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This paper explores the role of social preferences in a competitive framework. More precisely, we study other-regarding strategic models where agents show Rawlsian preferences and, therefore, they care about the best interest of the worst-off agent. The representation of preferences proposed is the most appropriate when the utilities of the agents are vector-valued and their components are not compensable but complementary. In these cases, the improvement of the result for each agent has to be reached by simultaneously improving all the components of the vector-valued utility. Depending on the attitude exhibited by the agents with respect to the results of the others, we distinguish different types of agents and relate them with the parameters of the Rawlsian preference function. An analysis of the sets of equilibria in terms of these parameters is presented. Particularly, in the case of two agents, the equilibria for all the values of the parameters are completely described.
A.M. Mármol; A. Zapata; L. Monroy; M.A. Caraballo. When your gain is also my gain. A class of strategic models with other-regarding agents. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 2020, 96, 102366 .
AMA StyleA.M. Mármol, A. Zapata, L. Monroy, M.A. Caraballo. When your gain is also my gain. A class of strategic models with other-regarding agents. Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 2020; 96 ():102366.
Chicago/Turabian StyleA.M. Mármol; A. Zapata; L. Monroy; M.A. Caraballo. 2020. "When your gain is also my gain. A class of strategic models with other-regarding agents." Journal of Mathematical Psychology 96, no. : 102366.
The many growing migratory flows render our societies increasingly heterogeneous. From the point of view of social welfare, achieving all the positive effects of diversity appears as a challenge for our societies. Nevertheless, while it is true that ethnolinguistic diversity involves costs and benefits, at a country level it seems that the former are greater than the latter, even more so when income inequality between ethnic groups is taken into account. In this respect, there is a vast literature at a macro level that shows that ethnolinguistic fragmentation induces lower income, which leads to the conclusion that part of the difference in income observed between countries can be attributed to their different levels of fragmentation. This paper presents primary evidence of the role of education in mitigating the adverse effects of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on the level of income. While the results show a negative association between fragmentation and income for all indices of diversity, the attainment of a certain level of education, especially secondary and tertiary, manages to reverse the sign of the marginal effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on income level. Since current societies are increasingly diverse, these results could have major economic policy implications.
Mª Ángeles Caraballo; Eva Mª Buitrago. Ethnolinguistic Diversity and Education. A Successful Pairing. Sustainability 2019, 11, 6625 .
AMA StyleMª Ángeles Caraballo, Eva Mª Buitrago. Ethnolinguistic Diversity and Education. A Successful Pairing. Sustainability. 2019; 11 (23):6625.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMª Ángeles Caraballo; Eva Mª Buitrago. 2019. "Ethnolinguistic Diversity and Education. A Successful Pairing." Sustainability 11, no. 23: 6625.
In this paper we address bimatrix games when the players take into account not only their own payoff, but they also show some concerns about the payoff of the other player. We propose a weighted Rawlsian representation of players’ preferences which can accommodate the behaviours of different types of players, which are identified with different values of the parameters. The Battle of the Sexes game is analyzed in this extended setting where certain social interactions between the players determine their strategic behaviours. The best response correspondences are described depending on the relative importance that each player assigns to her own payoff and to the payoff of the other. This permits the identification of the corresponding sets of equilibria and the study of the changes produced with the variation of the parameters.
Asunción Zapata; Amparo M. Mármol; Luisa Monroy; M. Ángeles Caraballo. When the Other Matters. The Battle of the Sexes Revisited. AIRO Springer Series 2018, 501 -509.
AMA StyleAsunción Zapata, Amparo M. Mármol, Luisa Monroy, M. Ángeles Caraballo. When the Other Matters. The Battle of the Sexes Revisited. AIRO Springer Series. 2018; ():501-509.
Chicago/Turabian StyleAsunción Zapata; Amparo M. Mármol; Luisa Monroy; M. Ángeles Caraballo. 2018. "When the Other Matters. The Battle of the Sexes Revisited." AIRO Springer Series , no. : 501-509.
This paper deals with the equilibria of non-cooperative games where the preferences of the players are incomplete and can be represented by vector-valued functions. In the literature, these preferences are frequently approximated by means of additive value functions. However, other value functions can also be considered. We propose a weighted maxmin approach to represent players’ preferences, where the weights are interpreted as the relative importance of the corresponding components of the vector payoffs. We establish the relationship between the equilibria, the weak equilibria and the ideal equilibria of vector-values games and the equilibria of the scalar weighted maxmin games. The potential applicability of the theoretical results is illustrated with the analysis of a vector-valued bimatrix game where all the equilibria are generated, and it is shown how the resulting equilibrium strategies depend on the values of the parameters which represent the importance assigned to the components of the vector-valued payoffs.
A. Zapata; A. M. Mármol; L. Monroy; M. A. Caraballo. A Maxmin Approach for the Equilibria of Vector-Valued Games. Group Decision and Negotiation 2018, 28, 415 -432.
AMA StyleA. Zapata, A. M. Mármol, L. Monroy, M. A. Caraballo. A Maxmin Approach for the Equilibria of Vector-Valued Games. Group Decision and Negotiation. 2018; 28 (2):415-432.
Chicago/Turabian StyleA. Zapata; A. M. Mármol; L. Monroy; M. A. Caraballo. 2018. "A Maxmin Approach for the Equilibria of Vector-Valued Games." Group Decision and Negotiation 28, no. 2: 415-432.
The increasing ethnic heterogeneity that many societies are experiencing could be interpreted as a detrimental phenomenon, since empirical literature exists that indicates that higher levels of ethnic fractionalization induce higher levels of corruption. This paper aims to show the role of tolerance in overcoming this harmful effect of ethnic heterogeneity. To this end, a sample of 86 countries is tested for a positive association between ethnic fractionalization and corruption. It is then shown that tolerance offsets this effect through both direct and indirect effects on corruption. In order to analyse the indirect effects, the level of income and the freedom of the press are selected as channels, since these represent two determinants of corruption that are linked to tolerance. Moreover, tolerance and corruption have been modelled as composites. Consequently, partial least squares path modelling has been used. For our sample, an index of tolerance towards immigrants and people of different race and an index of corruption are constructed, for which several sources are jointly utilised. Our results appear to indicate that the adverse effect of ethnic fractionalization on corruption is offset by tolerance, which reduces corruption not only directly but also indirectly through the level of income and the freedom of the press.
Eva Mª Buitrago; Mª Ángeles Caraballo; José L. Roldán. Do Tolerant Societies Demand Better Institutions? Social Indicators Research 2018, 143, 1161 -1184.
AMA StyleEva Mª Buitrago, Mª Ángeles Caraballo, José L. Roldán. Do Tolerant Societies Demand Better Institutions? Social Indicators Research. 2018; 143 (3):1161-1184.
Chicago/Turabian StyleEva Mª Buitrago; Mª Ángeles Caraballo; José L. Roldán. 2018. "Do Tolerant Societies Demand Better Institutions?" Social Indicators Research 143, no. 3: 1161-1184.
In this paper we investigate a model of duopolistic competition in an uncertain environment where the attitudes of the firms towards uncertainty are incorporated. In particular, we analyze an extension of a Cournot duopoly in which the firms face a different market demand in each of two scenarios, and make their output decisions before uncertainty is resolved. The way in which firms value the possible outcomes is critical when deciding their strategies. In real-life situations the attitudes that agents exhibit can vary from extreme pessimism to extreme optimism, and it is possible to characterize their behavior according to their degrees of optimism. In this context, we identify the sets of equilibria for the full range of degrees of optimism, and illustrate the results with the analysis of some cases in which the demand functions are linear.
A. Zapata; M. A. Caraballo; L. Monroy; Amparo Mármol. Hurwicz’s criterion and the equilibria of duopoly models. Central European Journal of Operations Research 2017, 27, 937 -952.
AMA StyleA. Zapata, M. A. Caraballo, L. Monroy, Amparo Mármol. Hurwicz’s criterion and the equilibria of duopoly models. Central European Journal of Operations Research. 2017; 27 (4):937-952.
Chicago/Turabian StyleA. Zapata; M. A. Caraballo; L. Monroy; Amparo Mármol. 2017. "Hurwicz’s criterion and the equilibria of duopoly models." Central European Journal of Operations Research 27, no. 4: 937-952.
In this paper, we address duopolistic competition when the firms have to assess the results of the interaction at different scenarios. Specifically, we consider the case in which the scenarios are identified with several states of nature and, therefore, the firms face uncertainty on their results. The probability of occurrence of the scenarios is unknown by the firms and they make their output decision before uncertainty is resolved. Within this framework, we analyze competition between firms when these firms exhibit extreme and neutral attitudes toward uncertainty with respect to the final profits. For the variety of cases that can occur, we characterize the sets of equilibria, and provide procedures to determine them. The analysis proposed can also be applied to study situations in a deterministic setting with simultaneous multiple scenarios, and to the analysis of multiple criteria duopolistic competition.
L. Monroy; M.A. Caraballo; A.M. Mármol. Duopolistic competition with multiple scenarios and different attitudes toward uncertainty. International Transactions in Operational Research 2017, 25, 941 -961.
AMA StyleL. Monroy, M.A. Caraballo, A.M. Mármol. Duopolistic competition with multiple scenarios and different attitudes toward uncertainty. International Transactions in Operational Research. 2017; 25 (3):941-961.
Chicago/Turabian StyleL. Monroy; M.A. Caraballo; A.M. Mármol. 2017. "Duopolistic competition with multiple scenarios and different attitudes toward uncertainty." International Transactions in Operational Research 25, no. 3: 941-961.
The relationship between income inequality and economic growth is estimated using dynamic panel estimation on a sample covering 112 emerging countries for the period 1980–2014. The results show that income inequality has a positive influence on economic growth for richer countries, in line with the classic theory, and a negative effect for poorer countries, as argued by the political economy approach. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Mª. Ángeles Caraballo; Carlos Dabús; Fernando DelBianco. Income Inequality and Economic Growth Revisited. A Note. Journal of International Development 2017, 29, 1025 -1029.
AMA StyleMª. Ángeles Caraballo, Carlos Dabús, Fernando DelBianco. Income Inequality and Economic Growth Revisited. A Note. Journal of International Development. 2017; 29 (7):1025-1029.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMª. Ángeles Caraballo; Carlos Dabús; Fernando DelBianco. 2017. "Income Inequality and Economic Growth Revisited. A Note." Journal of International Development 29, no. 7: 1025-1029.
This paper deals with the equilibria of games when the agents have multiple objectives and, therefore, their utilities cannot be represented by a single value, but by a vector containing the various dimensions of the utility. Our approach allows the incorporation of partial information about the preferences of the agents into the model, and permits the identification of the set of equilibria in accordance with this information. We also propose an additional conservative criterion which can be applied in this framework in order to predict the results of interaction. The potential application of the theoretical results is shown with an analysis of a mixed oligopoly in which the agents value additional objectives other than their own benefit. These objectives are related to social welfare and to the profit of the industry. The flexibility of our approach provides a general theoretical framework for the analysis of a wide range of strategic economic models.
Amparo M. Mármol; Luisa Monroy; M. Ángeles Caraballo; Asunción Zapata. Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly. Theory and Decision 2017, 83, 365 -383.
AMA StyleAmparo M. Mármol, Luisa Monroy, M. Ángeles Caraballo, Asunción Zapata. Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly. Theory and Decision. 2017; 83 (3):365-383.
Chicago/Turabian StyleAmparo M. Mármol; Luisa Monroy; M. Ángeles Caraballo; Asunción Zapata. 2017. "Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly." Theory and Decision 83, no. 3: 365-383.
We present a unified approach to study the problem of the commons for agents with other-regarding preferences. This situation is modeled as a game with vector-valued utilities. Several types of agents are characterized depending on the importance assigned to the components of their utility functions. We obtain the set of equilibria of the game with two types of agents, pro-social and pro-self, and some refinements of this set for conservative agents. The most relevant result is that only a pro-social agent is required to avoid the tragedy of the commons, regardless of the behavior of the rest of the agents.
Luisa Monroy; M. Angeles Caraballo; Amparo Mármol; Asunción Zapata. Agents with other-regarding preferences in the commons. Metroeconomica 2016, 68, 947 -965.
AMA StyleLuisa Monroy, M. Angeles Caraballo, Amparo Mármol, Asunción Zapata. Agents with other-regarding preferences in the commons. Metroeconomica. 2016; 68 (4):947-965.
Chicago/Turabian StyleLuisa Monroy; M. Angeles Caraballo; Amparo Mármol; Asunción Zapata. 2016. "Agents with other-regarding preferences in the commons." Metroeconomica 68, no. 4: 947-965.
Carlos Dabús; Fernando Tohme; M. Angeles Caraballo. A middle income trap in a small open economy: Modeling the Argentinean case. Economic Modelling 2016, 53, 436 -444.
AMA StyleCarlos Dabús, Fernando Tohme, M. Angeles Caraballo. A middle income trap in a small open economy: Modeling the Argentinean case. Economic Modelling. 2016; 53 ():436-444.
Chicago/Turabian StyleCarlos Dabús; Fernando Tohme; M. Angeles Caraballo. 2016. "A middle income trap in a small open economy: Modeling the Argentinean case." Economic Modelling 53, no. : 436-444.
In this paper we analyze competition between firms with uncertain demand functions. A duopoly model is considered in which two identical firms producing homogeneous commodities compete in quantities. They face uncertain market demand in a context in which two different future scenarios are possible, and no information about the probability distribution of occurrence of the scenarios is available. This decision-making situation is formalized as a normal-form game with vector-valued utility functions for which the notion of Pareto equilibrium is adopted as a natural extension of that of Cournot equilibrium. Under standard assumptions about the demand functions, we characterize the complete set of Pareto equilibria. In the second part of the paper, we analyse the equilibria to which the agents will arrive depending on their attitude to risk. We find that equilibria always exist if both agents are simultaneously pessimistic or optimistic. In the non-trivial cases, for pessimistic firms, infinitely many equilibria exist, whereas when firms act optimistically, only those pairs of strategies corresponding to the Cournot equilibria in each scenario can be equilibria.
M. A. Caraballo; Amparo Mármol; L. Monroy; E. M. Buitrago. Cournot competition under uncertainty: conservative and optimistic equilibria. Review of Economic Design 2015, 19, 145 -165.
AMA StyleM. A. Caraballo, Amparo Mármol, L. Monroy, E. M. Buitrago. Cournot competition under uncertainty: conservative and optimistic equilibria. Review of Economic Design. 2015; 19 (2):145-165.
Chicago/Turabian StyleM. A. Caraballo; Amparo Mármol; L. Monroy; E. M. Buitrago. 2015. "Cournot competition under uncertainty: conservative and optimistic equilibria." Review of Economic Design 19, no. 2: 145-165.
Fernando Delbianco; Carlos Dabús; M. Angeles Caraballo. Income inequality and economic growth: new evidence from latin america. Cuadernos de Economía 2014, 33, 381 -398.
AMA StyleFernando Delbianco, Carlos Dabús, M. Angeles Caraballo. Income inequality and economic growth: new evidence from latin america. Cuadernos de Economía. 2014; 33 (63):381-398.
Chicago/Turabian StyleFernando Delbianco; Carlos Dabús; M. Angeles Caraballo. 2014. "Income inequality and economic growth: new evidence from latin america." Cuadernos de Economía 33, no. 63: 381-398.
La curva de Kuznets de carbono ha sido un tema ampliamente estudiado por la economía ambiental empírica y altamente controversial debido sobre todo a sus consecuencias para la elaboración política contra el cambio climático. Este trabajo está dirigido a analizar la relación entre emisiones de dióxido de carbono y producto para un conjunto de países de la América Latina y el Caribe utilizando un enfoque semiparamétrico. Los resultados confirman la inexistencia de una curva de Kuznets de carbono en la región y ofrecen pruebas en favor de un proceso de relocalización de emisiones, verificando la hipótesis del paraíso de contaminadores en los países de menores ingresos. En este contexto, “esperar y crecer” es una solución totalmente inviable para la situación ambiental en la América Latina y el Caribe. En su lugar, surge con urgencia la necesidad de crear una política climática dirigida a adaptar y mitigar los efectos del cambio climático en la región
Mariana Zilio; M. Angeles Caraballo. ¿El final de la curva de Kuznets de carbono? Un análisis semiparamétrico para la América Latina y el Caribe. El Trimestre Económico 2014, 81, 241 -270.
AMA StyleMariana Zilio, M. Angeles Caraballo. ¿El final de la curva de Kuznets de carbono? Un análisis semiparamétrico para la América Latina y el Caribe. El Trimestre Económico. 2014; 81 (321):241-270.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMariana Zilio; M. Angeles Caraballo. 2014. "¿El final de la curva de Kuznets de carbono? Un análisis semiparamétrico para la América Latina y el Caribe." El Trimestre Económico 81, no. 321: 241-270.
This paper studies the relation between inflation and relative price variability (RPV) in Spain during the 1987-2009 period. We find that this relation presents a U-shape profile, and that the optimal annual inflation rate (defined as the one that minimizes RPV) is around 4%, higher than the 2% inflation target proposed by the European Monetary Union. More importantly, this result does not depend on whether the monetary regime is before or after the euro. Hence, the main policy implication is that disinflation efforts to achieve the 2% inflation target result in welfare losses. The key link between inflation and RPV is unexpected inflation, whose optimal level is around zero. This suggests that monetary policy matters: the welfare costs associated with higher RPV can be minimized with a credible and predictable inflation targeting policy set at the appropriate level.
Ma Ángeles Caraballo; Carlos Dabús. Price Dispersion and Optimal Inflation: The Spanish Case. Journal of Applied Economics 2013, 16, 49 -70.
AMA StyleMa Ángeles Caraballo, Carlos Dabús. Price Dispersion and Optimal Inflation: The Spanish Case. Journal of Applied Economics. 2013; 16 (1):49-70.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMa Ángeles Caraballo; Carlos Dabús. 2013. "Price Dispersion and Optimal Inflation: The Spanish Case." Journal of Applied Economics 16, no. 1: 49-70.
According to the relevant literature, monetary policy implications concerning the optimal inflation rate can be derived by examining the relationship between inflation and the Relative Price Variability (RPV). This paper studies this issue for selected Euro Area (EA) countries, using monthly data for the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices. In particular, semi-parametric estimations are employed so as to find the accurate form of the inflation-RPV relationship. The results indicate that this relationship exhibits a U-shape functional profile. Furthermore, the optimal inflation rates for the EA, France, Germany and Spain are also calculated. For all countries and the EA, we find that although the European Central Bank’s “below but close to 2 %” inflation target is optimal for the EA average, it is not the optimum inflation rate for the individual counties.
Ma Ángeles Caraballo; Tilemahos Efthimiadis. Is 2 % the optimal inflation rate for the Euro Area? International Economics and Economic Policy 2012, 9, 235 -243.
AMA StyleMa Ángeles Caraballo, Tilemahos Efthimiadis. Is 2 % the optimal inflation rate for the Euro Area? International Economics and Economic Policy. 2012; 9 (3-4):235-243.
Chicago/Turabian StyleMa Ángeles Caraballo; Tilemahos Efthimiadis. 2012. "Is 2 % the optimal inflation rate for the Euro Area?" International Economics and Economic Policy 9, no. 3-4: 235-243.
The methodology applied in this article to the Spanish economy is based on Ball and Mankiw (1995 Ball, L and Mankiw, NG. 1995. Relative-price changes as aggregate supply shocks. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110: 161–93. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]). These authors assume that a good proxy for supply shocks is the third moment of the price changes distribution. The main data used are the monthly consumer price indexes of each region, disaggregated in 57 categories, for the 1993–2005 period. We estimate the relation between mean inflation and the higher moments of the distribution, including several control variables. Our results point out that Spanish regions show a common pattern with regard to nominal rigidities, and that Spanish inflation is vulnerable to supply shocks.
M. Angeles Caraballo; Carlos Usabiaga. The relevance of supply shocks for inflation: the spanish case. Applied Economics 2009, 41, 753 -764.
AMA StyleM. Angeles Caraballo, Carlos Usabiaga. The relevance of supply shocks for inflation: the spanish case. Applied Economics. 2009; 41 (6):753-764.
Chicago/Turabian StyleM. Angeles Caraballo; Carlos Usabiaga. 2009. "The relevance of supply shocks for inflation: the spanish case." Applied Economics 41, no. 6: 753-764.
M. Angeles Caraballo; Carlos Dabús. The Determinants of Relative Price Variability: further evidence from argentina. Cuadernos de economía 2008, 45, 235 -255.
AMA StyleM. Angeles Caraballo, Carlos Dabús. The Determinants of Relative Price Variability: further evidence from argentina. Cuadernos de economía. 2008; 45 (132):235-255.
Chicago/Turabian StyleM. Angeles Caraballo; Carlos Dabús. 2008. "The Determinants of Relative Price Variability: further evidence from argentina." Cuadernos de economía 45, no. 132: 235-255.
M. Angeles Caraballo; Carlos Dabús. Nominal rigidities, skewness and inflation regimes. Research in Economics 2008, 62, 16 -33.
AMA StyleM. Angeles Caraballo, Carlos Dabús. Nominal rigidities, skewness and inflation regimes. Research in Economics. 2008; 62 (1):16-33.
Chicago/Turabian StyleM. Angeles Caraballo; Carlos Dabús. 2008. "Nominal rigidities, skewness and inflation regimes." Research in Economics 62, no. 1: 16-33.
This paper analyses the relationship between inflation and relative price variability, in the direction of the latter, in two countries with very different inflationary experiences: Argentina and Spain. To address this objective, using disaggregated price indexes (the Wholesale Price Index for Argentina and the Consumer Price Index for Spain), we delimitate different inflationary regimes and compute a set of regressions for each country. Our results suggest evidence in favour of the non-neutrality of inflation (mostly in hyperinflation periods) and do not support either the menu costs or the signal extraction approaches. We also detect significant structural changes in the relationship depending on the inflationary regime.
M. Angeles Caraballo; Carlos Dabús; Carlos Usabiaga. Relative prices and inflation: new evidence from different inflationary contexts. Applied Economics 2006, 38, 1931 -1944.
AMA StyleM. Angeles Caraballo, Carlos Dabús, Carlos Usabiaga. Relative prices and inflation: new evidence from different inflationary contexts. Applied Economics. 2006; 38 (16):1931-1944.
Chicago/Turabian StyleM. Angeles Caraballo; Carlos Dabús; Carlos Usabiaga. 2006. "Relative prices and inflation: new evidence from different inflationary contexts." Applied Economics 38, no. 16: 1931-1944.