In the future, humans are likely to be exposed to environments with altered gravity conditions, be it only visually (Virtual and Augmented Reality), or visually and bodily (space travel). As visually and bodily perceived gravity as well as an interiorized representation of earth gravity are involved in a series of tasks, such as catching, grasping, body orientation estimation and spatial inferences, humans will need to adapt to these new gravity conditions. Performance under earth gravity discrepant conditions has been shown to be relatively poor, and few studies conducted in gravity adaptation are rather discouraging. Especially in VR on earth, conflicts between bodily and visual gravity cues seem to make a full adaptation to visually perceived earth-discrepant gravities nearly impossible, and even in space, when visual and bodily cues are congruent, adaptation is extremely slow. We invoke a Bayesian framework for gravity related perceptual processes, in which earth gravity holds the status of a so called “strong prior”. As other strong priors, the gravity prior has developed through years and years of experience in an earth gravity environment. For this reason, the reliability of this representation is extremely high and overrules any sensory information to its contrary. While also other factors such as the multisensory nature of gravity perception need to be taken into account, we present the strong prior account as a unifying explanation for empirical results in gravity perception and adaptation to earth-discrepant gravities.
1 January 2007 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
The authors argue that human sequential learning is often but not always characterized by a shift from stimulus- to plan-based action control. To diagnose this shift, they manipulated the frequency of 1st-order transitions in a repeated manual left-right sequence, assuming that performance is sensitive to frequency-induced biases under stimulus- but not plan-based control. Indeed, frequency biases tended to disappear with practice, but only for explicit learners. This tendency was facilitated by visual-verbal target stimuli, response-contingent sounds, and intentional instructions and hampered by auditory (but not visual) noise. Findings are interpreted within an event-coding model of action control, which holds that plans for sequences of discrete actions are coded phonetically, integrating order and relative timing. The model distinguishes between plan acquisition, linked to explicit knowledge, and plan execution, linked to the action control mode.
Fast interceptive actions, such as catching a ball, rely upon accurate and precise information from vision. Recent models rely on flexible combinations of visual angle and its rate of expansion of which the tau parameter is a specific case. When an object approaches an observer, however, its trajectory may introduce bias into tau-like parameters that render these computations unacceptable as the sole source of information for actions. Here we show that observer knowledge of object size influences their action timing, and known size combined with image expansion simplifies the computations required to make interceptive actions and provides a route for experience to influence interceptive action.
It is known that people can learn to deal with delays between their actions and the consequences of such actions. We wondered whether they do so by adjusting their anticipations about the sensory consequences of their actions or whether they simply learn to move in certain ways when performing specific tasks. To find out, we examined details of how people learn to intercept a moving target with a cursor that follows the hand with a delay and examined the transfer of learning between this task and various other tasks that require temporal precision. Subjects readily learned to intercept the moving target with the delayed cursor. The compensation for the delay generalized across modifications of the task, so subjects did not simply learn to move in a certain way in specific circumstances. The compensation did not generalize to completely different timing tasks, so subjects did not generally expect the consequences of their motor commands to be delayed. We conclude that people specifically learn to control the delayed visual consequences of their actions to perform certain tasks.
Many actions involve limb movements towards a target. Visual and proprioceptive estimates are available online, and by optimally combining (Ernst and Banks, 2002) both modalities during the movement, the system can increase the precision of the hand estimate. The notion that both sensory modalities are integrated is also motivated by the intuition that we do not consciously perceive any discrepancy between the felt and seen hand’s positions. This coherence as a result of integration does not necessarily imply realignment between the two modalities (Smeets et al., 2006). For example, the two estimates (visual and proprioceptive) might be different without either of them (e.g. proprioception) ever being adjusted after recovering the other (e.g. vision). The implication that the felt and seen positions might be different has a temporal analog. Because the actual feedback from the hand at a given instantaneous position reaches brain areas at different times for proprioception and vision (shorter for proprioception), the corresponding instantaneous unisensory position estimates will be different, with the proprioceptive one being ahead of the visual one. Based on the assumption that the system integrates optimally and online the available evidence from both senses, we introduce a temporal mechanism that explains the reported overestimation of hand positions when vision is occluded for active and passive movements (Gritsenko et al., 2007) without the need to resort to initial feedforward estimates (Wolpert et al., 1995). We set up hypotheses to test the validity of the model, and we contrast simulation-based predictions with empirical data.