Punishment involves learning about the relationship between behavior and its adverse consequences. Punishment is fundamental to reinforcement learning, decision-making and choice, and is disrupted in psychiatric disorders such as addiction, depression, and psychopathy. However, little is known about the brain mechanisms of punishment and much of what is known is derived from study of superficially similar, but fundamentally distinct, forms of aversive learning such as fear conditioning and avoidance learning. Here we outline the unique conditions that support punishment, the contents of its learning, and its behavioral consequences. We consider evidence implicating GABA and monoamine neurotransmitter systems, as well as corticostriatal, amygdala, and dopamine circuits in punishment. We show how maladaptive punishment processes are implicated in addictions, impulse control disorders, psychopathy, anxiety, and depression and argue that a better understanding of the cellular, circuit, and cognitive mechanisms of punishment will make important contributions to next generation therapeutic approaches.
Making decisions in environments with few choice options is easy. We select the action that results in the most valued outcome. Making decisions in more complex environments, where the same action can produce different outcomes in different conditions, is much harder. In such circumstances, we propose that accurate action selection relies on top-down control from the prelimbic and orbitofrontal cortices over striatal activity through distinct thalamostriatal circuits. We suggest that the prelimbic cortex exerts direct influence over medium spiny neurons in the dorsomedial striatum to represent the state space relevant to the current environment. Conversely, the orbitofrontal cortex is argued to track a subject's position within that state space, likely through modulation of cholinergic interneurons.
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is critical for updating reward-directed behaviours flexibly when outcomes are devalued or when task contingencies are reversed. Failure to update behaviour in outcome devaluation and reversal learning procedures are considered canonical deficits following OFC lesions in non-human primates and rodents. We examined the generality of these findings in rodents using lesions of the rodent lateral OFC (LO) in instrumental action-outcome and Pavlovian cue-outcome devaluation procedures. LO lesions disrupted outcome devaluation in Pavlovian but not instrumental procedures. Furthermore, although both anterior and posterior LO lesions disrupted Pavlovian outcome devaluation, only posterior LO lesions were found to disrupt reversal learning. Posterior but not anterior LO lesions were also found to disrupt the attribution of motivational value to Pavlovian cues in sign-tracking. These novel dissociable task- and subregion-specific effects suggest a way to reconcile contradictory findings between rodent and non-human primate OFC research.
Theories of functioning in the medial prefrontal cortex are distinct across appetitively and aversively motivated procedures. In the appetitive domain, it is argued that the medial prefrontal cortex is important for producing adaptive behavior when circumstances change. This view advocates a role for this region in using higher-order information to bias performance appropriate to that circumstance. Conversely, literature born out of aversive studies has led to the theory that the prelimbic region of the medial prefrontal cortex is necessary for the expression of conditioned fear, whereas the infralimbic region is necessary for a decrease in responding following extinction. Here, the argument is that these regions are primed to increase or decrease fear responses and that this tendency is gated by subcortical inputs. However, we believe the data from aversive studies can be explained by a supraordinate role for the medial prefrontal cortex in behavioral flexibility, in line with the appetitive literature. Using a dichotomy between the voluntary control of behavior and the execution of well-trained responses, we attempt to reconcile these theories. We argue that the prelimbic region exerts voluntary control over behavior via top-down modulation of stimulus-response pathways according to task demands, contextual cues, and how well a stimulus predicts an outcome. Conversely, the infralimbic region promotes responding based on the strength of stimulus-response pathways determined by experience with reinforced contingencies. This system resolves the tension between executing voluntary actions sensitive to recent changes in contingencies, and responses that reflect the animal's experience across the long run. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).
The amygdala is a critical substrate for learning about cues that signal danger. Less is known about its role in processing innocuous or background information. The present study addressed this question using a sensory preconditioning protocol in male rats. In each experiment, rats were exposed to pairings of two innocuous stimuli in stage 1, S2 and S1, and then to pairings of S1 and shock in stage 2. As a consequence of this training, control rats displayed defensive reactions (freezing) when tested with both S2 and S1. The freezing to S2 is a product of two associations formed in training: an S2-S1 association in stage 1 and an S1-shock association in stage 2. We examined the roles of two medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures in consolidation of the S2-S1 association: the perirhinal cortex (PRh) and basolateral complex of the amygdala (BLA). When the S2-S1 association formed in a safe context, its consolidation required neuronal activity in the PRh (but not BLA), including activation of AMPA receptors and MAPK signaling. In contrast, when the S2-S1 association formed in a dangerous context, or when the context was rendered dangerous immediately after the association had formed, its consolidation required neuronal activity in the BLA (but not PRh), including activation of AMPA receptors and MAPK signaling. These roles of the PRh and BLA show that danger changes the way the mammalian brain stores information about innocuous events. They are discussed with respect to danger-induced changes in stimulus processing. Significance Statement How the brain stores innocuous information (e.g., the relationship between two neutral stimuli) is critically determined by (1) the presence of danger at the time of information processing, and (2) exposure to danger after information has been processed. In the absence of danger, storage (or consolidation) of innocuous information requires neuronal activity in the perirhinal cortex (PRh), but not the basolateral complex of the amygdala (BLA). In contrast, when the context is dangerous at the time of information processing, or became dangerous afterward, storage of the same information requires neuronal activity in the BLA, but not PRh. These results advance the field by providing the first demonstration that danger changes how innocuous information is consolidated in the medial temporal lobe.