Water rights trading is an effective way to optimize the allocation of water resources. However, the existing practice of water rights trading in China lacks any consideration of the practical value of the exchanged water. This deficiency may lead to disputes between transferor and transferee during the implementation of the water rights trading contract. This paper puts forward the concept of Standard Water (SW). First, getting the original value of exchanged water by the shadow price model based on input-output table; Second, based on the original value, building the economic profits or costs model to obtain the practical value of exchanged water; Third, establishing SW quantity measurement model according to the principle of rewarding excellence and punishing inferiority, so as to convert the water quantity of exchanged water into SW quantity. With the standardization method, this paper takes the water rights transaction between Dongyang City and Yiwu City in 2000 as an example to carry out case study, and provides policy recommendations. The results show that when the contract requires the provision of 49.999 million m³ water of Class I the quality, if the exchanged water quality provided is in Class II-V, the corresponding SW will be decreased to 48.699–37.399 million m³. The application of this research will be conducive to ensuring the fairness and durability of the water rights trading processes.

The initial emission rights allocation is the key measure to achieve the goal of total amount control and deepen the emission trading system. Although many studies have focused on the modeling of initial emission rights allocation, such as using game theory and multi-objective optimization methods, few studies have observed the hierarchical relationship of mutual interference and restriction between watershed management agency and local governments in each subarea during allocation. This relationship directly affects the rationality of the results of regional emission rights allocation. In this study, a leader-follower hierarchical decision model (LFHDM) for allocating initial emission rights in a basin is developed. Based on the bilevel programming approach, the model simulates the interactive decision-making process between the watershed management agency of the upper-level model (LFHDM-U) and the local government of the lower-level model (LFHDM-L) in the allocation under total amount control. A case study of China’s Yellow River Basin is conducted to demonstrate the feasibility and practicality of the model. Findings reveal that, compared with the single-level model, the developed LFHDM has higher satisfaction with the allocation scheme. Under different scenarios, the overall satisfaction of the configuration schemes of COD and NH₃-N in each province and autonomous region remains above 0.9. In addition, the allocation volumes of COD and NH₃-N in each province of the Yellow River Basin in planning year increase with the enhancement of allowable assimilative capacity of water bodies, but the interval gap of satisfaction with allocation schemes gradually narrows. It shows that when the allowable assimilation capacity of a water body is low, the decision-making of the allocation scheme needs to be more cautious. Moreover, for the Yellow River Basin, apart from Qinghai and Sichuan, the task of reducing water pollutants in other provinces in the next few years is very arduous. The average reduction of total COD and NH₃-N in the basin is about 48% and 46%, respectively.