationships, implicit normative judgements and vulnerability portrayals, provides a useful way of understanding where discourses differ. While discourses show a wide range of opinions "for" and "against" climate conflict relations, engagement with vulnerability has been less pronounced – except for the dominant context centrism discourse concerned about human security (particularly in Africa). In exploring this discourse, we observe an increasing sense of contextual vulnerability that is oriented towards a concern for complexity rather than predictability. The article concludes by illustrating that a turn towards contextual vulnerability thinking will help advance a constructivist theory-informed climate conflict scholarship that recognises historicity, specificity, and variability as crucial elements of contextual totalities of any area affected by climate conflict.