The global maritime industry is continuing the rapid digitization of systems and dependency on advancing technology, in a trend akin to other industrial domains. One of the main issues that this integration has brought is an increased vulnerability to a growing number of cyber threats. While several security measures are being implemented to prevent or respond to cyber attacks, the human element is still one of the main weaknesses. Many of today’s cyber attacks take advantage of human personnel’s lack of awareness, which makes cyber security awareness and training activities of critical importance. Unfortunately, current research is still limited in its offerings for cyber security training specific to maritime personnel. Moreover, such training programmes for the professionals should be developed role-based in accordance with the suggestions of many credited maritime organizations. For this reason, we developed a modular cyber security training programme for the maritime domain called Maritime Cyber Security (MarCy) by implementing Critical Events Model (CEM). Then, we evaluated the MarCy programme by utilizing the Delphi technique with the participation of 19 experts from academia and industry. In this study, we offer cyber security training for seafarers and office employees in shipping companies. We proposed eleven elective modules to improve the knowledge, skills, and attitude of learners against cyber risks. The MarCy programme can be implemented by universities, shipping companies, training institutes, and governmental organizations for maritime cyber security training purposes.
30 June 2022 in International Journal of Safety and Security Engineering
Human preparedness is a critical aspect of critical infrastructure (CI) cybersecurity. Many efforts, including educational curricula and training programs, have been taken at both national and company level to ensure human preparedness in CI incident response. These efforts are usually based on corporate requirements or external guidelines and policies. However, the best practices recommended for these efforts in the literature differ significantly from the measures implemented in CI companies. For this reason, we compared state of practice in cybersecurity awareness and training in selected CI companies with the recommendations in literature, aiming to identify the areas that CI companies need to increase efforts for further security implementations. Specifically, we conducted interviews (n=7) and sent out questionnaires to cybersecurity personnel (n=11) in different CI sectors of Norway. The collected data were analyzed to establish the commonalities, differences, and areas of concern among the interviewees, with respect to certain critical attributes. All Norwegian companies involved in the study offered some type of awareness or training activities to their employees, but these activities varied greatly in the level of maturity. Besides, we noted several limitations in methods and contents. According to many participants, the team skills, communication skills, and managerial skills were often inadequately developed. Additional limitations in delivery methods were noticed, too. Finally, we suggested the solutions from the best practices in the literature, and pointed out the areas where the literature has not provided effective measures.
2 June 2023 in International Journal of Information Security
Current enterprises’ needs for skilled cyber-security (CS) professionals have prompted the development of diverse CS training programs and offerings. It has been noted that even though enterprise staff is now more aware of security threats, the number of successful attacks against companies has all but decreased over the years. Several criticisms were raised against current CS training offerings, which often made them inadequate, or unable to change participants’ behavior and security attitude. One of the main factors CS training programs are often not very effective is the lack of engagement or motivation of participants. This is often the result of training not being tailored to the needs or preferences of participants. In our previous work, we tackled this issue by developing a personalized learning theory-based model for developing CS training frameworks. In this work, we utilize the model to develop two CS training exercises: two game-based scenarios using the CS training video game Cyber CIEGE and one table-top team exercise. The exercises are later tested by involving a group of 12 students from the Norwegian Institute of Science and Technology (NTNU) Information Security master’s degree program. According to the results of the experiment and the feedback from the students, students felt more engaged during the exercises due to having been participants in their development process. This has in turn motivated them to continue using the training tools independently in their spare time. Further research is recommended to establish whether the training development model is adequate for different target groups, as well as better performing than other models when developing full-fledged training programs.
As digital instrumentation in Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) is becoming increasingly complex, both attack vectors and defensive strategies are evolving based on new technologies and vulnerabilities. Continued efforts have been made to develop a variety of measures for the cyber defense of these infrastructures, which often consist in adapting security measures previously developed for other critical infrastructure sectors according to the requirements of NPPs. That being said, due to the very recent development of these solutions, there is a lack of agreement or standardization when it comes to their adoption at an industrial level. To better understand the state of the art in NPP Cyber-Security (CS) measures, in this work, we conduct a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) to identify scientific papers discussing CS frameworks, standards, guidelines, best practices, and any additional CS protection measures for NPPs. From our literature analysis, it was evidenced that protecting the digital space in NPPs involves three main steps: (i) identification of critical digital assets; (ii) risk assessment and threat analysis; (iii) establishment of measures for NPP protection based on the defense-in-depth model. To ensure the CS protection of these infrastructures, a holistic defense-in-depth approach is suggested in order to avoid excessive granularity and lack of compatibility between different layers of protection. Additional research is needed to ensure that such a model is developed effectively and that it is based on the interdependencies of all security requirements of NPPs.