3 April 2017 in Nature Neuroscience
Learning to predict reward is thought to be driven by dopaminergic prediction errors, which reflect discrepancies between actual and expected value. Here the authors show that learning to predict neutral events is also driven by prediction errors and that such value-neutral associative learning is also likely mediated by dopaminergic error signals. Associative learning is driven by prediction errors. Dopamine transients correlate with these errors, which current interpretations limit to endowing cues with a scalar quantity reflecting the value of future rewards. We tested whether dopamine might act more broadly to support learning of an associative model of the environment. Using sensory preconditioning, we show that prediction errors underlying stimulus–stimulus learning can be blocked behaviorally and reinstated by optogenetically activating dopamine neurons. We further show that suppressing the firing of these neurons across the transition prevents normal stimulus–stimulus learning. These results establish that the acquisition of model-based information about transitions between nonrewarding events is also driven by prediction errors and that, contrary to existing canon, dopamine transients are both sufficient and necessary to support this type of learning. Our findings open new possibilities for how these biological signals might support associative learning in the mammalian brain in these and other contexts.
1 April 2018 in Current Opinion in Neurobiology
1 July 2017 in Current Biology
27 September 2018 in Annual Review of Psychology
Making decisions in environments with few choice options is easy. We select the action that results in the most valued outcome. Making decisions in more complex environments, where the same action can produce different outcomes in different conditions, is much harder. In such circumstances, we propose that accurate action selection relies on top-down control from the prelimbic and orbitofrontal cortices over striatal activity through distinct thalamostriatal circuits. We suggest that the prelimbic cortex exerts direct influence over medium spiny neurons in the dorsomedial striatum to represent the state space relevant to the current environment. Conversely, the orbitofrontal cortex is argued to track a subject's position within that state space, likely through modulation of cholinergic interneurons.
22 February 2017 in Frontiers in Psychology
Phasic activity of midbrain dopamine neurons is currently thought to encapsulate the prediction-error signal described in Sutton and Barto’s (1981) model-free reinforcement learning algorithm. This phasic signal is thought to contain information about the quantitative value of reward, which transfers to the reward-predictive cue after learning. This is argued to endow the reward-predictive cue with the value inherent in the reward, motivating behavior towards cues signaling the presence of reward. Yet theoretical and empirical research has implicated prediction-error signaling in learning that extends far beyond a transfer of quantitative value to a reward-predictive cue. Here, we review the research which demonstrates the complexity of how dopaminergic prediction errors facilitate learning. After briefly discussing the literature demonstrating that phasic dopaminergic signals can act in the manner described by Sutton and Barto (1981), we consider how these signals may also influence attentional processing across multiple attentional systems in distinct brain circuits. Then, we discuss how prediction errors encode and promote the development of context-specific associations between cues and rewards. Finally, we consider recent evidence that shows dopaminergic activity contains information about causal relationships between cues and rewards that reflect information garnered from rich associative models of the world that can be adapted in the absence of direct experience. In discussing this research we hope to support the expansion of how dopaminergic prediction errors are thought to contribute to the learning process beyond the traditional concept of transferring quantitative value.
20 January 2020 in Nature Neuroscience