This article examines the neighborhood effects of various activities of human rights international nongovernmental organizations (human rights INGOs or, as used hereafter, HROs). We argue that the presence of HRO members or volunteers “next door” increases the advocacy mobilization and resources of a domestic population, resulting in improvements in human rights performance. When contiguous countries have large numbers of HRO members within their borders, these members are able to mobilize resources that are either directly transmitted across borders or diffuse across state boundaries. Using spatial econometric techniques in a sample of 117 states from 1994 to 2003, we examine the effect of neighboring HRO membership, permanent location presence, and shaming on the probability of improvements in human rights practices. We find that the presence of neighboring HRO members increases the probability of human rights improvements, but that this is conditional on the ability of the groups to freely move across borders
22 January 2016 in British Journal of Political Science
Leaders are assumed to face fiscal constraints on their ability to remain in office by competitively distributing public and/or private goods. However, many leaders can relax this constraint by borrowing on sovereign credit markets. This article argues that states with the fiscal flexibility offered by favorable credit terms have the resources necessary to (1) respond to citizen demands with policies other than widespread repression and (2) avoid agency loss that may result in unauthorized repression by state agents. Empirical analyses indicate that creditworthy states have greater respect for physical integrity rights and are less likely to suffer diminished respect for those rights when facing violent dissent or negative shocks to government revenues.
US noninvasion troops deployed abroad often try to promote greater respect for human rights in the host country. The host country, having an incentive to retain the troop presence, may choose to comply with these requests. We argue that this effect will not be at play in states with high security salience for the United States (US) (for which the US may not be able to credibly threaten to remove the troops). In these cases, US deployments will provide the leader with security from both internal and external threats that is independent of the local population’s support for the leader. Host state leaders thus become less reliant on (and potentially less responsive to) their local populations, which in turn may lead to increased human rights violations. In this article, we use data on both US troop deployments abroad and on human rights violations to test these arguments from 1982 to 2005.
Information transparency is frequently heralded as a positive regime feature. However, does information transparency produce negative side effects such as increased terrorist activity? We theorize that freer transmission of information creates opportunities for radical dissidents to employ political violence to draw attention to their agendas. We build a theoretical argument connecting external (international) transparency to increases in transnational terrorism, and internal (domestic) transparency to increases in domestic terrorism. We find empirical support for our theory by analyzing the effects of measures of transparency on counts of terrorist attacks in as many as 144 countries for time periods as long as 1970 to 2006.