Marten van Dijk

Marten van Dijk


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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9 December 2017 in Cryptography
Verified
Journal Article
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CJChenglu Jin
Chenglu Jin
CHCharles Herder
Charles Herder
LRLing Ren
Ling Ren
PNPhuong Ha Nguyen
Phuong Ha Nguyen
BFBenjamin Fuller
Benjamin Fuller
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
Herder et al. (IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2017) designed a new computational fuzzy extractor and physical unclonable function (PUF) challenge-response protocol based on the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem. The protocol requires no irreversible state updates on the PUFs for security, like burning irreversible fuses, and can correct for significant measurement noise when compared to PUFs using a conventional (information theoretical secure) fuzzy extractor. However, Herder et al. did not implement their protocol. In this paper, we give the first implementation of a challenge response protocol based on computational fuzzy extractors. Our main insight is that “confidence information” does not need to be kept private, if the noise vector is independent of the confidence information, e.g., the bits generated by ring oscillator pairs which are physically placed close to each other. This leads to a construction which is a simplified version of the design of Herder et al. (also building on a ring oscillator PUF). Our simplifications allow for a dramatic reduction in area by making a mild security assumption on ring oscillator physical obfuscated key output bits.

5 January 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CJChenglu Jin
Chenglu Jin
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
With the globalization of semiconductor production, out-sourcing IC fabrication has become a trend in various aspects. This, however, introduces serious threats from the entire untrusted supply chain. To combat these threats, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) proposed in 2014 the Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics Defense (SHIELD) program to design a secure hardware root-of-trust, called dielet, to be inserted into the host package of legitimately produced ICs. Dielets are RF powered and communicate with the outside world through their RF antennas. They have sensors which allow them to passively (without the need for power) record malicious events which can later be read out during an authentication protocol between the dielet and server with a smartphone as intermediary. This paper introduces a general framework for the initialization and authentication protocols in SHIELD with different adversarial models based on formally-defined security games. We introduce a “try-and-check” attack against DARPA's example authentication protocol in their call for SHIELD proposals which nullifies the effectiveness of SHIELD's main goal of being able to detect and trace adversarial activities with significant probability. We introduce the first concrete initialization protocol and, compared to DARPA's example authentication protocol, introduce an improved authentication protocol which resists the try-and-check attack. The area overhead of our authentication and initialization protocols together is only 64-bit NVM, one 8-bit counter and a TRNG based on a single SRAM-cell together with corresponding control logic. Our findings and rigorous analysis are of utmost importance for the teams which received DARPA's funding for implementing SHIELD.

11 May 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YGYansong Gao
Yansong Gao
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
LXLei Xu
Lei Xu
WYWei Yang
Wei Yang
SNSurya Nepal
Surya Nepal
DRDamith Ranasinghe
Damith Ranasinghe
A physical unclonable function (PUF) generates hardware intrinsic volatile secrets by exploiting uncontrollable manufacturing randomness. Although PUFs provide the potential for lightweight and secure authentication for increasing numbers of low-end Internet of Things devices, practical and secure mechanisms remain elusive. Our work aims to explore simulatable PUFs (SimPUFs) that are physically unclonable but efficiently modeled mathematically through privileged one-time PUF access to address the problem of authentication for resource limited devices. Given a random challenge, a securely stored SimPUF in possession of a trusted server computes the corresponding response and its bit-specific reliability. Consequently, naturally noisy PUF responses generated by a resource-limited prover is immediately processed by a one-way function (OWF) and transmitted to a server, because the resourceful server can exploit the SimPUF to perform a trial-and-error search over likely error patterns to recover the noisy response to authenticate the prover. TREVERSE security is guaranteed by the hardness of inverting the OWF under the random oracle model. We formally evaluate the authentication capability of our trial-and-error reverse (TREVERSE) authentication under two SimPUFs experimentally derived from popular silicon PUFs.

25 March 2019 in Cryptography
Verified
Journal Article
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SHSyed Kamran Haider
Syed Kamran Haider
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a cryptographic primitive which obfuscates the access patterns to a storage, thereby preventing privacy leakage. So far in the current literature, only ‘fully functional’ ORAMs are widely studied which can protect, at a cost of considerable performance penalty, against the strong adversaries who can monitor all read and write operations. However, recent research has shown that information can still be leaked even if only the write access pattern (not reads) is visible to the adversary. For such weaker adversaries, a fully functional ORAM turns out to be an overkill, causing unnecessary overheads. Instead, a simple ‘write-only’ ORAM is sufficient, and, more interestingly, is preferred as it can offer far better performance and energy efficiency than a fully functional ORAM. In this work, we present Flat ORAM: an efficient write-only ORAM scheme which outperforms the closest existing write-only ORAM called HIVE. HIVE suffers from performance bottlenecks while managing the memory occupancy information vital for correctness of the protocol. Flat ORAM introduces a simple idea of Occupancy Map (OccMap) to efficiently manage the memory occupancy information resulting in far better performance. Our simulation results show that, compared to HIVE, Flat ORAM offers 50 % performance gain on average and up to 80 % energy savings.

4 December 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TJTara Merin John
Tara Merin John
SHSyed Kamran Haider
Syed Kamran Haider
HOHamza Omar
Hamza Omar
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
Data-dependent access patterns of an application to an untrusted storage system are notorious for leaking sensitive information about the user's data. Previous research has shown how an adversary capable of monitoring both read and write requests issued to the memory can correlate them with the application to learn its sensitive data. However, information leakage through only the write access patterns is less obvious and not well studied in the current literature. In this work, we demonstrate an actual attack on power-side-channel resistant Montgomery's ladder based modular exponentiation algorithm commonly used in public key cryptography. We infer the complete 512-bit secret exponent in $\sim 3.5$ minutes by virtue of just the write access patterns of the algorithm to the main memory. In order to learn the victim algorithm's write access patterns under realistic settings, we exploit a compromised DMA device to take frequent snapshots of the application's address space, and then run a simple differential analysis on these snapshots to find the write access sequence. The attack has been shown on an Intel Core(TM) i7-4790 3.60GHz processor based system. We further discuss a possible attack on McEliece public-key cryptosystem that also exploits the write-access patterns to learn the secret key.

11 November 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
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SVSaeed Valizadeh
Saeed Valizadeh
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
In this paper, we investigate the importance of a defense system's learning rates to fight against the self-propagating class of malware such as worms and bots. To this end, we introduce a new propagation model based on the interactions between an adversary (and its agents) who wishes to construct a zombie army of a specific size, and a defender taking advantage of standard security tools and technologies such as honeypots (HPs) and intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPSes) in the network environment. As time goes on, the defender can incrementally learn from the collected/observed attack samples (e.g., malware payloads), and therefore being able to generate attack signatures. The generated signatures then are used for filtering next attack traffic and thus containing the attacker's progress in its malware propagation mission. Using simulation and numerical analysis, we evaluate the efficacy of signature generation algorithms and in general any learning-based scheme in bringing an adversary's maneuvering in the environment to a halt as an adversarial containment strategy.