Ching-To Albert Ma

Prof. Ching-To Albert Ma

Department of Economics, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

28Years (1999-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 December 2007 in The RAND Journal of Economics
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Journal Article
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GBGary Biglaiser
Gary Biglaiser
Ching-To Albert MaChing-To Albert Ma
Ching-To Albert Ma

19 October 2011 in International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics
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TITor Iversen
Tor Iversen
Ching-To Albert MaChing-To Albert Ma
Ching-To Albert Ma

1 January 2015 in Journal of Health Economics
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Journal Article
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GGGeir Godager
Geir Godager
TITor Iversen
Tor Iversen
Ching-To Albert MaChing-To Albert Ma
Ching-To Albert Ma

6 August 2002 in Health Economics
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MLMingshan Lu
Mingshan Lu
Ching-To Albert MaChing-To Albert Ma
Ching-To Albert Ma
LYLasheng Yuan
Lasheng Yuan

1 March 2002 in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
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Journal Article
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Ching-To Albert MaChing-To Albert Ma
Ching-To Albert Ma
TMThomas G. McGuire
Thomas G. McGuire
This paper introduces a theory of network incentives in managed health care. Participation in the plan' s network confers an economic beneé t on providers; in exchange, the plan expects compliance with its protocols. The network sets a target for the number of outpatient visits in an episode of care. A provider failing to satisfy the target may be penalized by the plan' s attempt to direct patients to other providers within its network. There is an equilibrium in which every provider in the network uses the target. We test the theory by observing behavior of providers before and after the introduction of managed mental health care in a large, employed population. Managed care consisted of price reductions, utilization review, and creation of a network. Quantity per episode of care fell sharply after initiation of managed care. We identify a network effect in our empirical work. The results indicate that in this case, network incentives account for most of the quantity reduction due to managed care.

6 July 2008 in International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics
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Journal Article
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GGGeir Godager
Geir Godager
TITor Iversen
Tor Iversen
Ching-To Albert MaChing-To Albert Ma
Ching-To Albert Ma