Covert communication conceals transmission of messages between Alice and Bob from an adversary, Willie, who tries to determine if a transmission took place or not. While covert communication in a basic, standard setting where all variables are known to Willie, results in the well-known square-root law, when a jammer is present and assists Alice by creating uncertainty in Willie's decoder, a strictly positive transmission rate is possible. In this work, we analyze the case where the jammer is equipped with multiple antennas. Specifically, we analyze the effect of multiple antennas at the jammer on Alice's transmission power and consequently on the transmission rate. We consider both the case where the channel knowledge of Willie is known as well as the case where it is unknown. We formulate several optimization problems for the transmission strategies of the jammer to maximize his assistance to Alice, in terms of maximizing Bob's received SNR and consequently the covert rate. When the channel information is known to the jammer, we show that under an achievable covertness scheme, the optimal strategy of the jammer is to perform beamforming towards a single direction with all his available power. This direction though, is not trivial, since it reflects a tradeoff point between minimizing the interference at Bob and maximizing the interference at Willie. When the channel knowledge is unknown, we show that the optimal strategy of the jammer is either to transmit isotropically to all directions or to the null-space of Bob, where this choice depends on certain channel conditions. This is in contrast to current schemes in the literature. Furthermore, we extend the optimization problems to the case where Bob is also equipped with multiple antennas, and provide insightful results, shown to be asymptotically optimal, accompanied by simulations.

In September 2017, the McAfee Labs quarterly report estimated that brute-force attacks represent 20% of total network attacks, making them the most prevalent type of attack ex-aequo with browser-based vulnerabilities. These attacks have sometimes catastrophic consequences, and understanding their fundamental limits may play an important role in the risk assessment of password-secured systems and in the design of better security protocols. While some solutions exist to prevent online brute-force attacks that arise from one single IP address, attacks performed by botnets are more challenging. In this paper, we analyze these distributed attacks by using a simplified model. Our aim is to understand the impact of distribution and asynchronization on the overall computational effort necessary to breach a system. Our result is based on guesswork, a measure of the number of queries (guesses) before a correct sequence, such as a password, is found in an optimal attack. Guesswork is a direct surrogate for time and computational effort of guessing a sequence from a set of sequences with the associated likelihoods. We model the lack of synchronization by a worst-case optimization in which the queries made by multiple adversarial agents are received in the worst possible order for the adversary, resulting in a min-max formulation. We show that, even without synchronization, and for sequences of growing length, the asymptotic optimal performance is achievable by using randomized guesses drawn from an appropriate distribution. Therefore, randomization is key for the distributed asynchronous attacks. In other words, asynchronous guessers can asymptotically perform brute-force attacks as efficiently as synchronized guessers.

Consider the problem of guessing the realization of a random vector X by repeatedly submitting queries (guesses) of the form “Is X equal to x?”until an affirmative answer is obtained. In this setup, a key figure of merit is the number of queries required until the right vector is identified, a number that is termed the guesswork. Typically, one wishes to devise a guessing strategy which minimizes a certain guesswork moment. In this work, we study a universal, decentralized scenario where the guesser does not know the distribution of X, and is not allowed to use a strategy which prepares a list of words to be guessed in advance, or even remember which words were already used. Such a scenario is useful, for example, if bots within a Botnet carry out a brute–force attack in order to guess a password or decrypt a message, yet cannot coordinate the guesses between them or even know how many bots actually participate in the attack. We devise universal decentralized guessing strategies, first, for memoryless sources, and then generalize them for finite–state sources. In each case, we derive the guessing exponent, and then prove its asymptotic optimality by deriving a compatible converse bound. The strategies are based on randomized guessing using a universal distribution. We also extend the results to guessing with side information. Finally, for all above scenarios, we design efficient algorithms in order to sample from the universal distributions, resulting in strategies which do not depend on the source distribution, are efficient to implement, and can be used asynchronously by multiple agents.

Data collection in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) draws significant attention, due to emerging interest in technologies ranging from Internet of Things (IoT) networks to simple “Presence” applications, which identify the status of the devices (active or inactive). Numerous Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols for WSN, which can address the challenge of data collection in dense networks, were suggested over the years. Most of these protocols utilize the traditional layering approach, in which the MAC layer is unaware of the encapsulated packet payload, and therefore there is no connection between the data collected, the physical layer and the signaling mechanisms. Nonetheless, in many of the applications that intend to utilize such protocols, nodes may need to exchange very little information, and do so only sporadically, that is, while the number of devices in the network can be very large, only a subset wishes to transmit at any given time. Thus, a tailored protocol, which matches the signaling, physical layer and access control to traffic patterns is required. In this work, we design and analyze a data collection protocol based on information theoretic principles. In the suggested protocol, the sink collects messages from up to K sensors simultaneously, out of a large population of sensors, without knowing in advance which sensors will transmit, and without requiring any synchronization, coordination or management overhead. In other words, neither the sink nor the other sensors need to know who are the actively transmitting sensors, and this data is decoded directly from the channel output. We provide a simple codebook construction with very simple encoding and decoding procedures. We further design a secure version of the protocol, in which an eavesdropper observing only partial information sent on the channel cannot gain significant information on the messages transmitted or even which are the sources that sent these messages.

A distributed binary hypothesis testing (HT) problem involving two parties, a remote observer and a detector, is studied. The remote observer has access to a discrete memoryless source, and communicates its observations to the detector via a rate-limited noiseless channel. The detector observes another discrete memoryless source, and performs a binary hypothesis test on the joint distribution of its own observations with those of the observer. While the goal of the observer is to maximize the type II error exponent of the test for a given type I error probability constraint, it also wants to keep a private part of its observations as oblivious to the detector as possible. Considering both equivocation and average distortion under a causal disclosure assumption as possible measures of privacy, the trade-off between the communication rate from the observer to the detector, the type II error exponent, and privacy is studied. For the general HT problem, we establish single-letter inner bounds on both the rate-error exponent-equivocation and rate-error exponent-distortion trade-offs. Subsequently, single-letter characterizations for both trade-offs are obtained (i) for testing against conditional independence of the observer’s observations from those of the detector, given some additional side information at the detector; and (ii) when the communication rate constraint over the channel is zero. Finally, we show by providing a counter-example where the strong converse which holds for distributed HT without a privacy constraint does not hold when a privacy constraint is imposed. This implies that in general, the rate-error exponent-equivocation and rate-error exponent-distortion trade-offs are not independent of the type I error probability constraint.

The principal mission of Multi-Source Multicast (MSM) is to disseminate all messages from all sources in a network to all destinations. MSM is utilized in numerous applications. In many of them, securing the messages disseminated is critical. A common secure model is to consider a network where there is an eavesdropper which is able to observe a subset of the network links, and seek a code which keeps the eavesdropper ignorant regarding all the messages. While this is solved when all messages are located at a single source, Secure MSM (SMSM) is an open problem, and the rates required are hard to characterize in general. In this paper, we consider Individual Security, which promises that the eavesdropper has zero mutual information with each message individually, or, more generally, with sub sets of messages. We completely characterize the rate region for SMSM under individual security, and show that such a security level is achievable at the full capacity of the network, that is, the cut-set bound is the matching converse, similar to non-secure MSM. Moreover, we show that the field size is similar to nonsecure MSM and does not have to be larger due to the security constraint.