In daily life we often interact with moving objects in tasks that involve analyzing visual motion, like catching a ball. To do so successfully we track objects with our gaze, using a combination of smooth pursuit and saccades. Previous work has shown that the occurrence and direction of corrective saccades leads to changes in the perceived velocity of moving objects. Here we investigate whether such changes lead to equivalent biases in interception. Participants had to track moving targets with their gaze, and in separate sessions either judge the targets’ velocities or intercept them by tapping on them. We separated trials in which target movements were tracked with pure pursuit from trials in which identical target movements were tracked with a combination of pursuit and corrective saccades. Our results show that interception errors are shifted in accordance with the observed influence of corrective saccades on velocity judgments. Furthermore, while the time at which corrective saccades occurred did not affect velocity judgments, it did influence their effect in the interception task. Corrective saccades around 100 ms before the tap had a stronger effect on the endpoint error than earlier saccades. This might explain why participants made earlier corrective saccades in the interception task.
It is known that people can learn to deal with delays between their actions and the consequences of such actions. We wondered whether they do so by adjusting their anticipations about the sensory consequences of their actions or whether they simply learn to move in certain ways when performing specific tasks. To find out, we examined details of how people learn to intercept a moving target with a cursor that follows the hand with a delay and examined the transfer of learning between this task and various other tasks that require temporal precision. Subjects readily learned to intercept the moving target with the delayed cursor. The compensation for the delay generalized across modifications of the task, so subjects did not simply learn to move in a certain way in specific circumstances. The compensation did not generalize to completely different timing tasks, so subjects did not generally expect the consequences of their motor commands to be delayed. We conclude that people specifically learn to control the delayed visual consequences of their actions to perform certain tasks.
Many actions involve limb movements towards a target. Visual and proprioceptive estimates are available online, and by optimally combining (Ernst and Banks, 2002) both modalities during the movement, the system can increase the precision of the hand estimate. The notion that both sensory modalities are integrated is also motivated by the intuition that we do not consciously perceive any discrepancy between the felt and seen hand’s positions. This coherence as a result of integration does not necessarily imply realignment between the two modalities (Smeets et al., 2006). For example, the two estimates (visual and proprioceptive) might be different without either of them (e.g. proprioception) ever being adjusted after recovering the other (e.g. vision). The implication that the felt and seen positions might be different has a temporal analog. Because the actual feedback from the hand at a given instantaneous position reaches brain areas at different times for proprioception and vision (shorter for proprioception), the corresponding instantaneous unisensory position estimates will be different, with the proprioceptive one being ahead of the visual one. Based on the assumption that the system integrates optimally and online the available evidence from both senses, we introduce a temporal mechanism that explains the reported overestimation of hand positions when vision is occluded for active and passive movements (Gritsenko et al., 2007) without the need to resort to initial feedforward estimates (Wolpert et al., 1995). We set up hypotheses to test the validity of the model, and we contrast simulation-based predictions with empirical data.
Humans time their interceptive actions with remarkable precision. This daily-life performance is far too good to be explained by reported experimental perceptual estimates of when an object will arrive at the interception location. One option is that people use general principles to reduce variability such as integrating early estimates from predictive mechanisms with late estimates from online vision. Here we explore this possibility by presenting virtual balls that people had to catch and compared 3 conditions: early, late, and full vision of a parabolic path. If people integrate these different estimates, the precision of the timing under full vision should be higher than when only late vision is available. We tested this hypothesis and found a benefit for full vision, but only for those (steeper) trajectories in which early and late estimates are likely based on different cues. Overall, the integration of the different estimates of the impending interceptive event was optimal and can help explain the observed high temporal precision in many daily-life situations. Finally, by revealing the situations in which people do not take into account early predictions and rely on online visual information only we elucidate the theoretical controversy between predictive versus online control of timed actions.
There are two main anatomically and physiologically defined visual pathways connecting the primary visual cortex with higher visual areas: the ventral and the dorsal pathway. The influential two-visual-systems hypothesis postulates that visual attributes are analyzed differently for different functions: in the dorsal pathway visual information is analyzed to guide actions, whereas in the ventral pathway visual information is analyzed for perceptual judgments. We here show that a person who cannot identify objects due to an extensive bilateral ventral brain lesion is able to judge the velocity at which an object moves. Moreover, both his velocity judgements and his interceptive actions are as susceptible to a motion illusion as those of people without brain lesions. These findings speak in favor of the idea that dorsal structures process information about attributes such as velocity, irrespective of whether such information is used for perceptual judgments or to guide actions.