Asuncion Zapata

Asuncion Zapata

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Asuncion Zapata

Universidad de Sevilla

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
27 March 2017 in Theory and Decision
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
AMAmparo M. Mármol
Amparo M. Mármol
LMLuisa Monroy
Luisa Monroy
MCMaría Ángeles Caraballo
María Ángeles Caraballo
AZAsunción Zapata
Asunción Zapata

12 December 2018 in Group Decision and Negotiation
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
AZA. Zapata
A. Zapata
AMA. M. Mármol
A. M. Mármol
LML. Monroy
L. Monroy
MCMaría Ángeles Caraballo
María Ángeles Caraballo

9 December 2016 in Metroeconomica
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
LMLuisa Monroy
Luisa Monroy
MCMaría Ángeles Caraballo
María Ángeles Caraballo
AMAmparo M. Mármol
Amparo M. Mármol
AZAsunción Zapata
Asunción Zapata

28 December 2017 in Central European Journal of Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
AZA. Zapata
A. Zapata
MCMaría Ángeles Caraballo
María Ángeles Caraballo
LML. Monroy
L. Monroy
AMA. M. Mármol
A. M. Mármol

28 September 2023 in TOP
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AZA. Zapata
A. Zapata
AMA. M. Mármol
A. M. Mármol
LML. Monroy
L. Monroy
Berge’s notion of equilibrium represents a complementary alternative to the Nash equilibrium when modeling socioeconomic behavior and human interactions. While the notion of Nash equilibrium is based on self-interest, as players seek to maximize their own payoffs given the action of the other players, the idea behind Berge equilibrium is mutual support, as given the action of one of the players, all others select their actions looking for her best interest. However, because of the demanding conditions involved, the existence of Berge equilibria is rarely guaranteed. In this paper, we propose vector-valued normal-form games as a unified framework in which to study and extend the concept of Berge equilibrium. Based on the equilibria of the so-called altruistic game, we introduce new equilibrium concepts which constitute different relaxations of Berge’s notion, although they still retain the underlying idea of mutual support. We establish the links between these new equilibria, Nash equilibrium, Berge equilibrium, and other related concepts already existing in the literature. Our approach has the advantage that it permits the incorporation of preference information to identify the equilibria which are consistent with different altruistic attitudes of the players.

1 June 2020 in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AMA.M. Mármol
A.M. Mármol
AZA. Zapata
A. Zapata
LML. Monroy
L. Monroy
MCMaría Ángeles Caraballo
María Ángeles Caraballo