Scholarship on the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows has produced valuable insights into the role of host state characteristics and home-host relations. This study draws attention to another factor in investment decisions—the political and economic relations that home and host states maintain with third-party states. More narrowly, we focus on how investors respond to their home-state's imposition of economic sanctions against a trading partner. Greater economic integration has allowed states to use economic sanctions more frequently in recent decades. At the same time, economic sanctions are thought to have a distorting effect on global trade and financial flows as firms and governments adjust to new constraints. We argue that as firms at home in the sanctioning state respond to coercive measures against a trading partner by looking for alternative sources of profit, they will shift investments to states that can provide indirect access to the sanctioned economy. In particular, those states that are perceived as prospective sanctions-busters—major trading partners of the sanctions target or states with a history of sanctions-busting behavior—will benefit disproportionately from the misfortune of others. We test this conjecture using data on US economic sanctions and global flows of US FDI from 1966 to 2000. The findings reveal that investor decision making in part responds to political developments beyond the home-host dyad.
9 February 2018 in Review of International Political Economy
Theoretically, instability and violence should deter foreign investment. Empirically, the evidence has been inconsistent. I highlight two key deficiencies in existing research, and present a more nuanced theoretical framework for considering this relationship. First, I make the case that the costs and risks associated with conflict are a function of both intensity and duration. Both should be accounted for. Second, I argue that the logic governing multinational corporations' (MNC) behavior changes post-entry into the host country. Combining these two insights, I argue that firms’ sensitivity to conflict, and that the particular signals they respond to, vary in predictable ways across different stages of the FDI lifecycle. I test the according hypotheses using firm-level foreign investment data, and find supporting evidence. Multinationals look for sustained peace when pursuing new ventures, but prove resilient to all but the most intense and persistent conflicts after the costs of entry have been sunk.
A central theme in the foreign direct investment (FDI) literature is that political risk deters investment. The empirical record, however, is mixed. multinational corporations (MNCs) continue to invest in high-risk countries. We argue it is not merely about the level of risk, but rather firms’ ability to quantify risk. When MNCs can confidently assess both the nature and the degree of the threats present, they can take appropriate measures to hedge against them. This should increase their willingness to invest, even in higher risk environments. We contend that the ability to accurately quantify risk is a function of political transparency. Among opaque countries, we expect risk to exert a deterring effect on FDI, as commonly theorized. Among more transparent countries, however, we expect that risk is a less salient concern for MNCs. We test this argument using firm-level data on the foreign operations of some of the world’s largest multinationals between 1995 and 2008. The evidence supports the argument. Risk has a strong negative effect on the likelihood of investment at lower levels of transparency, but the magnitude of this effect weakens at higher levels of transparency. This pattern is consistent across multiple types of political risk, and is most pronounced in nonextractive (relative to extractive) industries.
We present new data on labor laws and practices for all countries of the world, recorded annually from 1994 to 2010. The dataset covers seven different labor standards. These are freedom of association, collective bargaining, minimum wage, limitations on working hours, protection from unsafe and unhealthy working conditions, protection from forced and compulsory labor, and protection of children and young people. This list reflects an array of internationally recognized labor rights and closely corresponds with the standards identified in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. A simple analysis demonstrates the utility of the dataset and showcases some of the ways it might be used as a powerful tool in the scientific study of labor rights specifically, and human rights more generally. Presentamos nuevos datos sobre leyes y prácticas laborales para todos los países del mundo. Estos datos se registraron anualmente desde 1994 hasta 2010. El conjunto de datos abarca siete normas laborales diferentes. Se trata de la libertad de asociación, la negociación colectiva, el salario mínimo, la limitación de la jornada laboral, la protección contra las condiciones de trabajo inseguras e insalubres, la protección contra el trabajo forzado y obligatorio, y la protección de los niños y los jóvenes. Esta lista incluye una serie de derechos laborales reconocidos internacionalmente y se corresponde estrechamente con las normas identificadas en la Declaración sobre los Principios y Derechos Fundamentales en el Trabajo de la OIT de 1998. Mediante un sencillo análisis, se demuestra la utilidad del conjunto de datos y se muestran algunas de las formas en que podría utilizarse como una herramienta eficaz en el estudio científico de los derechos laborales en particular, y de los derechos humanos en general. Nous présentons de nouvelles données sur les lois et pratiques du travail pour tous les pays du monde qui ont été enregistrées annuellement de 1994 à 2010. Le jeu de données couvre sept normes du travail différentes. Elles comprennent la liberté syndicale, les négociations collectives, le salaire minimum, la limitation du temps de travail, la protection contre les conditions de travail dangereuses et insalubres, la protection contre le travail forcé et obligatoire et la protection des enfants et des jeunes. Cette liste reflète toute une série de droits du travail internationalement reconnus et correspond étroitement aux normes identifiées dans la Déclaration de l’OIT relative aux principes et droits fondamentaux au travail de 1998. Une analyse simple démontre l’utilité de ce jeu de données et présente certaines des façons dont il pourrait être utilisé en tant qu’outil puissant dans l’étude scientifique des droits du travail en particulier, et des droits de l’homme de manière plus générale.
Previous research indicates that a lack of state capacity is a key determinant of internal armed conflict. Scholars identify several internal dimensions of state capacity, but have yet to explore how international finance influences state resources. This is surprising because sovereign lending has increased dramatically in recent decades and plays an increasing role in the functioning of developed and developing governments. In this article, we explore this relationship between a state’s integration into global credit markets and its subsequent capacity to promote domestic stability. We argue that international capital increases a state’s ability to respond to internal opposition because states with favorable credit terms can expand their resource base beyond domestic constraints to deter, accommodate, or repress opposition while maintaining a level provision of resources to their political base. We examine the influence that both capital access and credit terms have on the risk of civil conflict in 141 countries from 1981 to 2007. Our empirical results indicate that states with affordable credit access are indeed less likely to experience civil conflict.