Aybars Oruc

Dr. Aybars Oruc

Computer Science, University of North Carolina Wilmington, Wilmington, Delaware, USA
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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 February 2022 in Information
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Journal Article
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Ahmed AmroAhmed Amro
Ahmed Amro
Aybars OrucAybars Oruc
Aybars Oruc
VGVasileios Gkioulos
Vasileios Gkioulos
Sokratis KatsikasSokratis Katsikas
Sokratis Katsikas
Several disruptive attacks against companies in the maritime industry have led experts to consider the increased risk imposed by cyber threats as a major obstacle to undergoing digitization. The industry is heading toward increased automation and connectivity, leading to reduced human involvement in the different navigational functions and increased reliance on sensor data and software for more autonomous modes of operations. To meet the objectives of increased automation under the threat of cyber attacks, the different software modules that are expected to be involved in different navigational functions need to be prepared to detect such attacks utilizing suitable detection techniques. Therefore, we propose a systematic approach for analyzing the navigational NMEA messages carrying the data of the different sensors, their possible anomalies, malicious causes of such anomalies as well as the appropriate detection algorithms. The proposed approach is evaluated through two use cases, traditional Integrated Navigation System (INS) and Autonomous Passenger Ship (APS). The results reflect the utility of specification and frequency-based detection in detecting the identified anomalies with high confidence. Furthermore, the analysis is found to facilitate the communication of threats through indicating the possible impact of the identified anomalies against the navigational operations. Moreover, we have developed a testing environment that facilitates conducting the analysis. The environment includes a developed tool, NMEA-Manipulator that enables the invocation of the identified anomalies through a group of cyber attacks on sensor data. Our work paves the way for future work in the analysis of NMEA anomalies toward the development of an NMEA intrusion detection system.

12 November 2022 in Sensors
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Aybars OrucAybars Oruc
Aybars Oruc
Ahmed AmroAhmed Amro
Ahmed Amro
VGVasileios Gkioulos
Vasileios Gkioulos
Shipping performed by contemporary vessels is the backbone of global trade. Modern vessels are equipped with many computerized systems to enhance safety and operational efficiency. One such system developed is the integrated navigation system (INS), which combines information and functions for the bridge team onboard. An INS comprises many marine components involving cyber threats and vulnerabilities. This study aims to assess the cyber risks of such components. To this end, a methodology considering the MITRE ATT&CK framework, which provides adversarial tactics, techniques, and mitigation measures, was applied by modifying for cyber risks at sea. We assessed cyber risks of 25 components on the bridge by implementing the extended methodology in this study. As a result of the assessment, we found 1850 risks. We classified our results as 1805 low, 32 medium, 9 high, and 4 critical levels for 22 components. Three components did not include any cyber risks. Scientists, ship operators, and product developers could use the findings to protect navigation systems onboard from potential cyber threats and vulnerabilities.

Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Aybars OrucAybars Oruc
Aybars Oruc
VGVasileios Gkioulos
Vasileios Gkioulos
Sokratis KatsikasSokratis Katsikas
Sokratis Katsikas
The e-navigation concept was introduced by the IMO to enhance berth-to-berth navigation towards enhancing environmental protection, and safety and security at sea by leveraging technological advancements. Even though a number of e-navigation testbeds including some recognized by the IALA exist, they pertain to parts only of the Integrated Navigation System (INS) concept. Moreover, existing e-navigation and bridge testbeds do not have a cybersecurity testing functionality, therefore they cannot be used for assessing the cybersecurity posture of the INS. With cybersecurity concerns on the rise in the maritime domain, it is important to provide such capability. In this paper we review existing bridge testbeds, IMO regulations, and international standards, to first define a reference architecture for the INS and then to develop design specifications for an INS Cyber-Physical Range, i.e., an INS testbed with cybersecurity testing functionality.

3 January 2024 in International Journal of Information Security
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Aybars OrucAybars Oruc
Aybars Oruc
NCNabin Chowdhury
Nabin Chowdhury
VGVasileios Gkioulos
Vasileios Gkioulos
The global maritime industry is continuing the rapid digitization of systems and dependency on advancing technology, in a trend akin to other industrial domains. One of the main issues that this integration has brought is an increased vulnerability to a growing number of cyber threats. While several security measures are being implemented to prevent or respond to cyber attacks, the human element is still one of the main weaknesses. Many of today’s cyber attacks take advantage of human personnel’s lack of awareness, which makes cyber security awareness and training activities of critical importance. Unfortunately, current research is still limited in its offerings for cyber security training specific to maritime personnel. Moreover, such training programmes for the professionals should be developed role-based in accordance with the suggestions of many credited maritime organizations. For this reason, we developed a modular cyber security training programme for the maritime domain called Maritime Cyber Security (MarCy) by implementing Critical Events Model (CEM). Then, we evaluated the MarCy programme by utilizing the Delphi technique with the participation of 19 experts from academia and industry. In this study, we offer cyber security training for seafarers and office employees in shipping companies. We proposed eleven elective modules to improve the knowledge, skills, and attitude of learners against cyber risks. The MarCy programme can be implemented by universities, shipping companies, training institutes, and governmental organizations for maritime cyber security training purposes.

1 January 2022
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Journal Article
Open access
Aybars OrucAybars Oruc
Aybars Oruc
This study seeks to contribute to the literature by presenting a discussion of potential cyber risks and precautionary measures concerning unmanned vehicles as a whole. In this study, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing, jamming, password cracking, denial-of-service (DoS), injecting malware, and modification of firmware are identified as potential cyberattack methods against unmanned vehicles. Potential deterrents against the aforementioned cyberattack methods are suggested as well. Illustrations of such safeguards include creating an architecture of the multi-agent system, using solid-state storage components, applying distributed programming tools and techniques, implementing sophisticated encryption techniques for data storage and transmission, deploying additional sensors and systems, and comparing the data received from different sensors.

Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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Aybars OrucAybars Oruc
Aybars Oruc
Georgios KavallieratosGeorgios Kavallieratos
Georgios Kavallieratos
VGVasileios Gkioulos
Vasileios Gkioulos
Sokratis KatsikasSokratis Katsikas
Sokratis Katsikas
As maritime operations become increasingly reliant on interconnected information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems, ensuring cybersecurity on vessels has become more critical than ever. One of these systems is the Integrated Navigation System (INS), which assists the Officer of Watch (OOW) on the bridge in ensuring safe navigation. The INS comprises several components that may be susceptible to cyber attacks, hence it faces cyber risks that need to be mitigated. Cyber risks are understood differently, depending on perspective. In this paper, we determine the perspective that the research community has of cyber risk, focusing on the INS, and that of professionals representing the maritime industry, and analyze similarities and differences. To this end, we conduct a systematic literature review and interviews with maritime professionals. This study provides useful insights for researchers and professionals seeking to understand the cyber risks of the INS.