Reliable access to electricity is still a challenge in many developing countries. Indeed, rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa and developing countries such as India still encounter frequent power outages. Local energy markets (LEMs) have emerged as a low-cost solution enabling prosumers with power supply systems such as solar PV to sell their surplus of energy to other members of the local community. This paper proposes a one-to-one automated negotiation framework for peer-to-peer (P2P) local trading of electricity. Our framework uses an autonomous agent model to capture the preferences of both an electricity seller (consumer) and buyer (small local generator or prosumer), in terms of price and electricity quantities to be traded in different periods throughout a day. We develop a bilateral negotiation framework based on the well-known Rubinstein alternating offers protocol, in which the quantity of electricity and the price for different periods are aggregated into daily packages and negotiated between the buyer and seller agent. The framework is then implemented experimentally, with buyers and sellers adopting different negotiation strategies based on negotiation concession algorithms, such as linear heuristic or Boulware. Results show that this framework and agents modelling allow prosumers to increase their revenue while providing electricity access to the community at low cost.

The trend of decentralization of energy services has given rise to community energy systems. These energy communities aim to maximize the self-consumption of local renewable energy generated and stored in assets that are typically connected to low-voltage (LV) distribution networks. Energy community schemes often involve jointly owned assets such as community-owned solar photo-voltaic panels (PVs), wind turbines and/or shared battery storage. This raises the question of how these assets should be controlled in real-time, and how the energy outputs from these jointly owned assets should be shared fairly among heterogeneous community members. Crucially, such real-time control and fair sharing of energy must also consider the technical constraints of the community, such as the local LV network characteristics, voltage limits and power ratings of electric cables and transformers. In this paper, we design and analyze a heuristic-based battery control algorithm that considers the influence of battery life degradation, and the resultant increase in local renewable energy consumption within local operating constraints of the LV network. We provide a model that first studies the techno-economic benefits of community-owned versus individually-owned energy assets considering the network/grid constraints. Then, using the methodology and principles from cooperative game theory, we propose a redistribution model for benefits in a community based on the marginal contribution of each household. The results from our study demonstrate that the redistribution mechanism is fairer and computationally tractable compared to the existing state-of-the-art methods. Thus, our methodology is more scalable with respect to modeling the economic sharing of joint assets in community energy systems.

With increasing decarbonisation and accessibility to our energy systems and markets, there is a need to understand and optimise the value proposition for different stakeholders. Game-theoretic models represent a promising approach to study strategic interactions between self-interested private energy system investors. In this work, we design and evaluate a game-theoretic framework to study strategic interactions between profit-maximising players that invest in network, renewable generation and storage capacity. Specifically, we study the case where grid capacity is developed by a private renewable investor, but line access is shared with competing renewable and storage investors, thus enabling them to export energy and access electricity demand. We model the problem of deducing how much capacity each player should build as a non-cooperative Stackelberg-Cournot game between a dominant player (leader) who builds the power line and renewable generation capacity, and local renewable and storage investors (multiple followers), who react to the installation of the line by increasing their own capacity. Using data-driven analysis and simulations, we developed an empirical search method for estimating the game equilibrium, where the payoffs capture the realistic operation and control of the energy system under study. A practical demonstration of the underlying methodology is shown for a real-world grid reinforcement project in the UK. The methodology provides a realistic mechanism to analyse investor decision-making and investigate feasible tariffs that encourage distributed renewable investment, with sharing of grid access.