Chenglu Jin

Mr. Chenglu Jin

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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3 November 2020 in Proceedings of the IEEE
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PMPriyanka Mahesh
Priyanka Mahesh
ATAkash Tiwari
Akash Tiwari
CJChenglu Jin
Chenglu Jin
PKPanganamala R. Kumar
Panganamala R. Kumar
ARA. L. Narasimha Reddy
A. L. Narasimha Reddy
RKRamesh Karri
Ramesh Karri
The Industry 4.0 concept promotes a digital manufacturing (DM) paradigm that can enhance quality and productivity, which reduces inventory and the lead time for delivering custom, batch-of-one products based on achieving convergence of additive, subtractive, and hybrid manufacturing machines, automation and robotic systems, sensors, computing, and communication networks, artificial intelligence, and big data. A DM system consists of embedded electronics, sensors, actuators, control software, and interconnectivity to enable the machines and the components within them to exchange data with other machines, components therein, the plant operators, the inventory managers, and customers. This article presents the cybersecurity risks in the emerging DM context, assesses the impact on manufacturing, and identifies approaches to secure DM.

17 January 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SHSyed Kamran Haider
Syed Kamran Haider
CJChenglu Jin
Chenglu Jin
MAMasab Ahmad
Masab Ahmad
DSDevu Manikantan Shila
Devu Manikantan Shila
OKOmer Khan
Omer Khan
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
Over the past decade, Hardware Trojans (HTs) research community has made significant progress towards developing effective countermeasures for various types of HTs, yet these countermeasures are shown to be circumvented by sophisticated HTs designed subsequently. Therefore, instead of guaranteeing a certain (low) false negative rate for a small constant set of publicly known HTs, a rigorous security framework of HTs should provide an effective algorithm to detect any HT from an exponentially large class (exponential in number of wires in IP core) of HTs with negligible false negative rate. In this work, we present HaTCh, the first rigorous algorithm of HT detection within the paradigm of pre-silicon logic testing based tools. HaTCh detects any HT from $H_D$ , a huge class of deterministic HTs which is orders of magnitude larger than the small subclass (e.g., TrustHub) considered in the current literature. We prove that HaTCh offers negligible false negative rate and controllable false positive rate for the class $H_D$ . Given certain global characteristics regarding the stealthiness of the HT within $H_D$ , the computational complexity of HaTCh for practical HTs scales polynomially with the number of wires in the IP core. We implement and test HaTCh on TrustHub and other sophisticated HTs.

9 December 2017 in Cryptography
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CJChenglu Jin
Chenglu Jin
CHCharles Herder
Charles Herder
LRLing Ren
Ling Ren
PNPhuong Ha Nguyen
Phuong Ha Nguyen
BFBenjamin Fuller
Benjamin Fuller
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
Herder et al. (IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 2017) designed a new computational fuzzy extractor and physical unclonable function (PUF) challenge-response protocol based on the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem. The protocol requires no irreversible state updates on the PUFs for security, like burning irreversible fuses, and can correct for significant measurement noise when compared to PUFs using a conventional (information theoretical secure) fuzzy extractor. However, Herder et al. did not implement their protocol. In this paper, we give the first implementation of a challenge response protocol based on computational fuzzy extractors. Our main insight is that “confidence information” does not need to be kept private, if the noise vector is independent of the confidence information, e.g., the bits generated by ring oscillator pairs which are physically placed close to each other. This leads to a construction which is a simplified version of the design of Herder et al. (also building on a ring oscillator PUF). Our simplifications allow for a dramatic reduction in area by making a mild security assumption on ring oscillator physical obfuscated key output bits.

5 January 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CJChenglu Jin
Chenglu Jin
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
With the globalization of semiconductor production, out-sourcing IC fabrication has become a trend in various aspects. This, however, introduces serious threats from the entire untrusted supply chain. To combat these threats, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) proposed in 2014 the Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics Defense (SHIELD) program to design a secure hardware root-of-trust, called dielet, to be inserted into the host package of legitimately produced ICs. Dielets are RF powered and communicate with the outside world through their RF antennas. They have sensors which allow them to passively (without the need for power) record malicious events which can later be read out during an authentication protocol between the dielet and server with a smartphone as intermediary. This paper introduces a general framework for the initialization and authentication protocols in SHIELD with different adversarial models based on formally-defined security games. We introduce a “try-and-check” attack against DARPA's example authentication protocol in their call for SHIELD proposals which nullifies the effectiveness of SHIELD's main goal of being able to detect and trace adversarial activities with significant probability. We introduce the first concrete initialization protocol and, compared to DARPA's example authentication protocol, introduce an improved authentication protocol which resists the try-and-check attack. The area overhead of our authentication and initialization protocols together is only 64-bit NVM, one 8-bit counter and a TRNG based on a single SRAM-cell together with corresponding control logic. Our findings and rigorous analysis are of utmost importance for the teams which received DARPA's funding for implementing SHIELD.

21 March 2022 in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
CJChenglu Jin
Chenglu Jin
WBWayne Burleson
Wayne Burleson
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
URUlrich Rührmair
Ulrich Rührmair

2 May 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NSNiloufar Sayadi
Niloufar Sayadi
PNPhuong Ha Nguyen
Phuong Ha Nguyen
MDMarten van Dijk
Marten van Dijk
CJChenglu Jin
Chenglu Jin
The XOR Arbiter PUF was introduced as a strong PUF in 2007 and was broken in 2015 by a Machine Learning (ML) attack, which allows the underlying Arbiter PUFs to be modeled individually by exploiting reliability information of the measured responses. To mitigate the reliability-based attacks, state-of-the-art understanding shows that the reliability of individual Arbiter PUFs and the overall XOR Arbiter PUF can be boosted to an arbitrarily high level, thus rendering all known reliability-based ML attacks infeasible; alternatively, an access control interface around the XOR Arbiter PUF can prevent the same challenge-response pairs from being accessed repeatedly, thus eliminating the leakage of reliability information. We show that, for the first time, a perfectly reliable XOR Arbiter PUF can be successfully attacked in a divide-and-conquer manner, meaning each underlying Arbiter PUF in an XOR Arbiter PUF can be attacked individually. This allows us to attack large XOR Arbiter PUFs efficiently, even without reliability information or any side-channel information. Our key insight is that, instead of reliability information, the responses of highly correlated challenges also reveal how close the responses are to the response decision boundary. This leads to a chosen challenge attack on XOR Arbiter PUFs by carefully choosing correlated challenges to measure and aggregate the collected information. We validate our attack by using PUF simulation, as well as an XOR Arbiter PUF implemented on FPGA. We also demonstrate that our chosen challenge methodology is compatible with the state-of-the-art combined gradient-based multi-objective optimization attack. Finally, we discuss an effective countermeasure that can prevent our attack but with a relatively large area overhead compared to the PUF itself.